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SOCRATES AND PLATO

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THE question as to the relation of the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues to the historical Socrates, over which an apparently endless and irreconcilable controversy has raged, is well raised by a passage from Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, at page 28: "Anamnesis appears first in the middle group of dialogues and provides the link between the two Platonic doctrines—the eternal nature of the human soul and the 'separate' existence of Forms, the proper objects of knowledge. The probable inference is that Anamnesis was a theory which squared the professions and practice of Socrates with Plato's discovery of the separately existing Forms and his conversion from Socratic agnosticism to a belief in immortality."

As to "Plato's discovery of the separately existing Forms" having to be "squared with the professions and practice of Socrates," an attempt will be made in this paper to trace the development of the doctrine of Forms from the search for some one common element, existing in and giving meaning to a group of passing phenomena, to the enunciation of the timeless Form as we find it in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*, or as we see it "separated" in the transcendental world of the myth of the *Phaedrus*. Where Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, ends and the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues begins, is an insoluble problem. That the existence of the "separately existing Forms" was a "discovery" of Plato which he found it necessary to "square" with the "professions and practice of Socrates" is a solution which seems to me to draw a line of demarcation more definite than is warranted by our materials. But it should be noted that the doctrine of anamnesis, in its first appearance, has no connection with "separately existing Forms," though it does mark a new line of advance in the inquiries pursued by Socrates in the earlier dialogues.

In the early dialogues we get vivid and obviously life-like pictures of Socrates. In the *Euthydemus*, the *Charmides*, the *Lysis*, and others we find him in the palaestra and other places of public resort—more especially those which the young men would frequent. His discussions with those whom he met there show him not as a teacher having some definite knowledge or doctrine to impart, but as a fellow-seeker. The search is always for the "What is it? What *is* virtue or courage or the good or the beautiful?" It never ends by finding a satisfactory answer, but usually by leaving all the circle in a state of confusion—conscious only of the inadequacy of the conceptions with which they had previously been content. The *Hippias Major* is a good illustration of these Socratic discussions. He plays with Hippias like an angler with a fish, but with the lightest touch—never so as to hurt his susceptibilities or lower his somewhat inflated self-esteem. He is looking to Hippias for help in his efforts to define the beautiful (τὸ καλὸν), i.e. to express its nature in terms of something else, but the solutions put forward by Hippias, or by himself in agreement with Hippias, will not stand a critical examination. So he will have to go home and face again a censorious companion (i.e. his own intellectual conscience) who makes him feel a fool for always talking about "the beautiful" and not being able to answer the question "What is beauty?"—beauty itself in virtue of which beautiful things are beautiful. We are not yet in sight of anything in the nature of an "ideal" theory. The beauty itself (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν) of which they are in search is referred to as a Form (εἶδος). The thing is beautiful when that Form comes to be present to it (ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος—289*d*). But the word in this context does not bear the technical sense of the transcendental Form which it and the word ἰδέα afterwards came to denote. That is clear, because Hippias at once concludes that the Form in question must be gold, since gold beautifies everything to which it is applied. It is to be noted that what Socrates is seeking is not a definition in the Aristotelian sense, but an εἶδος a nature, a form of Being or reality. But is it not reasonable to suppose that, when Aristotle attributes to Socrates, as the main characteristic of his philosophy, the search for definition, it was this sort of inquiry which he had in mind? Out of this, no doubt, was developed the logical conception of definition, but the Socratic inquiry did not take that form. The development can be traced in the later dialogues—the *Sophistes* and the *Politicus*, but Socrates does not hold the stage in these. In the earlier dialogues he is looking for a Form (εἶδος), e.g. in the *Meno* (72*c*), where he says that virtues may be many and of all sorts, but they must all possess one particular Form (εἶδος) by means of which they are virtues.

The discussion in the *Meno* is specially interesting because it leads

to the threshold of the more fully developed doctrine of the Form and its connection with the immortality of the soul. Faced with the eristic dilemma about the search for knowledge, Socrates falls back, as usual, on the "tradition" (τὰ λεγόμενα) of wise men and women of the past and of inspired poets. It may be noted in passing that he often associates women prominently as his authorities for belief in the immortality of the soul. Here their beliefs are adopted as enabling him to maintain that man acquires knowledge, not by search in the vacuum of the unknown, but by bringing out into clearness, in relation to his temporal experience, knowledge which lay dormant in the immortal soul which inhabits him, and which it has to be stimulated into remembering or making actual for him. This is the doctrine of anamnesis or recollection. It is never developed in the dialogues, except in mythical or semi-mythical form, and here it does not appear, as it does for instance in the *Phaedrus*, as directly connecting our knowledge of the sensible world with the eternal world of the Forms. Nor in these early dialogues do we reach a conception of the real thing itself (αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστι) as something possessing independent being—indeed the only real being. That is a later elaboration, and there, as it would seem, we find the explanation of that separation (χωρισμὸς) which Aristotle condemns, when the Form develops from something in the many particular instances to a self-existent order of being beyond the sensible world, attainable only by reason, alone possessing true reality. But that development goes back in an unbroken line to the Socratic inquiries of the earlier dialogues.

The other significance attributed by Professor Cornford to the doctrine of anamnesis is that it covered Plato's "conversion from Socratic agnosticism to a belief in immortality." That the attitude of Socrates to the conception of the immortality of the soul was one of "agnosticism" seems to me to be unsupported by anything that we are told about him. In the *Apologia*, it is true, he is represented as speaking as if it was an open question whether the soul of man survived the death of the body. He deals with both alternatives, either of which would justify his facing without fear a sentence of death from the Court. There was no reason why, on that occasion and in that place, he should declare a definite conviction on the immortality of the soul, which would certainly not have been understood by the audience which he was addressing. Nor, in any case, was it the Socratic habit to announce dogmatic convictions on such subjects. But it seems to me impossible to read the *Apologia* without being convinced that the whole attitude of Socrates towards the issues confronting him was inspired by faith that death was not the end. It is, to my mind, equally impossible to read the *Phaedo* as meaning that Socrates rested his opinion about immortality on the

somewhat halting "proofs" which are attributed to him there. His whole outlook and attitude in that dialogue betray an almost passionate conviction that that day was not for him the last day of life.

In the *Apologia* Socrates declares that the object of his mission, as understood by him, was to turn people from regarding wealth or reputation or high place as the objectives of their lives and to direct them to care of the soul—that its state may be the best possible (29*d*). This teaching rests on the doctrine that the soul (ψυχή), or at any rate, the reasonable element in man, is something beyond and outside the temporal and material objectives from the pursuit of which he wished to turn them. This comes out clearly in the dialogues, as e.g. the *Meno*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*, where his arguments against the acceptance of pleasure or power as the supreme objects of satisfaction lead him directly to a doctrine of immortality, either plainly stated or involved in an eschatological myth.

That the purpose of his mission, as it is put into his mouth by Plato in the *Apologia*, is as it was really conceived by Socrates, and is not merely an ascription to Socrates of Plato's own doctrine, cannot reasonably be doubted. The influence exerted by Socrates on those who were attracted by him, of which there is abundant testimony outside the dialogues of Plato, cannot be attributed to one who was merely a clever dialectician, able to reduce any adversary in debate to a state of confusion, through arguments which (as in the case of some of those attributed to him in the dialogues) are sometimes barely distinguishable from verbal juggleries. He would have been merely a pedant and a nuisance—he admits in the *Apologia* that he was regarded as a nuisance by those whom he subjected to his examination (ἐξέτασις)—but he would have been nothing more. It is quite clear that those who associated with him found in him something akin to inspiration—certainly much more than the pleasure of hearing self-important men reduced to mental confusion, to which, in the *Apologia*, he modestly ascribes the attraction of young men to his company. His influence on Plato is sufficient evidence of that.

That Socrates was a figure of such prominence in the Athenian society of his time was not due to his being a prominent personage in public life. On the contrary, he avoided as far as possible taking part in public affairs, as he admits in the *Apologia*. There is no reason for supposing that his statement there is merely a dramatic fiction of Plato. Nor was it due to his being recognized as the teacher of any philosophic or scientific doctrines. He expressly disclaims all such "knowledge," and in this respect the picture of him which we find in the Platonic dialogues is sufficiently borne out by what we know of him from other sources. That he should have gathered round

him so many associates of so varied types and interests in Athens and from outside, can only be explained by our recognizing in him an altogether exceptional and profound personality. The interest taken in him in his lifetime by the comic poets, the fact that shortly after his death Socratic dialogues and memoirs appeared from different sources—e.g. Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines of Sphettos—is a testimony to the abiding influence of his memory.

That he was known to profess belief in doctrines about the soul which, to the ordinary man, were peculiar, is shown by references to them in the *Clouds* and the *Birds*, to which Aristophanes could have found no point in alluding had they not been recognizable traits of the character of Socrates. There is, for example, his reference in the *Birds* to that place of mystery "where the unwashed Socrates acts as guide to the souls" (*Birds*, 1553). Chairephon the Bat is also there.

The *ἄλουτος Σωκράτης*—the unwashed Socrates—is one of the stock jibes in Aristophanes, based on the complete indifference to conventional appearances which was characteristic of Socrates. The picture which we get of him in the Comedies, and in some touches in the dialogues, is that of a man so imbued with the spirit of search for truth and reality in the shifting scenes of life and action, as to be oblivious of beliefs and habits which to him had no inner significance. To the ordinary Athenian who did not know him he would be merely a figure of oddity—a butt for the wits of the comedians. But his neglect of the conventions and of the pursuits and ambitions of the ordinary man was not that of the cynic or the recluse. On the contrary, in social or convivial gatherings, or in any company of men, he was the centre of interest, and those who knew him well enough to penetrate the comic or repellent exterior found an inner attraction which was irresistible. The speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, in its picture of the contrast between the uncouth exterior and the effect of his talk, even in worldly and frivolous surroundings, can only be understood as a vivid reminiscence of Plato's own experience of association with Socrates. And unless we are to regard that picture as entirely imaginary, presenting a personality which no one who knew Socrates would recognize, we must see in it the portrait of a man whose life and conduct were based on faith in an abiding reality beyond the appetites of the body or the passing scenes of daily life.

The speech of Socrates, as reproduced in the *Apologia* of Plato, is not so much an answer to the specific charges brought against him, as a profession of faith, a justification of his life. Had he merely been concerned about rebutting the actual charges, there was no need for him to have introduced, even indirectly, his views about immortality. That he does so, not directly but tentatively, by repeated reference

to the "tradition" (*τὰ λεγόμενα*), is a personal touch which it is difficult not to regard as drawn from the living man. The whole speech, indeed, bears on its face the impress of the personality of the speaker. There is nothing in it that suggests a set piece composed for the occasion. Nor can it be supposed that Plato, writing shortly after the trial, could have put into the mouth of Socrates words or ideas which, to his other friends, would have seemed quite foreign to the Socrates whom they knew. Some comment on it would surely have survived.

The same consideration applies, with perhaps even more force, to the picture of Socrates which we find in the *Phaedo*, if we accept the *Phaedo* as an account of a meeting of Socrates with his friends which actually took place on the last day of his life. If we regard it as having no relation to any actual occasion, but as a dramatic *tour de force* of Plato, who chose that setting in order to expound his own doctrine of the survival of the soul after death, it will of course afford no ground for any views as to the actual beliefs of Socrates.

With all respect to the acknowledged dramatic genius of Plato, I find it impossible to believe that the *Phaedo* is not intended as the narrative of a meeting which actually took place, and I am not aware that that has been seriously questioned. That it is, or is intended to be, a verbatim report of the actual words of Socrates in the arguments ascribed to him, need not be maintained. But that he should have spent his last day without giving utterance to his convictions about the soul and its relation to the bodily life is not conceivable, and, as I have said elsewhere, what impresses us most in the dialogue is not the attempt to find a philosophic proof for the doctrine of immortality, but the almost passionate conviction which inspires Socrates throughout the dialogue. To believe that the expressions and implications of a belief in the survival of the soul after death, which we find in the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, are not there as a revelation of the mind of the authentic Socrates, but as the characterization of a dramatic personage invented by Plato as the vehicle of his own philosophical doctrines, is to admit that we know nothing of the character and beliefs of the real Socrates at all. We should certainly know nothing which would enable us to understand the picture of the man and his way of life which has come down to us from Plato and others, in situations where philosophical doctrines were not involved, or the "other-worldly" effect which he seems to have exercised over those who associated with him. In this connection an examination of the writings of Xenophon is instructive.

The picture of Socrates which we get in Xenophon's writings does not convey the impression of an intimate knowledge of the man. Indeed, in the nature of things Xenophon could not have had many

opportunities of being in the company of Socrates. The conversations of Socrates which he records, some of which he may himself have heard, relate to the principles to be followed for attaining success in business or agriculture or matters of domestic interest. Socrates is a mine of common-sense advice, with no evidence of interest in any but the immediate material outlook. The tribute to his character in *Memorabilia*, IV, viii, reads almost like a paraphrase of the closing words of the *Phaedo*. Similarly, the provocative reference to him by the Syracusan in the *Symposium*, VI, 6, is merely a repetition in almost identical language of the old jibes of Aristophanes in the *Clouds*. On the other hand, there are references which recall the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, but give the impression of attempts by Xenophon to record some conversation or characteristic which he had heard, or heard of, but had not fully understood. For instance, in *Memorabilia*, III, ix, we have a crude statement of the well-known Socratic thesis that no one is willingly bad, and again, in IV, ii, a discussion of the meaning of justice, with which we may compare, by way of contrast, the opening of the *Republic*. In IV, vii, we find Socrates dissuading from the study of mathematics or astronomy except in so far as they might serve a practical purpose. To go beyond that was useless, and, in the case of astronomy, possibly impious. And yet he is careful to add that Socrates himself was by no means a stranger to the more theoretical side in both sciences. So, too, we find, as it were, echoes of the Socratic inquiry as it is described in the early Platonic dialogues—the search for the "What is it? What *is* the good, justice, the beautiful, etc.," recorded as such questions would have impressed a mind unused to philosophic discussions. In the *Memorabilia*, IV, vi, we are told that Socrates held that those who know what each particular thing is are best able to explain them to others, and he was therefore continually inquiring with his associates what each thing is—τὶ ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων. The answer to the question is sought—in the manner deprecated by the Platonic Socrates—in the citation of particular instances or particular characteristics (ποιόν τι). But the record is interesting as confirming, from the point of view of a man who did not appreciate its philosophic significance, the authenticity of the picture of Socrates which we get in the earlier Platonic dialogues.

Another interesting comparison is the treatment by Xenophon of the divine voice or influence (τὸ δαιμόνιον) which the Platonic Socrates acknowledges in the *Apologia* and in the dialogues. In the Platonic *Apologia* Socrates explains to the Court very clearly the nature of this influence to which from childhood he had been accustomed to listen. Its intervention was always in the nature of a check, warning him not to do something or go somewhere—never a positive urge to action (*Apologia*, 31*d*). In Xenophon's account, this

voice becomes a means of divination (Xenophon, *Apologia*, 13) by which Socrates ascertained the will of the Gods, as others did by observation of birds and otherwise, in regard to undertakings contemplated by himself or his friends. He is represented as a sort of oracle, which his friends consulted to ascertain the will of the Gods, and as claiming to be an infallible interpreter of it. This account strongly suggests a popular version or travesty of a claim of supernatural guidance such as the Platonic Socrates made for himself.

The Socratic writings attributed to Xenophon give no adequate account of a personality which could have attracted and held the interest of men such as we know to have been influenced by and devoted to Socrates. Where he reproduces, as it were, echoes of the Socratic inquiry as we find it in the Platonic dialogues, it is without any gleam of its philosophical implications. These found a good soil in the mind of Plato, but it is impossible to understand that such a line of inquiry should have been started by a mind to which such implication was entirely foreign. There is nothing in these writings to justify a claim for them as giving a more authentic picture of the actual Socrates—his manner of life and talk—than that which we find in the Platonic dialogues.

If, then, it is accepted, as I think it must be, that Socrates's attitude on the question of the survival of the soul after death was not that of an agnostic, but that of a man to whom the conviction of survival was part of his nature and fundamental to his teaching, we must accept the Platonic delineation of him as, in substance, true to life. This does not mean that the dialogues in which Socrates plays the leading part can be regarded as accurate reports of anything that Socrates ever said or ever could have said. It is not necessary to suppose that Socrates ever formulated his philosophical beliefs in any systematic form, or that he ever held a "theory of ideas," even in the fragmentary form in which we find it set forth in the dialogues. Plato's presentation in the dialogues of "a Socrates made beautiful and young," as he says in his *Letters*, no doubt elaborated the philosophical basis of thoughts which were implied, if not expressed, in the Socratic discussions.

How far Socrates, in his conversations, went in asserting the doctrine of Forms which we now have in the dialogues, we have no means of knowing. Even in the dialogues, apart from the *Timaeus* in which Socrates takes no part, it is never presented as a systematic scheme, and in the other dialogues Socrates is made to allude to it not as something new, but as a conception which would be familiar to his associates. In the *Parmenides* (130*b*) Socrates is represented as a very young man propounding to the elder philosophers Parmenides and Zeno, the doctrine of an order of Being apprehended

by thought (λογισμῷ) apart from the world of sense, and he is asked by Parmenides whether he himself was the author of this distinction and whether he held to the separate existence of these forms χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη ἄττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα. To the first part of the question Socrates makes no answer; the second he affirms. In the course of the discussion he is confronted with difficulties as to the participation of many sensible things in the one Form in respect of any quality or relation which may be asserted of them, and also as to the existence of Forms in respect of physical objects of sense themselves. These difficulties Socrates is represented as being unable to solve, but Parmenides declares that to deny, in the face of these difficulties, the existence of one identical Form in respect of each of the particulars, would be to make thought and discourse impossible (135*b–c*). By a sort of dramatic paradox, Socrates is represented at the beginning of his philosophic life as putting forward the doctrine of the Forms and meeting with criticisms which he was unable to answer, and yet on the last day of his life stating it again in as systematic a form as we find it elsewhere in the dialogues, except in the *Timaeus*, with no reference to, or attempt to answer, the criticisms which Parmenides had sent him away to think over.

It seems clear, from what we know of Socrates from other sources and from scenes and pictures in the dialogues which bear the impress of actuality, that, in his view of life, the material things of the sensible world and the desires and satisfactions associated with them, are a meaningless flux, hindering the higher nature of the soul, in so far as it allows its bodily environment to be affected by them, from finding its true life in knowledge of the eternal realities. From that, it is a short step to recognition of a truly real (ὄντως ὄν)—a real essence of the thing (αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστι) not apprehensible by the senses but only by reason, by participation in which, in some indefinable way, the world of becoming can become intelligible in its approximation to the real.

How far Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, went along that way, we cannot know for certain. But it is legitimate to reconstruct the influence which an outlook such as that, without further formulation, would have had on the youthful Plato, and would have inspired in him those visions of immortal imagery, in which, in the *Republic*, the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and elsewhere, he describes the conversion (περιαγωγή) of the soul from its twilight gropings among the things of the senses to the clear day of the world of truth and reality. It is there—in its power of spiritual and ethical illumination—not as an ontological system—that the main interest in the doctrine, as we find it in the dialogues, is placed. In that must have lain its chief interest to Plato, who had a profound distrust of anything like a

closed system of philosophy. Unless we regard the *Timaeus* as merely a dramatic picture of a scientific position which Plato himself had long outgrown, which does not seem to me to be justifiable, we must believe that he continued to think along the lines of the eternal unchangeable "Form" as essential to the possibility of true knowledge, of its reflection in the flux of "becoming" as it emerges into the ordered world of our sense perceptions, of number and geometrical figure as the elements on which the ordered world is built. But in place of any formal exposition of the doctrine, we get the myth of the Demiurge.

It seems clear that Plato's thought, in his later years, did move along the lines of a doctrine of Being in which the Form assumes a logical rather than an ontological significance. The problem of presence or participation becomes less prominent or is left alone, and the mathematical theories of the Pythagoreans are developed in new directions. But the references to his later teaching which have come down to us are too scanty to enable us to form a clear opinion about them. We have it from himself that he never had put and never would put his philosophical teaching into writing.

The traditional view that the doctrine of the Forms originated with Plato, and that the Socrates of the dialogues is created merely as a mouthpiece for the exposition by Plato of his own philosophy, seems to rest on two grounds. In the first place, no account of Socrates which has come down to us, other than the Platonic dialogues, makes any reference to his having held any such doctrine. The second and more important is the account given by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* of the origin of the Platonic philosophy.

The first point may be explained by the fact that Socrates made no attempt to commit to writing, or even orally to expound, philosophical doctrines. He disclaimed any pretension to be a teacher. Further, as Professor Taylor has, I think, conclusively shown, the use of the words εἶδος ἰδέα (which we translate by Form) to denote the real or characteristic nature, was not peculiar to the Socratic dialogues. This is borne out by the references in the *Phaedo* to the Forms in and by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ' ἁὐτὰ εἴδη) as needing no explanation to those among whom he was speaking—indeed as being common usage.

The statements of Aristotle have been subjected to close and critical examination by many scholars, and I do not propose here to examine them at length. In considering them, it must be borne in mind that Aristotle had no personal association with Socrates, and came to Athens as a young man more than thirty years after the death of Socrates. It is difficult to see from what source he could have gained information as to differences in the actual teachings of Socrates from the doctrines attributed to him in the Platonic

dialogues. Indeed, Professor A. E. Taylor (*Varia Socratica*) has contended (as I think convincingly) that Aristotle says nothing about the opinions of Socrates which he could not have got from the Platonic dialogues, and that these were the principal—possibly the only—sources of his information on that point.

What Aristotle says on this point may be summarized as follows (*Metaphysics*, A, 987):

After the Pythagorean system came the Platonic inquiry, which in many respects followed them with some peculiarities of its own. Plato, from his youth, had been conversant with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines of the perpetual flux of all sensible things, with the necessary consequence that there can be no knowledge of them. Socrates was busying himself with questions of conduct, and taking no interest in general scientific questions, but seeking for the universal in ethical judgments and giving his attention to definitions, as he was the first to do. Plato followed this line of inquiry, but held that as sensible things are in perpetual change they could not admit a general term of definition. Plato therefore called the other kind of things Forms, and held that sensible things were apart from these and were all spoken of in terms of these. The many that bear the same name as the Form exist by participation in it—differing from the Pythagoreans by a mere verbal change, because they held that things exist by imitation of numbers. He then goes on to explain how Plato again differed from the Pythagoreans in his putting the duad of the great and small in the place of their Unlimited. He is here referring to Platonic doctrines of which we hear nothing in the dialogues. It is clear, however, that he is referring vaguely to a connection in the Platonic doctrine between the Forms and numbers. Plato, he says, finds the cause of real Being (i.e. of things being what they are) for things in the Forms, and for the Forms in the One (988*b*).

In *Metaphysics*, M, 1078 and ff., he goes over the same ground in more detail. He begins by saying that we must first consider the doctrine of the Form in itself, without connecting it with the nature of numbers, but as it was originally put forward by those who first propounded the existence of Forms. He then again traces the origin of the doctrine to those who started from the perpetual flux of sensible things and who, holding that such things could not be objects of thought or knowledge, posited another order of things, beyond the sensible, which are permanent. Socrates is again introduced as having busied himself about the ethical virtues and as having been the first to look for general definitions in regard to them. Democritus, among the physical philosophers, had looked for something of this sort in material elements, and the Pythagoreans had applied it in a few cases which they tried to express in terms of number—e.g. they asked "What is opportunity? or Justice? or

Marriage?" But Socrates rightly tried to find the real essence of the thing, since his object was syllogistic reasoning, and the syllogism must start from a statement of the exact nature of the thing. Two things, he says, may be justly credited to Socrates—inductive propositions and definition of the universal. But Socrates did not ascribe separate existence to the universals or the definitions—the others did, and gave the name of Forms to that order of existence. He repeats this criticism at *Metaphysics*, M, 1086—that those who hold the doctrine of Forms make them at the same time universals and again separate substances as individuals. He repeats that it was Socrates who started this doctrine by his definitions, but he did not attribute to them separate existence from the particulars, and in this he was right.

What, we may ask, are we to understand by this "definition" which Aristotle ascribes to Socrates and regards as the starting-point of the doctrine of Forms? We know of no source other than the Platonic dialogues, or possibly the traditions of the Academy, from which Aristotle could have learned about the Socratic search for "definition." Nowhere in these dialogues is there any indication that Socrates sought for or understood definition in the sense in which we find it in the Aristotelian logic. We find an approach to it in the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, but these are later and not Socratic dialogues. The question to which Socrates is represented, in the earlier dialogues, as pressing for an answer is not to be satisfied by logical definition by genus and differentia. It is "What is Justice or Courage or the Beautiful in itself, apart from the things in which it is present." In the *Lysis* (217*c* and ff.), where the effect of the presence (παρουσία) of a quality such as "whiteness" is discussed, in the *Hippias Major* (289*d*), where we find expressions such as "the beautiful itself by which all the other things also are adorned and appear as beautiful," we recognize the authentic language of the Form doctrine.

In the *Cratylus*, in which Socrates is represented as trying to find some scientific principle for the origin of names, we get an elementary statement of the Form doctrine. In 389*b* he asks whether the maker of a loom-rod, if he breaks it, makes another looking to the one he has broken, or to the Form (εἶδος) by reference to which he made the broken one. On being answered that he looks to the Form, he proceeds to the further question—whether, in that case, we should not rightly call that Form the αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστι κέρκις—the rod as it really is, i.e. the real essential rod. The actual material ones will differ according to the purpose for which they are intended. But they must all possess (ἔχειν), the εἶδος or form. So, in other passages, he suggests almost playfully that the philosophic doctrines of universal flux and motion may be due to our thinking ourselves into a whirl about sensible things and not recognizing the necessity of

finding somewhere fixed unchanging being. He himself (439*c*) often has dreams of it (ὀνειρώττω), of a real beauty, a real good, which is always such and not subject to change. The expression is suggestive—as if we were to understand that the conception of a world of eternal reality, behind the flux of the sensible world, was one which inspired and was implicit in the "professions and practices" of Socrates, but which he reached dimly and intermittently and never clearly formulated. As stated here, it has no ethical or spiritual signification.

Aristotle was accustomed to criticize other systems in terms of his own, and, when he attributes to Socrates the use of definition, it is permissible to understand that he is applying to investigations such as those described above, a term which, as regards Socrates, was an anachronism, just as, when he says that the object of Socrates in searching for definition was syllogistic reasoning, he is appraising the work of Socrates in terms which are imported from his own logic, and which are foreign to the dialogues and to contemporary forms of thought.

We must conclude, therefore, that the search for definition which Aristotle ascribes to Socrates was, in fact, the attempt by Socrates, in his discussions, to discover the "real thing" as distinct from its manifestations in particular instances, and that, in those Socratic inquiries, we can trace the origin of that doctrine of reality which we find more expressly set out in the Forms of the *Phaedo* or the *Republic*. His examination (ἐξέτασις) was a search for reality, not for logical definition.

How, then, are we to understand the distinction, which is drawn by Aristotle, between the philosophical inquiries of Socrates and those attributed to Plato, or to "those who first propounded the doctrine of Forms"? It consists in the fact that Socrates did not ascribe separate existence to the universals or the Forms, while "the others" did—separate existence—that is—from the particulars. On what does this alleged distinction rest? What is meant by the separation (χωρισμός) which is attributed to "the others" and who were they? On the last question it seems clear from the reference to Plato in *Metaphysics*, A, that Aristotle was thinking of him as included in "the others." Professor A. E. Taylor would solve the difficulty by the ingenious answer that the distinction intended by Aristotle is "between the view ascribed to Socrates by Plato and that which he assigns to the Friends of the Forms (εἰδῶν φίλοι) of the Sophistes" (*Essay on the Aristotelian Socrates in Varia Socratica*, p. 81). It is these friends of the Forms," he holds, whom Aristotle intended to indicate as the real "separators," inasmuch as they denied the possibility of a relationship between the Forms and sensible things. It is difficult, however, to read into the Aristotelian text, sketchy and fragmentary as it is, a distinction between two doctrines based on the

existence of Forms, one of which was held by Socrates and Plato, and the other by others. Interpreted as it stands, with due reference to its context, it seems to deny to Socrates any acquaintance with the doctrine of Forms, and to include Plato among the Separators.

What precisely does Aristotle mean by "separation"? When he says that "the others" gave separate existence to universals, he would seem again to be applying conceptions peculiar to his own philosophy, in terms which could have no meaning when used to describe the philosophical thought of Socrates. His criticism would imply that the doctrine of Forms had grown out of the logical conception of the universal (*τὸ καθόλου*), whereas the historical course of development was in the opposite direction. We cannot, therefore, accept Aristotle as an authority for the opinion, which is often attributed to him, and which on his supposed authority has been widely held, that Socrates sought to find, through definitions, the universal, to which Plato afterwards gave substantial existence as a Form.

The approach to the logical conception of definition is seen in the *Sophistes*, in the process of division or analysis (*διαίρεσις*) as there illustrated. As Professor Taylor says (*Plato*, p. 387): "Thus Logic is here for the first time in literature contemplated as an autonomous science with the task of ascertaining the supreme principle of affirmative and negative propositions (the combinations and 'separations')." The *Sophistes* is a later dialogue in which the leading part, which has hitherto been played by Socrates, is taken by an Eleatic Stranger. The process of "dialectic" there described is the correct combination and division of Forms. The analysis of the conception of "not being" opens the way to the logical theory of predication, but, so far as this dialogue or any other of the dialogues is concerned, it is still undeveloped. As Professor Cornford says (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 268): "No satisfactory account of the relations of Platonic Forms can be given in terms of Aristotelian logic. . . . Plato was not concerned with propositional forms: his Dialectic studies realities and his conception of these realities was radically different from Aristotle's." "With Aristotle," he continues, "the most real things in the world are concrete individual substances, having a core of essential being, together with that material substrate which prevents them from being anything but subject, and a fringe of inherent and dependent attributes. Specific and generic concepts are not primary substances with an independent existence, but abstractions. As a consequence, the higher we ascend in the hierarchy of genera and species the further we are from full reality. . . . Now all this cannot be foisted upon Plato."

But is not this exactly what Aristotle unconsciously is doing in his criticisms of the doctrine of Forms and of those who "separated"

them from the things? He speaks of them as if they had started from the individual substances of his own thought to find the universal of definition, and proceeded to create on that a separate order of substantial being. As he says (*Metaphysics*, A, 990*b*), the result of "the others" (among whom he presumably includes Plato) ascribing separate existence to the universals under the name of Forms, was much as if one were wishing to count things and thought that he could not do it if they were few in number, but would do it by making more of them. But in fact, of course, the Socratic Platonic doctrine of Forms did not envisage them as constituting a separate order of reality over against the reality of individual "things." In that doctrine, in so far as it is ever elaborated as a philosophical doctrine in the dialogues, the sole reality is in the Forms, a supra-sensible order of Being, apprehended only by Reason, by relation to which, however such relationship may be conceived, the world of sense enters, in so far as is possible for it, into the real world of rational order. What authority Aristotle may have had for his statement that Socrates did not "separate" his "universals" from "things," while "the others" did, we do not know. But the Platonic dialogues, the only record we have of the philosophic teaching of Socrates, give no indication that any other conception of "the universal" than that of the Form was known to him, and in that conception the "universal" is not an abstraction from "the thing," but the reality, the *αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστι*—what the thing is itself.

It may be that in that very conception lay the "separation" of which Aristotle complains—the conception of a timeless order of Being which is the true reality above and beyond but in some way, difficult to define, connected with the world of sense. For Aristotle the real thing was the substance, the basis of the attributes in which were expressed the sensible qualities through which it came into perception and knowledge. The doctrine of the Platonic dialogues may well have seemed to him a separation—clothing with independent, even transcendent existence, the Forms which to him were mere universals, secondary to and inseparable in being from an underlying substance. In the myth of the *Phaedrus* the "separation" is complete. There we find ourselves in a world where the Forms exist in their own light—a world attainable only by the Gods and by the souls of those mortals who have been purified from all association with temporal objects or desires. But even if we do not suppose that revelation to have been understood in too literal a sense, we may conclude, as has already been suggested, that the Aristotelian criticism of "separation" may be based on a distinction between the inquiries of the earlier Socratic dialogues and the more fully developed doctrine of the Forms as we find it in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. But that does not enable us to draw a definite line, on the one side

of which is Socrates and on the other Plato. If the incomparable genius of Plato has left to us, as a tribute to his master, a system of philosophic thought which, from the scanty information which has come down to us, seems to be beyond anything to which the master himself could have given formal expression, the tribute remains as a testimony to the inspiration which Plato and others drew from their association with Socrates.

Plato was attracted to the theory of Forms as disclosing a supersensible reality, in which the mind of man, or the reason which is its governing principle, could find itself at home, in harmony with the ordered government of the universe. He will not go so far with it—as some apparently did—as to find a Form or eternal counterpart for every general concept, or every class of natural objects. Whenever he is brought up against that, as a necessary application of the doctrine, he turns away from it, as he makes the young Socrates do in his argument with Parmenides and Zeno. But he will not, on that account, abandon the conception of a timeless eternal reality, which can alone give meaning to the pursuit of knowledge by the soul of man, and to its aspirations for abiding values beyond the flux of bodily pleasures and material satisfactions. Nor, on the other hand, will he leave the Forms in some transcendental existence, outside the sensible world, and inaccessible to it, as in the *Sophistes* he accuses the "friends of the Forms" of doing. It is by participation in, or by the presence in it, of the Forms that the world of sense attains to that degree of reality and objectification that we find in it. But he gives no systematic explanation of that "participation" or "presence"—in what it consists or how it takes place. We are carried over that crucial difficulty on the wings of the myth.

We cannot say with any certainty—indeed the probabilities are the other way—that Socrates developed this conception of reality as we find it in the dialogues. But it is perhaps more difficult to believe that it was something foreign to the mind of Socrates, and that he is presented in the dialogues merely as a mask, through which Plato gives his own thoughts to the world. We have no clear guide to the real relation between them, but, putting at its lowest the contribution of Socrates to the doctrine as we find it in the dialogues, I do not see how we can escape the conclusion that it was in the sayings of Socrates, and in the faith in which he lived, that Plato found the inspiration which led him to elaborate that doctrine as far as he did. Even the poetic and semi-mystical presentation in which we sometimes find it must owe something to that strain of poetry and mysticism which we know to have underlain the character of Socrates.

Plato's conception of the Good, as at once the supreme cause and explanation of the world of existence, can be traced directly to the

light that broke upon Socrates, when he found in the writing of Anaxagoras the assertion that Mind is the ruling and creative principle of all things. It is impossible not to accept as authentic Plato's relation in the *Phaedo* of that incident in the life of Socrates, and of the dissatisfaction expressed by him that Anaxagoras, having attained to that conception, still looked to material causes as an explanation of the whole. Even in the meagre account which Aristotle gives of Socrates, as devoting himself to the search for "definitions," we can trace the beginning of that momentous revolution in philosophical inquiry, which turned it from a search for material causes to an examination of the principles of judgment and understanding.

So far, I have tried to establish the view that the doctrines of the Forms and of the immortality of the soul (which are closely interconnected) which we find in the Platonic dialogues, may be traced, in inspiration at least, to Socrates, though the soil in which they took root and came to fruition was the mind of Plato. The dramatic and poetic form of the dialogues, and Plato's aversion to any attempt at formulating a philosophical system, make it difficult to trace the elaboration in Plato's hands of the doctrine, but the new philosophical impulse, looking for the ultimate reality in Mind or Spirit rather than in material elements, proceeded along two main lines—(1) the immediate successors of Plato in the Academy leading up to the Neoplatonists, and (2) Aristotle.

It is possible, however, in the Platonic dialogues, to follow certain developments of the doctrine, which are evidently put forward as an advance beyond the expositions of what may be called the "Socratic" dialogues. In particular, there are the developments, on the logical side, of the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophistes*, and on the mathematical and scientific side of the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*. In these dialogues Socrates either takes no part at all, or appears in a rôle quite different from that of the earlier dialogues. The *Parmenides* seems to me to mark a transition from the one period to the other. There the youthful Socrates is presented as putting forward the theory of Forms, but as being unable to answer the difficulties raised by Parmenides in regard to the relation between the unique form and the particular things supposed to exist by participation in it. That Socrates should be represented as having been met at the outset of his philosophical career with these criticisms of his theory, as having been unable to answer them, and as having at the end of his life (in the *Phaedo*) put forward the doctrine without any answer or reference to the objections of Parmenides, cannot surely be merely accidental. Professor Taylor, in Appendix D to his translation of the *Parmenides*, offers an explanation which seems to me plausible. He says: "The objections raised by Par-

menides against the 'participation' of sensible things in 'forms' asserted by Socrates, are all formally invalid. At the same time, Plato must have a definite purpose in representing the youthful Socrates as completely at a loss to reply to them. He can hardly mean less than that the doctrine of 'participation,' which had been treated in the *Phaedo* as explaining how it is that we can *know* anything at all about the world revealed by our senses, is at best an incomplete statement which requires to be made a great deal more precise before it really solves the difficulty."

This interpretation gives an added significance to the words with which Parmenides concludes the discussion, in which he recommends to Socrates a further exercise in dialectical reasoning, and at the same time admits that if a man, owing to these difficulties and others like them were to refuse to believe in the existence of Forms, he would destroy the significance of all discourse. One may even be tempted to interpret this scene as depicting, in dramatic form, a turning point in Plato's own philosophical life, when he could no longer resist the impact of criticism on the vague notions of "participation" which we find in the earlier dialogues.

On what I have called the logical side of the development, we have in the dialogues mentioned above the foundations of the science of definition and reasoning as we find it in Aristotle, described as the art of correctly dividing and combining the Forms. On the other side, we see an adaptation of Pythagorean doctrines to explain the relation between the Form, through which the phenomena of the world of becoming can be apprehended in knowledge, and the irrational element of flux and passage which is never wholly rationalized in knowledge.

This is dealt with in detail in the *Timaeus*. Here, as elsewhere, when Plato has to do with "ultimate" things, he takes refuge in the myth, and leaves his readers to follow him as best they may. But there are two significant points: the Demiurge (Creator) uses the Forms as his model, and the process of creation or imposing order on the chaos of becoming, consists of building on the four natural elements, which themselves are rationalized as geometrical figures.

Both those lines of thought—the use of the Forms as models, and the explanation of the Universe as reducible in its rational explanation to mathematical figures, are reflected in Aristotle's description in the *Metaphysics* of the relationship of the Platonic and the Pythagorean philosophies.

The Demiurge (Creator) does not create the Forms. He works to them as models. There is another causative force, which he does not create but with which he has to work—the errant cause or necessity (*ἀνάγκη*). This apparently is meant to represent the irrational

element, which remains after any rationalization of the phenomena of becoming, or any analysis of events into intelligible cause. The Creator cannot force this element into his designs. He has to use it as far as possible by "reasonable persuasion." The other "given" or uncreated factor is the Receptacle (*ὑποδόχη*), sometimes identified with Space (*χώρα*), something only vaguely comprehensible by us—not really rational (*μόγις πιστὸν—νόθῳ τινι λογισμῷ*), but necessary to the process in which the irrational flux of becoming is stamped, as it were, with the element of rationality, the geometrical figures which give to it the capacity for order and measurement.

This is the framework of the myth, not to be taken as a scientific explanation, but as a similitude, in which may be expressed the relation of the eternal Form to the passage of becoming, transformed from mere chaos to a sequence ordered in time, and susceptible, in increasing measure, but never entirely, of rational analysis and explanation. And the basis of this relation is that both the soul and its material surroundings, in so far as these are capable of rational knowledge, have inherent in them the principles of arithmetical and geometrical proportion.

The Creator throughout, in bringing to being this Universe (*κόσμος*) as a self-contained, all-inclusive, eternal living creature, has worked to attain the Good—the "what is best."

Aristotle, after some years as a student under Plato in the Academy, broke away from that institution and from the Platonic tradition. He was, as has been said, definitely critical of the doctrine of Forms as it appears in the Platonic dialogues, though his criticisms sometimes appear to be based on technical, almost professional outlook, rather than on fundamental differences. His method is that of the scientific inquirer, testing his conclusions by an appeal to known facts or to generally accepted principles. I propose to examine briefly his philosophical doctrines as they appear in the *Metaphysics*, with a view to ascertaining how far the Platonic teaching as we know it, ostensibly rejected by him, in reality influenced his thought.

The subject of investigation in the books which have come down to us as the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle is Being, that which really is, the substance or ultimate reality underlying the passage of appearances which we apprehend through the senses and characterize by descriptive attributes or by definition.

He puts the question very definitely in Book K, 1060*a*, where he says: "Must we accept the existence of something beyond the particular things (*παρὰ τὰ καθ'ἕκαστα*) or not? . . . Must we assume that there is a separable substance besides the sensible substances—those of the world we know—or not? or that these are the real things and philosophy is concerned with them?" He ends the discussion by the admission that "such a principle and substance seems

to exist and is sought by all the best thinkers as something that exists; for how is there to be order unless there is something eternal and independent and permanent?" (Ross's translation).

This brings us at once to what is the common ground of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy—the recognition of ordered movement and harmony in the Universe, the regular motions of the heavenly bodies, the phenomena of birth and death in nature through which the individual creature, by reproduction of its type in another individual, strives to attain the eternity of the form, the possibility of moral judgments—all calling for an explanation which merely material causes cannot supply.

Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics*, or as he calls it, the First Philosophy (*πρώτη φιλοσοφία*), is investigating the nature of Substance or Being (*οὐσία*)—that which has real independent existence, not merely as an attribute of something else, that which, in predication, is always the subject. There are various lines of approach.

First, there is the substrate (*τὸ ὑποκείμενον*), the thing in itself, in which attributes inhere. But that will not serve, because a mere substrate is indeterminate. It can only be described as matter (*ὕλη*), and that has no individual existence. It is mere potentiality which comes to be in actuality (*ἐνεργείᾳ*) by association with Form (*εἶδος*). There is, indeed, a passage in Book XII, 1070*a*, where he tries to find a sort of individuality for it, by saying that it acquires individuality by being perceived (*τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι*), but, from the explanation of this which he offers, it would appear that he has in mind his old illustration of the bronze (matter) and the bronze sphere which is made from it. But, while the bronze exists as matter in relation to the sphere, it is not in itself perceptible as matter, except under some determination of form. The conception, therefore, of the bare substrate as substance will not serve.

We then have to consider the composite thing of matter and form, which we know through the senses, especially living things, e.g. the perishable substance which all recognize, such as plants and animals (1069*a*, 30). As Ross states the argument (Introduction to his edition, page cxiv): "In fact of perishable things, it is only those that are 'held together by nature' unified by an inherent power of initiating movement, that are substances." This statement illustrates Aristotle's difficulty in finding his "substance" in the composite thing. The individual is indefinable, and, being material, is perishable. There is a suggestion that, in the case of natural objects, there may be a separate essence, a *φύσις*, apart from the particular individuals—"for one might say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in destructible things" (1043*b*, 21, etc.). "There was reason," he says in another passage, "for Plato's doctrine of forms in the case of natural things (*ὅτι εἴδη ἐστιν ὅποσα φύσει*)

(1070*a*, 18), and elsewhere he refers to nature (*φύσις*) as a form or formal cause, by virtue of which each type of natural object is constant through the individuals that come to be and perish. True, he will not allow himself to be carried too far by this line of thought. It does not, he says, necessarily involve acceptance of the Forms (*οὐδὲν δεῖ διά γε ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας*); after all, reproduction is from individual to individual—Peleus produces Achilles—*ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*. The last illustration, it may be noted, could be used in proof rather than disproof of the need for invocation of the Form.

Then we have the Form itself, from time to time suggested as substance, but again rejected as not having individual existence. It is the capacity for separate existence (*χωριστὸν εἶναι*) which is the main test of substance, and while, as he says (1042*a*), the form in certain cases may be logically separable, it is the composite of matter and form, which alone is subject to coming to be and perishing, which is completely separable. As we have seen, however, the composite thing of matter and form will not serve as the substance for which he looks. His main ground of criticism of those who maintained the theory of Forms was that they "separated" them from things—in other words, assigned to them substantial existence. At the same time, of the three lines of approach to the determination of substance—the material substrate, the composite individual of matter and form, and the form itself, the last is evidently regarded by him as the most promising, though it has the appearance of a mere hypostatization of the universal to which he is uncompromisingly opposed.

Aristotle's conception of the potential and the actual (*δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*) is a notable advance in the formulation of the problem. Matter in this view has no existence, except as a potentiality. We only know it in the composite thing when it has been brought into actuality by the Form. In the composite thing, the matter determines the individuality of the thing or creature, but also its perishable character. The Form is the eternal element but not, in its relation to composite things, an individual—a "this."

But while it is the individual which is the immediate cause of the coming to be of another individual, the actual is prior to the potential, both in thought and time. That the process of generation proceeds from one concrete individual to another does not (as would seem to be implied in some passages) eliminate the function of the Form. On the contrary, the process of generation from one individual to another like itself presupposes actualization by the Form. It is this conception of the priority of the actuality which leads him to discard the old mythologies and philosophies, which placed the beginning of the universe in Chaos or Night or in an orderless agglomeration of

material elements, or in a perpetual movement such as the flux of Heraclitus. Movement and time cannot have come to be or cease to be, and they imply, as their cause, an eternal immaterial substance itself immovable. Thus he is led to his conception of the divine Mind (*νοῦς*) which, as the object of desire and of its own thought, is the source of movement and Being and, therefore, the ultimate or primary substance.

In connection with this conception of Mind, and as illustrative of its relationship to the Platonic philosophy, we may turn to his treatise on the Soul—usually cited by its Latin title *de Anima*—in particular, to his account of the intellective element (*νοῦς*) in the soul of man. That element which thinks and judges is real only in the act of thinking (*de Anima*, 429*b*), but is not blended with the body and has no special organ as the sensitive faculty has. It has thus, he says, well been called the place of the forms (*τόπος εἰδῶν*). This expression, as Professor J. A. Smith says, suggests a Platonic doctrine, though the actual expression is not found in the extant works of Plato. But the essence of the Platonic theory, as it appears in the dialogues, is that the Forms are the peculiar sphere of Mind (*νοῦς*), its own country, and are solely and directly cognizable by it.

This expression, however, for Aristotle is in the nature of an aside. He pursues his line of reasoning about mind. It has no material association, it is itself intelligible, as the objects of thought are, in the case of immaterial objects; the thinking faculty (*τὸ νοοῦν*) and the object of thought (*τὸ νοούμενον*) are the same, as are theoretic knowledge and its object (*de Anima*, Bk. III, 430*a*). Trendelenburg, in his note to this passage, puts it thus: "The mind is an object of thought to itself, so that thought (intellegentia) proceeds not from things but penetrates to things from the thinking mind. The objects of knowledge are either non-material, as e.g. those which fall within the sphere of science or meditation, or they are immanent in the matter itself. In the case of the former, the objects are not alien to the thinking process, but have their place in the actual mind activity. In the latter, whatever reality they have is participant in reason, so that whatever is understood by the mind is found existing there potentially. It follows, therefore, that mind is in itself the power of acting in all these cases—a power not coming to it from the things—on the contrary they, in so far as they have a place in reason, are already subordinate to mind itself."

This note seems to me to be a clear explanation, in so far as a clear explanation is possible, of the argument on which Aristotle based his doctrine of Mind. The precise interpretation of that doctrine has been from the beginning, and is still, a matter of obscurity and disagreement among his commentators. He distinguishes two elements in the soul—the passive and the active mind, related to

each other analogically as the matter which is in potentiality the things in a natural class is to the element which is the cause of their coming into being, as any material to an art which works upon it. The passive mind exists by becoming all things, the active mind by creating all things, just as light brings potential colours into actuality. Mind in this sense is separate (χωριστὸς), impassible (ἀπαθὴς), and unmixed (ἀμιγὴς), being in its essence in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ).

Without entering upon the difficult and controversial question as to the relation of this active or creative mind to the divine mind of the *Metaphysics*, it may be noted that the description in the *de Anima* of mind as an object of thought to itself, must be associated with the activity of the divine mind, which is pure thought of which itself is the object. Further, the analogy of the creative mind to light is curiously suggestive of the Platonic Form of the Good as described in the *Republic*. There the analogy of the sun is used as being the cause, both of our seeing and also of the existence of the objects of our sight. So the Form of the Good is the source, both of our knowing the objects of our knowledge and of their existence and their essence—not being itself the essence or Being of knowable objects, but something beyond that, superior in dignity and in power. With this conception, obscure as it is, may be compared Aristotle's conception of the supreme Mind which is the source of being and thought, desire of which as the supreme good is expressed in the movement of the Universe. In the *Timaeus*, too, it may be remembered, the inspiring motive of the Creator in his ordering of the Universe is the Good.

The work of Aristotle opened a new and wide field of scientific and philosophic inquiry, ranging, as it did, over the whole ground of the physical world as it was then known, and over the activities of the human spirit in art, literature, ethics, politics, and logic. But when he approaches the supreme inquiry of philosophy, and tries to find a reasonable scheme of the ultimate Being and reality beyond the changing phenomena of the Universe, we can trace, as it seems to me, in spite of all his criticisms of previous systems, an unbroken line of development. From the day when Socrates, reading in the scroll of Anaxagoras that Mind is the disposing power in the world of phenomena, found a new light break upon his soul, through the doctrine of the Forms, worked out by Plato, embellished by the magic of his poetic genius and then recast in the refining fire of criticism, through the myth of the *Timaeus*, to Aristotle's conception of the Supreme Being and Good, the object of its own thought, moving by desire of it the living Universe, we have a continuing tradition. It is a tradition which is still a living force among men, inspiring not only philosophic or theological doctrines, but a Way (to borrow the old Pythagorean word) or Life of the Spirit, followed

by those who are not satisfied with material explanations or with mundane values.

If the name of Plato, more than that of any other philosopher, is associated with that tradition, it is because of his profound insight into the needs and aspirations of the spirit of man. It was his conviction, as he states in his *Epistles*, that the highest truths could not be conveyed by the study of treatises or systems, but must pass by a spark of illumination from one soul to another. He has left, in his dialogues, an endowment to posterity which, while it embodies no four-square system of philosophical doctrine, has passed on from generation to generation through the centuries, that spark of spiritual illumination.

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT TELEPATHY AND CLAIRVOYANCE[1]

Professor H. H. PRICE

The founder of Psychical Research, though he has not yet received the honour due to him, seems to have been King Croesus of Lydia, who reigned from 560 to 546 B.C. He carried out an interesting experiment, recorded in detail by Herodotus,[2] to test the clairvoyant powers of a number of oracles. He sent embassies to seven oracles, six Greek and one Egyptian. They all started on the same day. On the hundredth day each embassy was instructed to ask its oracle, "What is King Croesus, the son of Alyattes, now doing?" The answer was to be written down and brought back. The oracle of Delphi replied as follows, in hexameters, as its custom was: "I know the number of the sands and the measures of the sea. I understand the dumb, and I hear him who does not speak." Then it went on: "There comes to my mind the smell of a strong-shelled tortoise, which is being cooked along with lamb's flesh in a brazen vessel; brass is spread beneath it, and with brass it is covered." As a matter of fact, this answer was perfectly correct. Herodotus tells us that "having considered what would be the most difficult thing to discover and to imagine," Croesus "cut up a tortoise and a lamb, and himself boiled them together in a brazen pot." What happened afterwards illustrates the difficulties of this sort of investigation, difficulties which still perplex us to this day. Croesus argued, reasonably enough, that if the Delphic priestess had clairvoyant powers, she probably also had the precognitive powers which she claimed to have. But when he consulted the oracle later about his forthcoming expedition against the Persians, he received two answers, one of which was ambiguous—"When Croesus crosses the Halys he shall destroy a great empire"—and the other correct, but too obscure to be easily interpreted.[3]

After this promising beginning, Psychical Research languished for some twenty-four centuries. It is true that the early history of Christianity, as of other great religions, abounds in stories of supernormal phenomena, including telepathy, clairvoyance, and pre-

[1] A paper read to the Jowett Society, Oxford, on May 15, 1940.

[2] Herodotus, *Histories*, Book I, chs. 46–49.

[3] Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book I, ch. 55. "When a mule shall become king of the Medes," etc. The "mule" was afterwards supposed to have been Cyrus, whose father was a Persian while his mother was a Mede (Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book I, chs. 107–108).

cognition. But, unfortunately, they were treated as topics of edification, not as materials for scientific inquiry. It is true, too, that in the course of those twenty-four centuries there was a great deal of Occultistic theorizing, and a good deal of Spiritualistic practice—notably among the Neo-platonists of the later Roman Empire, during the Renaissance period, and again towards the end of the eighteenth century. It is probable, too, that the witches of the Middle Ages and the early modern period possessed what we should now call mediumistic powers, and even cultivated them in a crude and haphazard manner. But neither Hagiography, nor Occultist theory, nor Spiritualistic practice, nor witchcraft can be regarded as a form of scientific investigation. Psychical Research proper—the systematic attempt to investigate supernormal phenomena by scientific methods—only began in earnest in the year 1882, when the English Society for Psychical Research was founded. (It is interesting to remember that one of its founders was the Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick.) One of its first acts was to carry out a Census of Hallucinations; the results were embodied in a work called *Phantasms of the Living*, by Gurney, Myers, and Podmore, which is still a classic in this field. For some fifty years now the published *Proceedings* of the Society have contained a mass of very carefully sifted evidence concerning supernormal phenomena of all sorts. There are similar societies in other countries. The most celebrated, though not the oldest, is perhaps the French Institut Métapsychique. It publishes an excellent periodical, the *Revue Métapsychique*, to which I shall refer more than once in the course of this paper.

For many years the devoted labours of these bodies made little impression. Official science, with a few illustrious exceptions, was frankly hostile; the educated public was for the most part contemptuous; and philosophers went on writing their books about mind and matter exactly as if supernormal phenomena had never been heard of. But in the last thirty years or so there has been a gradual change of opinion, partly because the mass of good evidence has now become so great, and partly because our prejudices have altered, and we are now willing to believe that even the physical world is a much queerer place than our grandfathers supposed. Most educated people are now prepared to admit the occurrence of supernormal *cognitive* phenomena at least. At any rate they are prepared to admit the reality of Telepathy and Clairvoyance, and even to give a fair hearing to the case for Precognition. Here I think that the educated public is quite right. The evidence for Telepathy and Clairvoyance is both abundant and good; and the evidence for Precognition—the most paradoxical, perhaps, of all supernormal phenomena—is very considerable.

I say that the educated public is now prepared to accept these things. But the philosophers, for the most part, have lagged behind.[1] They do not so much reject them as ignore them. Now this attitude seems to me indefensible. If Telepathy and Clairvoyance do occur—and I see no way of denying it—then surely they *must* be extremely important. For it will follow that the human mind has powers entirely different from sense-perception, introspection, memory, and inference. If Precognition occurs, we shall probably have to revise our theories of Time and Causation in the most drastic manner. Even Haunting raises some pretty problems for the student of Perception. I am afraid there is some truth in the taunt of Professor von Mises. Philosophers, he says, are always on the side of the big battalions; they erect the scientific conclusions of the last generation into *a priori* truths.

I may be told, perhaps, that Psychical Research is an empirical science, and that Philosophy has no concern with empirical facts; they should be left to the experts, whose business they are. It is not the philosopher's job to "give us news about the Universe." Now I confess that I am very suspicious about all these attempts to draw a sharp line between philosophy and other subjects. Certainly it is not the philosopher's business to *establish* the facts; but it may, nevertheless, be his business to discuss them. And if they appear *prima facie* to conflict with the conclusions established by other methods, say those of Physics or Physiology or Orthodox Psychology —and these supernormal facts certainly do appear to conflict with them—it is his business to bring about a reconciliation which will do justice to all sides. Perhaps some of you will object that Philosophy is entirely concerned with language, with systems of notation, and not with the facts or experiences which we describe by means of them. If this be said, I will reformulate my contention as follows. It is part of the philosopher's business—and an important and urgent part of it—to devise a terminology which will enable us to do two things, neither of which can be done at present: (1) It must enable us to classify supernormal phenomena themselves and to talk about them unambiguously and self-consistently; (2) it must enable us to talk self-consistently *both* about supernormal phenomena *and* about normal ones. In other words, we need a unified system of notation which can be applied to *all* departments of Nature, including the queer and disconcerting department which Psychical Researchers have disclosed to us.[2]

[1] There are, of course, notable exceptions: in this country, Professor C. D. Broad; in France, Professor Bergson; in Germany, Professor Driesch. As I have already mentioned, Henry Sidgwick was one of the founders of the S.P.R., and William James took a great interest in its work.

[2] Perhaps this suggestion has some bearing upon Professor Lévy Bruhl's theory concerning the "pre-logical" thinking of savages.

One further remark: those who say that the study of supernormal phenomena may safely be left to the experts, and is none of the philosopher's business, seem to be deceived by a false analogy. For in this field there *are* as yet no experts in the sense intended, the sense in which we speak of experts in Physics or Chemistry or Physiology. All we can say is that some people are more familiar with the facts and others less. When once a science has established itself, by devising some comprehensive hypothesis which will unify all the phenomena within its field, even though in a provisional manner; and when, consequently, it has been able to formulate with tolerable clearness the questions it wishes to ask, and has devised a reliable experimental technique which can be trusted to provide the answers—once all this has been accomplished, we *can* draw a sharp distinction between the people who are experts in that science, who understand and practice the technique of it, and the philosophers who are not. But Psychical Research is not yet in this happy position. What is more, it never will be in it, unless philosophers lend a hand, or—what comes to the same thing—unless Psychical Researchers do some philosophizing for themselves. If we want a parallel, let us consider the position of Physics in the early seventeenth century. An entirely new way of looking at the material world had first to be devised before Physics could establish itself as a science. And the people who devised that new outlook were the philosophers of that century, from Bacon to Leibniz, and chiefly Descartes. They succeeded so well that we almost forget how indispensable and how revolutionary their work was. For despite of much clever sniping both from the Right and from the Left, that way of looking at Nature has been taken for granted by scientists from that day to this. The whole of modern European civilization—its defects no less than its virtues—is based on nothing else.

But now suppose that the seventeenth-century philosophers had said, "We are not concerned with empirical facts; we leave them to the experts; these queer discoveries or alleged discoveries of Galileo are no business of ours." If they had said this, where would Physics be now? It would never have outgrown its infancy. I will not press the parallel further, though I think it is somewhat disquieting. The moral I wish to draw is only this: in the early stages of any inquiry it is a mistake to lay down a hard-and-fast distinction between a scientific investigation of the facts and philosophical reflection about them (or, if you like, about the terminology in which they are formulated). At the later stages the distinction is right and proper. But if it is drawn too soon and too rigorously those later stages will never be reached.

So far I have been trying to convince you that philosophers ought

to take an interest in Psychical Research, and that if they do not they are not doing their job. But exhortation is uphill work, and may even bring a good cause into odium. It is better to show by examples that Psychical Research does raise philosophical problems: problems, moreover, which are so curious and so interesting that, once we see what they are, we shall *want* to discuss them, whether we feel it is our duty or not.

The examples I am going to take are Telepathy and Clairvoyance. I choose them because the evidence for them is so good and so abundant. I am going to assume that the processes called by those names certainly do occur, whatever the right analysis of them may be. If anyone doubts whether I am justified in assuming this, I can only beg him to look at the evidence for himself.[1]

The classical definition of *Telepathy* is "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independent of the recognized channels of sense." The person *from* whom the communication comes is commonly called "the agent," and the person *to* whom it comes "the percipient." I shall use these expressions, because they are the current ones. But it must be understood that the "agency" of the agent is commonly, though not always, unconscious, and that the "perception" of the percipient is not very like what is ordinarily called by that name.

In the *spontaneous* cases, which first draw attention to the phenomenon, the agent is usually undergoing some crisis or other; for example, he is involved in an accident of some kind, such as a shipwreck or a railway accident, or he is seriously ill, or at the point of death. He usually, but not always, has some emotional linkage with the percipient; for example, he is a near relative or an intimate friend. The percipient's experience varies extremely. Sometimes it is no more than the emergence of an unaccountable conviction about the present situation of the agent, accompanied by a feeling of distress or anxiety. (Of course this is only of evidential value if the conviction is pretty detailed, and provided, further, that the fact which it corresponds to was antecedently improbable upon the information the percipient had at the time.) Sometimes the experience takes the form of a vivid and detailed visual hallucination—the seeing of a "telepathic phantasm" or "apparition." In the best cases the hallucination is found to correspond in detail with the agent's situation at the time. Sometimes, again, there is no hallucination, but there is a vivid "sense of presence." The percipient "feels," and feels intensely, that the agent is there in the room,

[1] I would refer him in the first place to Mr. G. N. M. Tyrrell's recent and admirable book, *Science and Psychical Phenomena* (Methuen, 1938), then to the *Proceedings* of the S.P.R., and to the *Revue Métapsychique*, mentioned above.

though he *sees* nothing. At other times the hallucination is auditory, or, again, it may be both visual and auditory. In one interesting case, the percipient wakes up in the morning and has a visual hallucination of a half-sheet of notepaper lying on the pillow; the paper contains the written words "Elsie was dying last night." The one person whom the percipient knew with that name did in fact die on the night in question.[1] Sometimes, again, the "message" is conveyed in the form of a vivid and detailed dream. In view of these great variations, it is natural to suppose that the original telepathic "impact"—whatever its nature may be—is always received unconsciously, and that the precise form in which it reaches consciousness depends upon the permanent idiosyncracy or temporary state of the percipient. Sometimes, perhaps, the impact, or rather the effect of it upon the percipient's unconscious, is "repressed" during waking hours, and only emerges in sleep, in the form of a dream-image.

But we are not confined to the evidence of spontaneous cases, numerous and striking though these are. Telepathy has also been investigated experimentally. When we consider the experimental cases, it becomes obvious that strong emotion is not essential, either on the agent's side or the percipient's. Nor need there be any emotional linkage between the two, or at any rate it need not be at all intimate. Again, intense concentration does not seem to be a necessary condition in either party; on the contrary, it seems sometimes to have an inhibiting effect (but perhaps there is more than one sort of concentration). It also becomes clear that the "message" may be *distorted* in various ways. If A thinks of a picture or diagram, B may get an image of a rather different picture; for instance, it may be turned the wrong way round. Unimportant details in the agent's original may become central in the percipient's reproduction. For example, the agent looks at a picture of a face with wavy lines in the background. The percipient has a visual image of a wire grill (the same shape as the wavy lines) together with the idea of a prison. Another percipient at the same time has a visual image of a grill with rectangular lines instead of wavy ones. Neither has an image of the face, which was what the agent concentrated on.[2] The reception seems to be, so to speak, "totalistic" rather than bit by bit (contrast the process of transmitting a picture telegraphically, where the reproduction *is* built up bit by bit, out of spots). Yet it is also often inaccurate. Sometimes no more than the "general idea" gets across to the percipient.

In more recent experiments, what are called Zener cards have been used, and it is possible to apply statistical methods to the results.

[1] Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, p. 24. "Elsie" is a pseudonym.

[2] R. Warcollier, *Revue Métapsychique*, July–October 1938, pp. 247–8.

The Zener cards are a simplified form of playing-cards; the pack contains five suits of five cards each. If I am asked to guess the suit of the card you are looking at, one would expect on the hypothesis of chance coincidence that I should be right one time in five, i.e. in 20 per cent of the total number of trials. If we find in a long series of trials that I guess right in say 25 per cent of the cases, we have evidence of a mild telepathic effect, and we have a measure of its magnitude. A similar technique can be used for investigating Clairvoyance, Precognition, and Retrocognition. If the card is not looked at, but is merely taken from the pack and laid face downwards on the table, Telepathy can be excluded. And if we compare the percipient's guesses not with the card simultaneously drawn, but with those drawn before or after, we have a measure of his Retrocognitive and Precognitive powers. It appears from some recent work by Mr. Whately Carington and Mr. Soal[1] that a certain amount of Retrocognition and Precognition *is* often mixed up with Clairvoyance and likewise with Telepathy: it is found that the percipient's guess, when it does not correspond to the card which *is* being drawn, nevertheless does correspond in a significantly great proportion of cases with the one which is *going to be* drawn a little later, or *has been* drawn a little time before. Another noteworthy result of these card experiments—a result which one would never have anticipated from a study of the spontaneous cases—is that very frequently there appears to be nothing *cognitive* about the phenomenon at all, in any ordinary sense of the word "cognitive"; it seems to be purely *motor*. The percipient just calls out the suit of the card, and in a long series of trials he gives the right answer in a proportion of cases which exceeds the chance expectation. He does not see or feel anything in particular. He just utters words, and in such and such a proportion of cases they are found to be the right ones. The drawback of this experimental method is the necessarily uninteresting character of the material; neither Zener cards nor ordinary playing-cards are likely to arouse the faintest emotion in anyone's breast. From this point of view the older experimental method, which used pictures, seems to be better; on the other hand, it is then more difficult to give a precise figure to the chance expectation, so that statistical technique cannot be applied so readily to the results. How important these respective drawbacks and advantages are we cannot at present say.

I have now described some of the ascertained facts about Telepathy. But the question which interests a philosopher is, How are we to explain them? The most natural hypothesis at first sight is the *Radiation Hypothesis*, suggested by the analogy of wireless telegraphy. May we not suppose that some form of physical radiation

[1] Cf. *Proceedings* of the S.P.R., June 1940.

is emitted by the brain of the agent, and "picked up" by the brain of the percipient? But when we consider the empirical facts more closely, we find that this hypothesis is beset with all sorts of difficulties.[1] (1) Telepathy seems to be independent of distance in space. It often occurs between people whose bodies are separated by many hundreds of miles; and it often fails to occur between people whose bodies are only a few feet apart. Moreover, when it does occur, the intensity of the telepathic effect does not seem to vary with the distance. (2) How could a complex proposition or even a complex picture be transmitted by radiation, even if an emotion like fear or anger might be? In the transmission of a message by ordinary telegraphy or wireless, the thought-content of the sender must first be translated into a *code* of some kind, e.g. dots and dashes, or spots arranged in a spatial pattern. Then there must be a series of waves corresponding to these. Then the receiving station reacts to these waves, and translates them back into dots and dashes, or spots; and that again must be translated into words, and finally the words must be understood. Is there any conceivable analogue to all this in the case of Telepathy, especially when we remember that the code of dots and dashes (or whatever it may be) has first to be established by *convention*? (3) Is there any independent evidence for the existence of telepathic radiations or for the hypothesis that the human brain can either emit or receive them?

Such are the arguments which have convinced most investigators that the Radiation Hypothesis is false. Is there any evidence on the other side? It is sometimes claimed that there is. It is alleged that the electrical state of the human brain varies concomitantly with variations in the emotions; and further, that these electrical changes in a human brain can be detected by physical instruments some feet away. If so, physical radiations of some sort are presumably being emitted. Finally, it is alleged that in some cases *another* human organism is found to respond to these radiations, the response taking the form of muscular reactions. But if radiations of this sort can be both emitted and received by human organisms, does not this provide a physical basis for Telepathy? Now this evidence, or alleged evidence, about "brain-radiations"—radiations in the literal, physical sense—should no doubt be treated with the utmost caution. Nevertheless, we shall do well to consider it hypothetically, and ask ourselves how far it would take us, *if* it were securely established.

I think it would not take us all the way by any means. (1) These "brain-radiations"—assuming they do really occur—are admittedly of very faint intensity, and do not penetrate more than a few feet; whereas telepathic communications can be transmitted over very much greater distances than this (if "transmitted" is the word),

[1] Cf. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

even over hundreds of miles. (2) You remember the "Code" difficulty mentioned above. How is this to be dealt with? The transmission of "brain-radiations"—assuming again that the facts really are as reported—only seems to occur in cases of *undifferentiated emotional* Telepathy, where this difficulty does not arise. There is no question of transmitting a *proposition* (a piece of information) nor even a picture. What is transmitted is just an emotion. And on the side of the recipient there is hardly any discrimination as between one emotion and another. It is indeed alleged that the recipient is not absolutely undiscriminating, and that he reacts differently according as the transmitter is in a "Yes" state or a "No" state. But still I think it would be admitted that the response is *relatively* undiscriminating. Moreover, the process, as described, seems to be purely behaviouristic. The recipient does not feel the emotion himself, nor does he know or believe or take for granted that the transmitter is feeling one. All that happens on his side is a muscular reaction.

It would appear then—assuming for argument's sake that the facts are correctly reported—that the Radiation Hypothesis will only explain, at most, certain elementary forms of Telepathy, viz. *short-range, undifferentiated, emotional* Telepathy. If the evidence about "brain radiations" were to be securely established, we should have to conclude, I think, that the word "Telepathy" was ambiguous and covered two entirely different processes: (*a*) A short-range process, concerned only with the transmission of emotions—a process having a physical basis, and analogous in some respects to wireless transmission. (*b*) A quite different process—Telepathy proper—which is not so much long-range but rather independent of spatial conditions altogether—a process which is to all appearance purely mental, which is not limited to the transmission of emotions, and displays in favourable cases a high degree of discrimination.

So let us now turn once more to Telepathy proper, and consider again what explanation could conceivably be given of it. Should we say, perhaps, that it is a hitherto unrecognized form of *direct acquaintance*, in which one mind has immediate knowledge of another mind, or of some state of another mind: an *extrospective* acquaintance parallel to the introspective acquaintance which each of us has with states of his own mind? I do not think we can accept this suggestion, though it was natural to make it in the days when the only known examples of Telepathy were certain very striking spontaneous cases, in which the percipient's "impression" turned out to be correct in every detail. The difficulty is that knowing has, so to speak, an *all or none* character. There is no half-way house between knowing and not knowing. It is true that knowing admits of various degrees of definiteness. If x is in fact scarlet, I may know only that it is

red; I may even know no more than that it has some shade of colour or other. But it is self-contradictory to say that an act of knowing is partly correct and partly incorrect, or that it is nearly right but not quite. Now this is just what we do have to say of much telepathy, as the experimental cases show. The percipient's "impression" *is* often partly right and partly wrong, and the extent of the rightness or wrongness varies very much from one telepathic experience to another. Again, in a long series of trials the percipient may be right in a proportion of cases which significantly exceeds the chance expectation (say in 25 per cent, when by chance alone he should only be right in 20 per cent); and yet the experience on his side seems to be exactly the same both when he is right and when he is wrong. If he were knowing in the correct cases and only guessing in the incorrect ones, there ought to be an experienced difference between the two.

It seems then that we have to do with a process of *reproduction* or *representation* rather than with knowledge in any strict sense. The bare empirical facts come to this: with certain pairs of persons there is a surprisingly large degree of *correlation*, greater than the chance expectation, between A's images, dreams, hallucinations, or utterances on the one hand, and certain approximately contemporary experiences of B on the other. In some instances the correlation is substantially perfect in every detail; in others it is only partial. Thus Telepathy is a form of "cognition," if you like, but it is not a *knowledge* of other minds. All that the so-called percipient *knows*, or is directly aware of, is an image or hallucinatory sense-datum of his own, or sometimes only an utterance which he finds himself making; and this *corresponds* more closely or less closely, and sometimes exactly, with something which is happening in another mind. If I may use a crude analogy which I have already used elsewhere, Telepathy is more like infection than like knowledge. When A catches influenza from B, his disease corresponds more or less closely with B's, though his own physiological idiosyncracies will generally make some difference. But A's influenza is not a *knowing* of B's—merely an effect of it, which reproduces its cause more or less exactly.

If Telepathy, then, is not a form of knowing, but rather an experience which is *caused by* and more or less closely *corresponds with* an experience of someone else, how are we to conceive the causal process involved? As we have seen, it seems to be of a purely mental sort. Now I think this has an important philosophical consequence. The plain man, and even the plain philosopher, assumes with Descartes that the world of minds is divided up into a number of separate and as it were isolated mental substances. No mind, it is supposed, has direct causal relations with any other mind, nor indeed with anything at all except its own brain. But it now appears

that this view is true only of the conscious part of our mental life. When we consider unconscious mental processes—those which their owner is not, or perhaps cannot be, aware of by introspection—there seems to be no such isolation. It appears that my unconscious may on occasion stand in direct causal relations with yours. (I do not like this language much, but it is the only one available at present, so I must use it). The facts of Dual and Alternating Personality have already made us doubt whether the *unity* of any one mind is quite so absolute and unconditional as our predecessors supposed; it now appears that the *diversity* of different minds is not absolute and unconditional either. It begins to look as if both the unity and the isolatedness of a single mind were the result of certain special restrictive conditions, which are generally but not always fulfilled; or perhaps not even that, but rather a mere appearance arising from the extremely limited and superficial character of ordinary self-consciousness. The hypothesis of a "Collective Unconscious," common to all human minds, which certain speculative writers have suggested, begins to look more plausible. Let us consider for a moment what this hypothesis would amount to. What sort of unity would this Collective Unconscious have, if it existed? So far as I can see, its unity would be purely causal. The causal relations *between* Smith's mind and Brown's would be the same in kind as the causal relations *within* either of them, and equally direct. The Collective Unconscious would not be a "thing," but rather a "field" of (purely mental) interaction. In fact, the phrase "Collective Unconscious" would just be a way of saying that unconscious events in one mind can directly produce unconscious events in any other; from which it would follow that the distinction between unconscious mental events "in me" and unconscious mental events "in you" is no longer a hard-and-fast one. Now this hypothesis may seem altogether too speculative, and it would certainly need a good deal of clarification before we could accept it; nevertheless, the existence of Telepathy does suggest that some hypothesis on these lines is true, or at any rate nearer the truth than the common-sense view, which regards the mental world as a mere collection of causally isolated mental substances.

I admit, of course, that the whole terminology of "unconscious mental events" is far from satisfactory. They were originally called "mental" because the effects which they produce (or rather which they are postulated to explain) are exceedingly similar to those produced by events which *are* indubitably mental; but what their intrinsic nature is we cannot at present say. On the one hand, it is natural to suggest that in their intrinsic nature they are physical, or rather physiological. As Spinoza remarked, no one can yet lay down limits to what the human body can do; it might be able to produce

effects which are indistinguishable from the effects of conscious forethought and conscious wishing. On the other hand, the hypothesis of "unconscious" events which are mental in their intrinsic nature is perfectly conceivable. It amounts only to saying that there are mental events which are not introspected by anyone, and this involves no contradiction whatever; just as there are unperceived physical events, so there *may* perfectly well be unintrospected mental ones. Moreover, there may be some which it is *causally impossible* for human minds to introspect, just as there are physical events (e.g. in the centre of the Earth) which it is causally impossible for human minds to perceive. So far, then, there seems to be nothing much to choose between these two opposed theories about the intrinsic nature of "unconscious" events. It is sometimes maintained that the evidence of Abnormal Psychology and Psycho-therapy supports the theory that they are mental. On this I cannot offer an opinion. But the theory that they are purely physiological would certainly get into difficulty over Telepathy. It would commit us to a physical explanation of Telepathy, that is, to the Radiative Theory; for what other physical explanation could there be? And as I have tried to show, the Radiative Theory covers only a small part of the facts at the best, and not the most important part. Finally, we have to remember that this disjunction—either the Unconscious is mental in its intrinsic nature, or it is physiological—is not necessarily exhaustive. The Cartesian division of Nature into two parts, a mental part and a physical part, may not cover all the facts. There may be a third realm which is neither mental in the ordinary sense nor physical in the ordinary sense, but possesses some of the properties of both. If so, evidence against the physiological theory of the Unconscious would not by itself suffice to establish the mental theory of it, for there would be a third alternative. I know this sounds like nonsense to the modern educated European, whose whole outlook on the world, whether he knows it or not, has been powerfully influenced by the genius of Descartes. Nevertheless, this hypothesis of a third something, intermediate between what we ordinarily call "mind" and what we ordinarily call "matter," has long been familiar in the philosophy and cosmology of the Far East; and something not unlike it is found in Neo-Platonism. Perhaps it is not nonsense after all. Perhaps if we reject it out of hand, as most of us would do, we are merely being parochial.

Before leaving the subject of Telepathy, I have one further suggestion to make. Is it possible that when we discuss causal hypotheses about Telepathy we are asking the wrong question? Perhaps the right question to ask, anyhow at the beginning, is not "Why does Telepathy occur sometimes?" but rather "Why doesn't

it occur all the time?" (Compare M. Bergson's discussion of Memory. According to him, it is forgetting, rather than remembering, which needs a causal explanation; and the problem is "Why do we remember so little?" rather than "Why do we remember at all?") If we approach the matter in this way, there is one biological point which strikes us at once. *Too much* Telepathy would be paralysing to action. It would distract us from the immediate practical problems which we have to solve if we are to survive in this world. It might even lead to the utter disintegration of our personality, if the content of our consciousness varied from moment to moment under the influence of a perpetual and continually varying telepathic bombardment. One would therefore suppose, on general biological grounds, that any species of organisms which has managed to survive has developed some "repressive" mechanism (on the lines of those which Freud has described) whereby the majority of telepathic "impacts" are prevented from reaching consciousness. On the other hand, it is possible that no *special* repressive mechanism is needed. The repression may come about automatically and of itself. It may be that we all receive a vast multitude of telepathic "impacts" all the time, and that their very number and variety causes them to inhibit *one another*: so that either they do not influence consciousness at all, or else their influence is in the nature of a "mass-effect," a modification of our general emotional tone. If there is a special repressive mechanism, the good telepathic subject will be the person who can suspend its operations, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and so let through into consciousness the telepathic "impressions" which are reaching him all the time. Certainly it does appear that telepathic experiences occur more readily in states of relaxed attention. As we have seen, they often take the form of dreams; and when we dream, the ordinary repressive mechanisms of waking life are to a large extent suspended. The most striking example of all is the mediumistic trance, which is a particularly fertile source of telepathic phenomena; for it seems clear that at least a good many alleged "spirit-messages" are due to telepathy from the living. What exactly the mediumistic trance is, no one can yet say. But it certainly seems to involve a greater or larger degree of dissociation of personality, and in such dissociated states normal inhibitive mechanisms are presumably suspended.

Suppose, on the other hand, that there is no special repressive mechanism, and that what happens in normal life is merely that many different telepathic impacts inhibit one another. In that case, the good telepathic subject will be the person who can single out some one of these impacts from the total mass. He will not be more *receptive* to telepathy than other people, but only more *selective*. And this selectiveness might even be a deficiency, rather than an

extra endowment. He might be *less* receptive than the normal man: all but a few telepathic impulses might fail to reach him. Whereas normal men would receive a vast and indiscriminate multitude of impulses, which would have at most a confused mass-effect upon their consciousness, this abnormal man would receive only one or two, and so he might be aware of a tolerably distinct image, or hallucination. We might then suppose that some normal men at some times get into this state of *reduced* telepathic receptivity, which enables some one telepathic impulse to push through into consciousness in a distinct and definite form.

Of these two queer hypotheses—the hypothesis of a special repressive mechanism and the hypothesis of mutual inhibition—I am disposed to prefer the first, on grounds of analogy. For we know, or have good reasons for thinking, that there *are* repressive mechanisms in the human mind; and, thanks to Freud and others, we can form some plausible conjectures about the way in which they work, and about the psychological and psycho-physical conditions upon which their effectiveness depends. Or could we say that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive? There might be some cases where a telepathic impulse fails to reach consciousness because it is repressed by a special repressive mechanism; and there might also be some in which a number of telepathic impulses inhibit one another, so that either nothing at all "gets through," or only a general mass-effect upon our emotional tone. However, I do not propose to discuss these two hypotheses any further. I only mentioned them to illustrate the kind of considerations we are led to if we start by asking "Why doesn't telepathy occur more frequently?"—instead of asking the more usual question "Why does it occur at all?"

I now turn from Telepathy to Clairvoyance, which is in some ways an even more puzzling phenomenon. I am afraid I have not time to treat it as fully as it deserves; but fortunately some of the things I have said about Telepathy, especially about attempts to give a physical explanation of it, will apply to Clairvoyance too, and there will be no need to repeat them. Clairvoyance is usually defined as the awareness of some approximately contemporary[1] object or process in the material world without the use of the sense-organs or of rational inference. (The word "awareness" must not be taken too strictly, as we shall see. But let it stand for the moment.) The first problem we come upon is, that it is not at all easy in practice to distinguish Clairvoyance from Telepathy. (I am afraid that Croesus was not aware of this difficulty when he carried out

[1] I put in this qualifying phrase to exclude Precognition and Retrocognition. But one may say, if one likes, that these are special forms of Clairvoyance.

his experiment on the oracles.) Let us consider a fairly frequent and well-established type of case. Suppose that the percipient tells me the contents of a letter sealed up in an envelope. He has no normal means of discovering what the letter contains, either by observation or by inference; yet his description of it turns out to be correct. Are we to say that he had clairvoyantly "perceived" the letter, whatever we may mean by "perceive"? Or is it that he has got into touch, not with the letter itself, but with the mind of the writer, who presumably still retains a memory of what he wrote? If so, the process is telepathic. It is true that in such cases the percipient often does not know the writer personally and does not even know that he exists. But this is no obstacle to the telepathic explanation. As we saw earlier, telepathy can still occur even where there is no emotional linkage between the two parties. Now consider another type of case, where the percipient is able to give directions for finding a lost object—an object which was lost in a place many miles away, a place which the percipient has never seen, and lost by a person whom he does not know. Even this might be explained telepathically. It is true that the owner of the object does not consciously remember where the object is: otherwise he could not be said to have "lost" it. Nevertheless, the experience of putting the object down somewhere, say in a drawer, may well have left some "trace," some persistent modification, in his unconscious (it may indeed be that he *wanted* to lose the object, and that his forgetting is what Freud calls "active forgetting"; such things can happen). Now perhaps this trace has affected the percipient telepathically. We cannot absolutely exclude this explanation.

Nevertheless, I think there are some cases where telepathy *can* be excluded. A celebrated one is that of Mme. Morel,[1] which occurred in March 1914. An old man had disappeared from the village of Cour-les-Barres (in the Department of Cher, in Central France). He was repeatedly and carefully searched for, but could not be found. Mme. Morel, who was in Paris and had never been in the Department of Cher, was given a scarf belonging to the old man, and told to "look for" its owner. She said she saw him lying dead on the ground, in a place which she described in detail. She also gave a detailed description of the appearance and posture of the body. Asked to say how he had got there, she gave a detailed account of the route he had followed, and of his feelings on the way. People on the spot then followed the route Mme. Morel had described, arrived at the place she had described, and found the body lying there. The details she had given about the posture of the body and the clothes were verified exactly. The place also corresponded exactly

[1] I quote this from Mr. G. N. M. Tyrrell's *Science and Psychical Phenomena* pp. 34–5. It was originally reported by Dr. Osty.

to her description, with one instructive exception. She said that the body was lying near a rock. Actually it was a piece of a fallen tree which did look like a rock.

Now when she described the route the old man had taken, and the feelings he had had, you may say that this might have been Telepathy. If so, it was *retrocognitive* Telepathy, since the events had happened three weeks earlier. But when she described the situation and the posture of the dead body, this can hardly have been anything but pure Clairvoyance—the awareness of a material object at a distance without any use of the normal sense-organs, and of determinate facts about it which were not known to any living person. (Incidentally, the mistake about the rock and the tree trunk suggests that the experience was in some sense *visual*, and conformed to the etymological meaning of the word "clairvoyance" more closely than some experiences of this sort.)

This was a spontaneous case. But in recent years Clairvoyance has been investigated experimentally, both with pictures and with playing-cards, and special precautions have been taken to exclude Telepathy. For example, a pack of cards is shuffled, and a card is drawn by the experimenter. He sees only its back and at once lays it face downwards on the table. The percipient is placed at the other end of the table, and there is a screen in the middle, which prevents him from seeing what is going on. As soon as the card is drawn, he has to say what card he thinks it is, and his answer is written down. The same procedure is followed for all the cards in the pack. Then, and only then, they are turned face upwards, and their denominations, and the order in which they were drawn, are recorded. Then the pack is shuffled again and the whole procedure is repeated. Now if we find that in a long series of trials the proportion of correct guesses is significantly greater than the chance expectation, we have to conclude that the percipient is using the power of pure Clairvoyance. Telepathy is excluded, since no one sees the faces of the cards till afterwards. A good many experiments have now been carried out on these lines, though sometimes the procedure is more complicated. (Mr. Tyrrell, for example, has devised an elaborate electrical apparatus, in which electric light bulbs concealed inside boxes are substituted for the cards.) Several of these experiments have yielded positive results. We very seldom find a percipient who guesses right every time, even in a comparatively short series of trials. But there seem to be quite a number whose proportion of correct guesses is strikingly greater than the chance expectation.

When we set about giving a *theory* of Clairvoyance, or rather trying to give one, we are confronted with much the same difficulties as we found before in discussing Telepathy. No radiation hypothesis seems at all plausible, since Clairvoyance, like Telepathy, seems not

to be affected by spatial distance nor yet by physical obstacles. Again, it cannot be a form of direct acquaintance, an immediate knowledge of a spatially distant object or event, since it is liable to mistakes. Moreover, despite the etymological meaning of the word "clairvoyance" ("clear seeing"; cf. "second sight"), the phenomenon does not necessarily involve visual images or visual hallucinations; sometimes these are present—for example, hallucinatory scenes appear in a crystal, or as if projected on a cinematograph screen—but often they are not. Further, the vision, when it *is* a vision, may be partly symbolic, as in an allegory or a dream—a feature which is found in precognitive visions too. Sometimes the percipient says not "I see so-and-so," but "They tell me so-and-so," as if the data presented to him were *auditory* images, or hallucinations, rather then visual ones. You remember that in Croesus' experiment the Delphic priestess professed to *smell* the tortoise being cooked in the brazen pot. If the story is true, she must have had an olfactory image or hallucination, presumably accompanied by a visual one. There is some modern evidence for the occurrence of olfactory images in Telepathy. I do not know whether there is any modern evidence for their occurrence in Pure Clairvoyance; but on analogical grounds one would expect that they ought sometimes to be present, just as they sometimes are in ordinary memory. Finally, in some cases of Clairvoyance, and notably in some of the card-guessing experiments, the phenomenon seems to be almost wholly motor. The percipient just utters the *words* "five of spades," or whatever it may be, without any relevant form of cognition at all, and it is found afterwards that his words correspond to the facts in a significantly large proportion of instances. Here, too, the parallel between Clairvoyance and Telepathy is a close one. For sometimes, and especially in the experimental cases, Telepathy too seems to be a purely motor phenomenon (cf. p. 369 above).

Thus, whatever the underlying causal process may be, Clairvoyance, like Telepathy, can manifest itself in consciousness in a great variety of ways, differing from one percipient to another. Like Telepathy, again, it is often partly erroneous, so that it cannot be a form of direct knowledge in any strict sense of the word "knowledge." If we consider it from an epistemological point of view, the theory we hold about it must be a "representative" theory, not a "prehensive" theory. As with Telepathy, so with Clairvoyance, the bare empirical facts are *correlations*: between the percipient's images or hallucinations or utterances on the one hand, and certain facts about material objects on the other—facts not accessible to him by any form of normal sense-perception nor by inference. The correlation is not always perfect, though sometimes it approximates to being so; often it is partial; and sometimes it is only just greater than chance-

coincidence would account for. Evidently, then, it is a matter of "reproduction" or "representation," not of knowledge proper.

If these are the facts, what explanation are we to suggest? In the case of Telepathy, we could at least produce a *causal* hypothesis, vague as it might be. We said that an event in one mind could directly produce an event in another. The causal laws involved might still be ordinary psychological causal laws, or something sufficiently like them, with the proviso that their field of application is extended, so that they would link together events in *different* minds instead of being confined, as in Orthodox Psychology they are, to events within the *same* mind. But when we consider Clairvoyance, it is difficult to suggest any cause for it at all, still more to see how such a cause could work. When we are looking for the causal explanation of an unfamiliar phenomenon, we have to begin by relying upon analogies drawn from more familiar spheres. What else can we do, unless we are favoured with a special revelation? With the help of these analogies, we formulate a working hypothesis. It will almost certainly be a crude one, burdened with inessential details, and it may be completely mistaken. But it does at least enable us to get started. Further study of the empirical facts will show us how to correct it and refine it, until at last, perhaps centuries later, we arrive at a tolerably satisfactory theory. But Clairvoyance seems utterly unlike any other phenomenon we know of, unless it be Precognition; and Precognition is if possible even more difficult to understand than Clairvoyance itself. There is no occurrence within the field of *normal* experience which is at all like either of them. How can someone perceive a material object, if "perceive" is the word, without the use of any sense-organ, and without any train of physical events (radiations or anything else) intervening between the object and his own body? You may call it "perceiving" if you like, but the causal process underlying it must be something utterly different from anything which occurs in normal perception. We cannot hope to find any helpful analogy in that quarter. And if not there, where *can* we hope to find it?

But it will never do to give up the struggle in despair; still less to pretend that the facts do not exist, because they will not fit into our traditional scientific schemes. On the contrary, the very difficulties of the subject testify to its extreme importance. If Clairvoyance does occur, as I am persuaded it does, our ordinary theories of the human mind, or of physical nature, or perhaps of both, are badly wrong somewhere. For if those theories were wholly right, it would not occur at all. The world must be a much queerer place than we (or shall I say Descartes?) have supposed. Thus, just because Clairvoyance is so unlike every other phenomenon we are familiar with, it is specially incumbent on us to try to understand it.

It is quite certain that, if only it could be understood, we should get altogether new light upon the nature of the human mind, and perhaps upon the nature of the physical world as well.

Now I myself have got no theory of Clairvoyance to offer. I only want to make certain tentative suggestions as to the directions in which we might look for one. First, I want to suggest, as I did before in discussing Telepathy, that perhaps we are asking the wrong question. Perhaps what we should seek a causal explanation of is the absence of Clairvoyance rather than its presence? In that case the proper question to ask, anyhow in the first place, would be this: Why is our ordinary perceptual experience limited in the way it is? Why is it confined to those material objects which happen to exercise a physical effect upon our sense-organs? Ought we perhaps to assume that Clairvoyance is our normal state, and that ordinary perception is something subnormal, a kind of myopia? The question you ask depends on the expectation with which you begin. Ought we to have expected that by rights, so to speak, every mind would be aware of everything, or, at any rate, of an indefinitely wide range of things? The puzzle would then be to explain why the ordinary human mind is in fact aware of so little. We might then conjecture that our sense-organs and afferent nerves (which, of course, are physiologically connected with our organs of action, i.e. with the muscular system) are arranged to *prevent us from attending* to more than a small bit of the material world—that bit which is biologically relevant to us as animal organisms. We might still have an unconscious "contact"—I can think of no adequate phrase—with all sorts of other things, but the effects of it would be shut out from consciousness except on rare occasions, when the physiological mechanism of stimulus and response is somewhat deranged. In that case, what prevents us from being clairvoyant all the time is—in M. Bergson's phrase—*l'attention à la vie.* If so, we should expect that habitual clairvoyants would be physiologically or psycho-physically "abnormal" or "unbalanced"; or at any rate that their "balance"—I have to speak in metaphors again—would be more easily upset than other people's.

My second suggestion is already prefigured in my first; but as it will shock some of you, I had better state it quite openly. If we are to give an explanation of Clairvoyance, I am afraid we may have to look for light in works of Speculative Metaphysics. I myself should be disposed to look for it in the *Monadology* of Leibniz and in the more speculative parts of Lord Russell's book *Our Knowledge of the External World,* which admittedly starts from a somewhat Leibnizian point of view. But these are not the only metaphysicians who might be useful. For instance, we might find some help in Berkeley too.

Having administered the shock, I hasten to mitigate its effects. The more Positivistically minded members of my audience may tell me that whatever we may think of the *epistemological* doctrines of metaphysicians, their *speculative* doctrines were certainly nonsensical; the propositions of speculative metaphysics, they may say, are mere pseudo-propositions, not even false. To this I reply, first, that perhaps the great speculative metaphysicians of the past did not quite know what they were doing (men of genius often do not). They may have *thought* they were using *a priori* propositions to demonstrate matters of fact, or sometimes to demonstrate that matters of fact are not matters of fact at all, but only appearances or illusions. But perhaps they were really doing something else. And secondly, I will try to placate my critics with an analogy. Consider the history of Non-Euclidean Geometry. During the nineteenth century a number of Non-Euclidean Geometries were worked out by Pure Mathematicians. They were worked out as mere speculations in a purely deductive manner. No student of Physics supposed that they had any application to the physical world. But in the last thirty years it has turned out that Non-Euclidean Geometry does have the most important applications to the physical world. New physical facts have turned up, facts which were unknown and unsuspected at the time when Non-Euclidean Geometry was first developed; and either they cannot be fitted into a Euclidean framework at all, or they can only be fitted into it with the aid of unplausible *ad hoc* hypotheses. Now I suggest that the theories of some speculative metaphysicians may turn out to be useful in a similar way. At the time when they were first invented they may have been purely deductive systems; whether their inventors realized it or not, these systems may have had no relevance one way or the other to the empirical facts known at the time, so that they were incapable of being either confirmed or refuted by experiential evidence, and the Positivists of the day could plausibly regard them as nonsensical. But when we consider the new facts which Psychical Research has brought to light, some of these metaphysical speculations begin to wear a different look. We find that some of them do at least provide a conceptual framework into which supernormal cognition can be fitted, whereas it appears to be an inexplicable oddity so long as we stick to our ordinary (ultimately Cartesian) views of mind and of Nature. For example, in the *Monadology* of Leibniz every monad has clairvoyant and telepathic powers, not occasionally and exceptionally, but always, as part of its essential nature. Every monad represents the entire Universe from its own point of view (Clairvoyance) and the perceptions of each are correlated with the perceptions of all the rest (Telepathy). In fact, what Leibniz calls "perception" is always both clairvoyant and

telepathic. Moreover, he tells us that this perception is to a greater or lesser degree unconscious. I do not say that the system of Leibniz is workable as it stands. But I do suggest that we may gather useful hints from it. One of Leibniz' contemporaries described the *Monadology* as "a philosophical romance." So it was, at the time when it was written. But like some systems of Non-Euclidean Geometry, it may have been a kind of unconscious anticipation of the science of the future. Indeed, we do not have to go outside the history of Metaphysics itself to find hopeful and suggestive parallels. At the time when it was first put forward, the atomistic philosophy of Leucippus and Democritus was a piece of pure metaphysical speculation. But it turns out to have been a crude anticipation of some of the most important conclusions of modern science. Another instance, perhaps, is Schopenhauer's metaphysics of "the Will," which anticipates some of the discoveries of Psycho-analysis.[1] We must not be too proud, then, to take what hints we can from the theories of speculative metaphysicians. They may turn out to have some empirical application after all, especially when we consider that seamier side of Nature which Psychical Research gives us a glimpse of.

With these somewhat disturbing thoughts in mind, let us turn back to Clairvoyance. If we determine not to be frightened of Metaphysics, three hypotheses suggest themselves. First, we might suppose that there is an *omnisentient consciousness* which is aware of everything that is going on in the material world, and possibly of some future events as well. If you like, it would be a kind of God; but the present argument does not oblige us to attribute intelligence to it—whatever other arguments might do—still less moral predicates of any sort. It will be safest just to call it a "World-soul," if you want some old-established name for it. This omnisentient consciousness would enjoy unlimited clairvoyance; and human clairvoyance would be due to a telepathic relation between ourselves and it.

Secondly, we could suppose with Leibniz that every mind clairvoyantly perceives or represents the world from its own proper point of view, and that each is telepathically correlated with all other minds. We should then have to explain why there *seems* to be so little clairvoyance, and why the vast bulk of our perceptions or representations remain unconscious.

Thirdly, we might start from the modified form of Leibnizian metaphysics suggested by Lord Russell in his book *Our Knowledge of the External World.* According to this, the physical world itself consists of a multitude of "perspectives." Each of these perspectives exists from a certain place; it exists from that place whether it is

[1] I owe this suggestion to Dr. F. Waismann.

sensed or not; and a particular material object, a poker for example, is a complicated system of such perspectives, each existing from its proper place. When a suitably arranged sense-organ and nervous system occupies one of these places, the perspective is sensed, and the sensibilia of which it is made up turn into sense-data. If we now wish to fit Clairvoyance into this scheme, we may take one of two courses. On the one hand, we could suppose that a human mind is capable of being at one of those places (using it as a "point of view") otherwise than by putting its sense-organs there. If my body is in Oxford at 12 o'clock, and I have a clairvoyant vision of an event occurring at 12 o'clock in Piccadilly Circus, we then say that my "point of view" is for the moment in or near Piccadilly Circus, though my sense-organs remain in Oxford. Or, secondly, we could take a more extravagant line, which incidentally might come in useful when we considered other sorts of supernormal phenomena not dealt with in this paper, such as Haunting and Psychometry. Instead of stretching our ordinary notions of sense-perception, we could stretch our ordinary notions of *memory*. We could say that memory is not just a property of living organisms, as we ordinarily think; but that it, or something essentially like it, is a property of every point in physical space, or at any rate that it is a property of all those places from which "perspectives" exist. We could then suggest that these rudimentary "place-memories" can on occasion affect human minds telepathically, and this would be the explanation of Clairvoyance. This amounts to saying that every point in physical space, or at least every point from which perspective exist, is the "point of view of" a rudimentary mind, and that there is a telepathic linkage between these rudimentary minds or sub-minds and ourselves. And you will notice that this brings us back to something very like the full-blooded Leibnizian cosmology which Lord Russell started out from.

Few of you perhaps will want to go as far as this. But if anyone does, I am afraid he may have to go further still. For we saw before that once Telepathy is admitted, the sharp distinction between one mind and another breaks down.[1] Suppose that a sub-mind, or place-memory, or sub-human Liebnizian monad, whose point of view is at P_1, telepathically affects me, whose body is at P_2; and suppose that as a result I have a clairvoyant vision of the sensibilia existing from P_1. Then you can equally well say, if you like, that I or "me" is at both places, although my body is only at one of them. Or again, if you prefer the "World-Soul" hypothesis, the hypothesis of an omnisentient consciousness, and explain Clairvoyance by saying that we are sometimes in telepathic communication with it, then again there will be no sharp line between us and the "World-

[1] Cf. pp. 372–373 above.

Soul." We might have to say that we individual minds are, as it were, dissociated personalities of it, and that there are occasions when this dissociation is temporarily suspended.

Whatever we may think about these very queer speculations, there is one point which they have in common, and I think we must hold fast to it, extraordinary though it is: namely, that sense-experience, or something not wholly unlike it, is not necessarily connected with an organism or nervous systems. There can be sense-experiences, or something like them, from places *not* at the moment occupied by sense-organs and brains. You may say that the owner of these "extra-somatic" sense-experiences is an omnipresent and omnisentient being, or a Leibnizian monad; or you may say that its owner is the clairvoyant human being himself, whose body and sense-organs are somewhere else. But, whoever and whatever owns them, they do seem to occur. Nor are they prevented from occurring by the fact that we have at present no language for describing them intelligibly. If we are to talk about these subjects at all, we can hardly avoid talking a certain amount of nonsense. Indeed, how could we expect to avoid it? Our present linguistic conventions were mainly designed for talking about the physical world. Even the data of Normal Psychology (to say nothing of Abnormal) already subject them to a considerable strain. It would not be surprising if supernormal phenomena, such as I have discussed in this paper, sometimes strained them to breaking-point or beyond it. Nevertheless, we must take the risk. The facts are too important to be ignored. We must be content to talk a certain amount of nonsense for the present. Otherwise we cannot get on at all, and must simply ignore a group of phenomena which of all others it most concerns us to understand. Our better-instructed successors can be trusted to put matters straight. Philosophy, and science too, begins in nonsense; but it does not end there.

ESCAPE

The Very Reverend W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., F.B.A.

There are times when we are so much in harmony with our surroundings that we are content to bask in the sunshine and to say to the passing hour, like Faust, "Stay with us; you are so fair." There have been times when whole nations, or the most vocal part of them, have believed themselves to be living in a world which, if not the best of all possible worlds, is an abode from which they have no desire to escape. They are being challenged, for, as Walt Whitman says, "it is provided in the essence of things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary." But the challenge is unheeded, and the price is demanded later. *Ubi nil timetur, quod timeatur nascitur.*

But neither individuals nor societies are content for long. Most of us, though we look forward to an eternity of calm fruition, cannot spend an evening without trying to escape from a gentleman whom we know slightly and find, it seems, an intolerable bore—ourselves. There are various expedients—crossword puzzles, detective novels, day-dreaming, aimless chatter, card-playing, alcohol, or other drugs. Work is an anodyne for many; religion for some.

The effect of boredom on a large scale in history is underestimated. It is a main cause of revolutions, and would soon bring to an end all the static Utopias, and the farmyard civilization of the Fabians. France has never been so well governed as under Louis Philippe; but after eighteen years of his prudent and prosaic administration, Lamartine declares that "la France s'ennuie," and Napoleon the Little is installed in his place. Determined not to repeat the mistake of his predecessor, Louis Napoleon gives his country "glory," of which the stages are the Crimea, Solferino, Mexico, and Sedan. Boredom often generates wars, the supreme exhibition of human folly and wickedness. The criminals who arrange them have studied the minds of the masses who vote for them, and of the young men who will joyfully and gallantly die in them. Wars are not boring. In the Great War the suicide rate declined in all the belligerent countries.

When pessimism attacks an individual, so that the passionate desire for a final escape dominates the natural instinct of self-preservation, he may take refuge in suicide. It is an example of the strange conservatism of our institutions that in Great Britain, almost

alone among civilized nations, suicide is still a felony, and attempted suicide a crime. The unsuccessful but widely supported agitation for legalizing euthanasia showed that public opinion is changing on this question. The civilized world will no doubt come to the conclusion that so far as the State is concerned a man has a right to declare his innings closed whenever he chooses, and that though the occasions are few indeed when a brave and good man, in possession of his faculties, will choose this way of escape, there are exceptional cases when no obstacle should be put in the way of anticipating an inevitable and cruel end of an incurable and painful disease.

When pessimism attacks a society, it shows itself in a heavy fall in the birth-rate. Men and women do not wish to bring children into a world where misery seems to be much commoner than happiness. A few tribes, such as the Guanches of the Canary Islands, the Indians in the larger Antilles, and the natives of the Marquesas Islands, are said to have actually committed race-suicide, or to be in process of doing so. The Maoris, until the end of the nineteenth century, seemed to have lost all zest in living and to be threatened with extinction; but they have recovered their self-confidence, and are now increasing faster than the whites. There was a catastrophic fall in the birth-rate of Germany and Austria after the Great War. In Germany, where the rate in 1900 was 36·0 per thousand, it had fallen to 14·7 in 1933, the year when Hitler seized the power. The rate in Germany now, allowing for the universal decline in the ratio of births to population, is about what it probably would have been if there had been no war and no Nazism.

In this article I wish to consider neither the petty manifestations of boredom in our daily lives, nor the tragic effects of despair and misery in revolution, suicide, and depopulation. I wish to consider the various forms of escapism as they have shown themselves in philosophy and religion. It is plain that the desire for deliverance from the ills of life has been one of the determining factors in both these fields.

There are five ways in which a man may react against acute dissatisfaction with things as they are. He may direct his thoughts to a real or imagined happier state in the past. He may direct his thoughts to an imagined happier state in the future. He may turn his back on the outer world, and seek salvation in the contemplation of an inner world of unchangeable and blessed repose. He may try to correct his own want of faith, his spiritual myopia, in the hope that his transfigured self may find even in the external world a happier and truer picture than he could discern before he submitted himself to the discipline of religion and philosophy. Or lastly, in a more aggressive mood, he may accept provisionally, as true under the conditions of finite existence, the metaphysical dualism which is

and must be the working faith of the moralist, and advance strenuously to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty. These five are in practice by no means mutually exclusive. The third, the method of detachment, may find its fulfilment in a return to social activities, and the fifth may transcend dualism by faith in the supremacy of the absolute values. I will consider the four first in turn; the reaction of the moralist is hardly a form of escape.

Archaism is partly a retreat into a dream-world—this is the essence of romanticism, and partly an attempt to find guidance and inspiration in the records of our ancestors, who "had more wit and wisdom than we." The contemplation of happier ages in the past is consoling, apart from the presumption which it offers that the "sorrowful weary wheel" may bring back the age of gold which it traversed in part of its revolution. *Nostrum est quod praeteriit temporis.* Nothing can rob us of the happiness which we once enjoyed.

"The old is better" is the voice of authority, that reverence for tradition which, for good and evil, has made religion the most potent of antiseptics.

Priests have used stone knives long after iron has been discovered. Plutarch's father, arguing like Bishop Blougram, begged his son to be content with the "old faith," which cannot be pulled to pieces with impunity. "The faith once delivered to the saints" became petrified—not yet Petrified—only three generations after it was first proclaimed. *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus* is an impressive slogan, even if a closer investigation reveals that the first clause means "in 1563," the second "at Trent," the third "by a majority."

There is a charm about anything old. It is pleasant to swim against the stream, instead of being carried down with it, a feat which any dead dog can perform. "Visions," says Horace Walpole, "have always been my pasture; and so far from growing old enough to quarrel with their emptiness, I almost think there is no wisdom comparable to that of exchanging what are called the realities of life for dreams. Old castles, old pictures, old histories, and the babble of old people, make one live back into centuries that cannot disappoint one. The dead have exhausted their power of deceiving—one can trust Catharine of Medicis now." Romanticism such as that of Horace Walpole has now fallen into discredit; but how many of us still prefer an Elizabethan manor-house, replete with every ancient discomfort, to a modern labour-saving villa!

But human nature being what it is, archaism is not merely a city of refuge for a dreamer. From it come all the revivals. Revivals are shallow things, since they aim at reproducing what never existed, or what has perished with the age which gave it birth. In so far as they

try to preserve continuity, and to rescue from extinction values which are in danger of being lost, they are not really archaistic. Such were the great movements which we call collectively the Renaissance, which has governed European culture down to our own day. Nor can we find fault with the artificial reverence paid in our higher education to classical models, some of which approached perfection in their own line.

But it is in a disintegrating society that the anxiety to revive the past is most apparent, and too often it takes the form of primitivism, since the tastes of the recent past seem to be discredited. We have lost nearly the whole of Greek literature in the second and third centuries before Christ, because the restorers of pure Attic disliked the style in which it was written. Paganism was dying in euthanasia in the third century A.D., but it was resuscitated archaistically, so that Augustine, instead of dealing with the syncretistic religion of the cultivated pagans of his day, thinks it worth while to ridicule the old Roman godlings of Varro. The Catholic revival under Chateaubriand and de Maistre was almost equally shallow. Modern conversions to Romanism are perhaps to be otherwise explained. They are part of the reaction against Liberalism and liberty which has made possible the new totalitarian States. In art the reversion to savage models seems to be purely pathological.

In secular history romantic archaism has been disastrous. The ruin of the East Roman Empire is, in no small measure, traceable to Justinian's senseless wars, which were waged to revive the Empire of Augustus. Henry V's claim to the French crown led to the ruin of the Plantagenets and the old nobility. Two obsolete institutions, the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Church as a territorial Power, obstructed till within living memory the unification of Germany and Italy. The historian must not lose sight of the ghosts which hover over our modern world.

At the time when I am writing, these ghosts threaten to wreck the civilization of Europe. Even Mussolini's grotesque charade in the robes of Caesar is causing great inconvenience; and Germany has revived Napoleonism in its most dangerous and destructive form. A curious archaistic superstition has taken possession of the German nation, and has become a popular religion. A popular religion is a superstition which has enslaved a philosophy. The postulates in this case, as has been said, are that German has been spoken, *ab initio*, by a blonde and blue-eyed race; that this race is autochthonous in Northern Europe; and that the region, the race, and the language are all uniquely noble. Professor Hauer exhorts his countrymen to "return to the paganism in which our Teutonic forefathers found happiness before they were captivated by an alien Judaistic superstitution and an alien Romance culture." So, as F. L. Lucas says,

"a few hysterical sentences about Nordic heroism and Aryan purity suffice to build up a whole dream-world, in which a Hitler youth seems to himself a very Galahad as he spits on defenceless Jews." Corrupt romanticism is always obscene and sadistic.

Of all the ways of escape which we have to consider, Archaism is the least fruitful and the most dangerous.

Futurism is now far more important in religion and philosophy than archaism, but it has not always been so. In classical antiquity, in spite of the popular cults of the spirits of the dead, it played only a small part, except in the Orphic brotherhoods, to which Platonism was affiliated. We gather from Plato's Republic that the average young Athenian in his day had not been taught to believe in the immortality of the soul. The earlier Hebrew religion had no eschatology. The shadowy Sheol was outside Jehovah's jurisdiction. The Jewish view of the future was less a wishful optimism than a resolute conviction that divine justice, in reward and punishment, must somehow and somewhen be done on earth—of the chosen people a remnant, but perhaps only a remnant, would be saved. But as the prospects of the nation became darker, apocalyptism succeeded prophecy, and men's thoughts turned to a supernatural deliverance, a day of the Lord. The Christian Church succeeded to a mixed inheritance of Hellenistic thought, mainly Platonic and Stoic but with an infusion of Oriental cults, and of the Judaism of the dispersion, already influenced by Greek ideas. It was futuristic in its eschatology, which was supramundane, though a sporadic Chiliasm broke out at intervals without exercising an abiding influence. The doctrine of the Church crystallized at one of the most dismal periods of history, at the beginning of a long dark age which continued for some six hundred years, and there was nothing either in patristic theology or in Neoplatonic philosophy to encourage the idea that men might escape in thought from a distressful present to a brilliant revival of culture and prosperity in the near future. The general opinion was that the world had grown old and was near its end. *Hora novissima, tempora pessima;* the last scene was looked forward to without regret.

But supramundane futurism was firmly rooted in the popular mind. It was a way of escape, but not wholly a consolatory one, for it was commonly taught that the lost would far outnumber the saved, and that the fate of the lost would be inconceivably terrible. How far these crude and lurid pictures of bliss and torment were really believed in it is very difficult to say. The colours were heightened because the picture tended to fade. Eschatology is always symbolic, and the Christian teaching tried to combine two doctrines which were really incompatible, the Jewish belief in the resurrection of the body and the Greek belief in the immortality of the soul. But

however eternal life was conceived, heaven and hell were treated as places, and the time of divine reward and punishment was in the future.

It was not till the eighteenth century that futurism was secularized. The story of the superstition of human perfectibility has been often told, for example in my Romanes Lecture, and in J. B. Bury's *The Idea of Progress*, which appeared about the same time. It would not be worth while now to illustrate by quotations the extravagant predictions which fill the writings of the last century, predictions which were made by historians, publicists, and men of science, not excluding Darwin himself. Bradley protested in vain against a belief which, as he said, has his sympathy, but which he certainly cannot share. It was popularly assumed that the doctrine of evolution supported the supposed law of progress, although it should have been plain that Darwin's theory only explained how those types which were best suited to their environment survived, not that nature in any sense favoured the "higher" members of a species. Darwin himself never claimed to have discovered the cause of variations, the large majority of which are deleterious or lethal. Moreover, the distinction already drawn by Kant between "evolution," the mechanical unpacking of what was present in germ from the beginning, and "epigenesis," which involves the addition of new factors, was often forgotten, and it must be admitted that Lloyd Morgan's word "emergence" was admirably chosen to mask the confusion between two radically different theories. Several physiologists have said that the mechanism of nature, for example in the structure of the eye, is by no means so ingenious as Paley believed. They have agreed with Alfonso the Wise, of Spain, who remarked that he could have suggested improvements in the universe if the Creator had consulted him. A violent thunderstorm deterred him from placing his suggestions on record.

The superstition was dying before public affairs gave it its *coup de grâce*. But strange survivals are still to be seen. For instance, there is a strong prejudice against the theory of cosmic cycles, which on philosophical grounds has much to recommend it. Jeans cannot see any use in a repetition of the cosmic drama, and gives this as one reason for disbelieving it. Toynbee rejects it with indignation as absolute pessimism. But why call it pessimistic? "This odious scene of violence and cruelty," as Mill called the universe, is a pleasant enough habitation for most people in normal times. When Leopardi exclaims, "All that exists is evil. That anything exists is evil. Everything exists only to achieve evil. Existence itself is an evil; there is no other good than non-existence," we suspect that he was mad, or suffering from jaundice. Marcus Aurelius thought that an intelligent man of forty has seen all that life has to show us. Is it not rather a

relief to know that even politicians cannot do more than a limited amount of mischief?

What may we fairly believe about the future, after we have accepted Bosanquet's warning that to throw our ideals into the future is the death of all sane idealism, and Anatole France's gibe that the future is a convenient place in which to store our dreams? We probably have an immensely long lease of our present abode, so long that the race is a child and civilization a new-born babe. No doubt the sun may blow up and become a *nova*; or another star may charge into it; but both catastrophes are said to be extremely unlikely. We may therefore assume that there will be time for us to try every kind of political experiment, and that there will almost certainly be many flowering times of civilisation worthy to be compared with the ages of Pericles, of Augustus, of Louis XIV, and of Victoria. There will be glacial epochs and inter-glacial epochs, both physical and spiritual. But several of the arts seem to have already reached their perfection, and then "stopped," as Aristotle says. We can hardly imagine that there will ever be greater sculptors than Pheidias, greater painters than Raphael and Rembrandt, greater philosophers than Plato and Aristotle, greater poets than Shakespeare, greater physicists than Newton. And in religion perhaps most of us would agree that finality was reached in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago. It does not matter, for our present purpose, whether, as I believe myself, the discourses of Christ in the synoptic Gospels are in substance authentic, or whether, as is no doubt historically possible, the early Church (as Samuel Butler puts it) made his name a peg on which to hang its own best thoughts. In either case a unique spiritual revelation was made at that time and in that place.

As regards the near future, I fear that it is no "escape" to think of the state of Europe which our children are likely to see.

Eschatological futurism is another story. It depends on the hardest of all philosophical problems, the status of time in reality. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what God hath prepared for them that love him." All eschatology must be mythical and symbolical; and I fear that those who have frankly abandoned the idea of a geographical heaven somewhere in space, but think it possible to retain the idea of eternity as an endless series of moments of time, to begin for each of us at his death and never to stop, must be willing to take a further step and admit that when "there shall be time no longer" we are contemplating a state of existence of which we know nothing except "by symbols, as in a mirror." Even Spinoza gives us full leave to use these symbols; but it is a little surprising to find Gifford lecturers using without apology the language of popular homiletics. Edwyn Bevan speaks of the time-process coming to an end and being *suc-*

ceeded by a timeless state; and even A. E. Taylor, whom I am generally proud to follow, hopes quite seriously that Nelson in heaven may learn not to despise Frenchmen, and Aristotle not to despise the lower orders. The idea of progress in eternity is very doubtful, and it is no part of Christianity.

The "principle of Carnot," if it is universally valid, of course fixes a term, though a very distant one, to all human hopes. But a Platonist, and many who are not Platonists, will think it more likely that no date could be given for the beginning or the end of the cosmos. For if a clock is running down, it must have been wound up; and whatever power wound up the cosmic clock once may presumably wind it up again. Another cosmic cycle to follow ours would give no help to Mr. Bevan, for it would not be "timeless"; and I doubt whether Nelson and Aristotle would be able to go to school there.

Two things, however, I must say before leaving my discussion of futurism as a way of escape. The first is that belief in God is central, belief in human immortality is peripheral. I have met no one who thought that McTaggart's strange attempt to establish belief in human immortality while denying the existence of God was successful. I need hardly add that no help to religious faith can ever be given by necromancy. The second is that the exploitation of future reward and punishment as a bribe and threat to the unconverted has brought a heavy Nemesis on the Churches.

The third way of escape may be called in one word *Detachment.* We often call it the philosophy of India, and it is convenient to take Indian thought as the field in which this type may be best studied. But it would be a very shallow judgment, and unjust to India, to suppose that other philosophies, and other views of reality, have had no place in the long intellectual life of a nation which in the opinion of some good judges has shown more aptitude for metaphysical speculation than any other. Nor would it be at all difficult to find in European mysticism as good examples of the philosophy of detachment as can be gathered from the literature of Brahmanism and Buddhism.

We are told that if we ask Indians what they obtain, or hope to obtain, from their religion, their commonest answer is, "Deliverance." Theirs is therefore a religion of escape. Deliverance is won by the realisation of a spiritual unity with a spiritual Being who is impersonal and super-moral, a Being who is in a mysterious way none other than ourselves. This is a rigorous monistic mysticism, which is necessarily non-ethical, since ethics are ineradicably dualistic. All differences, whether of existence or of value, are in principle denied. There is nothing either good or bad, only the unreal phantasmagoria of the

outer world and the shoreless ocean of Nirvana. This is indeed a complete deliverance from sin and sorrow.

In practice, Indian thought gives an ethical character to God; we may remember that the later Platonists called the First Principle the Good as well as the One. But the religion remains essentially mystical. The doctrine of reincarnation, which also appears in Neoplatonism, is strictly inconsistent with Brahmanic mysticism, because it gives some reality to time; and the doctrine of Karma introduces an ethical element, since though nothing is inherited except the bare form of identity and the liabilities contracted in the last phase of existence, retributive justice is done. But as rebirth is itself regarded as an evil, the doctrine of Karma rather accentuates than attenuates the duty of detachment from the world. The belief in Karma, however, is said to have lost ground in modern Hinduism.

Another concession to world-affirmation is the common practice of retiring from active life only after a youth and middle age spent in the discharge of civic duties, among which the procreation of children has a prominent place. So in Neoplatonism the civic virtues are a necessary preliminary to purification and contemplation.

It is well known that Buddhism underwent transformations which have parallels in other religions. Buddha became a heavenly Being who took on him the form of a man in order to bring knowledge of redemption to mankind. It was no longer necessary to retire from the world in order to win redemption. Those who have earned Nirvana should renounce the privilege in order to live again on earth and help their fellow creatures.

Logically, Indian benevolence should be stoical and unpitying. But in practice it is not so. Compassion is justified on the ground that there is no real severance between human beings. In helping my neighbour I am helping myself.

The following brief declaration of faith by a modern Indian philosopher, Bhagavan Das, may perhaps be regarded as typical. "I believe in one all-including, all-pervading, ever-complete, timeless, spaceless universal Soul or Spirit or Self, which is absolute and changeless, which is also identical with and includes within itself all the countless individual selves, and whose eternally changeless yet ever-changing ideation the entire world-process of all souls and bodies is."[1]

"No society puts its foot on the neck of the wretched so mercilessly as that of India." This is the confession of a great Indian thinker, but it may be doubted whether this is a fair criticism of Indian and still more of Buddhist, religion. I cannot forget what a British officer said during the campaign in Burmah. "What a lot of trouble these fellows would have given us if they had been Christians!" It

[1] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 141.

would be more difficult to meet the charge that an Indian not only eats and drinks but *sins* religiously, and that the detachment of the Indian saint is so complete that all the rich contents of the spiritual life are lost in the blank trance.

The real crux is whether we should try to be detached from human affection. Many of the mystics have said "Yes." They have spurned their nearest relations; they have been known to rejoice when death relieved them of family ties which, they thought, came between them and the love of God; they have been quite indifferent to disasters which threatened their country and European civilization. Plotinus and Spinoza both express almost callous indifference to public misfortunes. We should remember, perhaps, that both were unmarried, and that neither an Egyptian in the third century nor a Jewish refugee in any Continental country could be expected to be an ardent patriot. Another eminent Jew, Einstein, has confessed that he has "never belonged to my country, my home, my friends, or even to my family, with a whole heart." But this kind of detachment is not the solution which we are looking for. It is not the business of philosophy or religion to make us invulnerable. Perhaps Christianity alone has firmly grasped this truth.

It has often been said that Christianity is essentially an Oriental world-renouncing creed, which did not conquer Europe, but was conquered by it. This is one of those half-truths which are more misleading than downright falsehoods. The early Christians mainly belonged, certainly not to the "proletariate," but to the lower middle class, who racially were neither Greeks nor Romans, and culturally were only superficially Hellenized. They were penalized by the Government more severely than the Jews, and though they were willing to carry off the treasures of pagan philosophy into their hive, had little sympathy with the political and social traditions of the dwindling ruling class. The urge to flight from the world was not confined to Christians, and was naturally encouraged by the miserable condition of Europe after the fourth century. But the Gospel itself, as I hope to show in the next section of this article, was not only detached from the world by its idealism, but attached to it by its fundamental doctrine that God is love. There is a noble inconsistency, perhaps not ultimately irreconcilable, between the Christian's acceptance of hardship and affliction for himself, and his refusal to recommend the like renunciation to his neighbours. If the influence of Asiatic religion has been on the whole paralysing to social activity, the same can hardly be said of Christianized Europe.

I now come to the fourth way of escape, for which I cannot find an appropriate name, unless we are content to call it *Platonic*. The essence of this creed is that the subject and object must be trans-

formed *pari passu*. I have summed up the message of Platonism as an act of faith that "if we live as we ought we shall see things as they are, and if we see things as they are we shall live as we ought." There is no sense in which Platonism can justly be called dualistic, and I entirely agree with Burnet that "to anyone who has tried to live in sympathy with the Greek philosophers, the suggestion that they were intellectualists must seem ludicrous." The mistake, so far as it is not based on pragmatist distrust of the intellect, is probably due to a failure to distinguish between νοῦς and διάνοια. Medieval philosophers translated νοῦς by *intellectus*, but they knew that *intellectus* does not mean discursive reasoning. *Noûs*, which the Greek Fathers equated with the Pauline πνεῦμα, is the whole personality acting under the guidance of its highest faculty, a faculty which, as Plotinus says, "all possess but few use," a faculty which may be called super-personal, since, as the mystics were to say, it is a spark kindled at the altar of God, a core of our nature which "can never consent to sin."

The beginning and end of the spiritual journey, says Proclus, are simple; the intermediate stage is complex. So for Clement of Alexandria the first step is from unbelief to faith, which is the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis, a "compendious knowledge of essentials," which verifies itself as experiment passes to experience. *Solvitur ambulando.* The second stage is knowledge, "a sure and firm demonstration of the things received through faith, carrying us on to unshaken conviction and scientific certainty." The fully real can be fully known, as Plato says, and as Spinoza was to say after him. Those who are filled with the most real are most really filled. Finally, knowledge, as it passes into love, begins at once to establish a mutual friendship between the knower and the known. The spirit in love (νοῦς ἐρῶν), as Plotinus says, is already in its heavenly home "Yonder," and the transfigured soul sees the objects of perception no longer as separated from the supreme values and from each other, but as irradiated with the light which comes from the ineffable Godhead; for even beatified spirits look upward; "all things pray, except the Supreme," Proclus says.

"Everything that is Yonder is also Here," says Plotinus. His heaven is no second physical world. "But soul must become spirit" before we can see the world as it is, and the discipline is long and hard. "This world is only a shadow and an image"; but, as the Quaker Isaac Penington says, though "every truth is a shadow except the last, every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but a shadow in another place; and the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance."

This is a sketch of the Platonic way of deliverance, *ex umbris et imaginibus in lucem*, in the words which Newman chose for his

epitaph. I may be reminded that in spite of what has been said, the whole emphasis in most of the mystical writers is laid on the *via remotionis*, the discarding of all concrete images in the hope of reaching the absolute Godhead, who in the words of Scotus Erigena, *non immerito nihilum vocitatur*. How does this differ from the Indian's quest of Nirvana? Do not the Neoplatonists pour scorn on "Matter," as if the visible world were an unclean thing?

Of course ὕλη does not mean "matter" as ponderable stuff; it only seems to be evil till we recognize what it is, or rather what it is not. But I think it is true that all who belong to this school of thought are tempted to dwell too exclusively on the escape of the soul, which may in truth be only part of the unending systole and diastole of the spiritual life. We have seen how the later Buddhism will not allow the saint to rest in Nirvana while his brothers still remain unredeemed and unenlightened. The Neoplatonists were puzzled by the same problem. Was it a sin, or a fall from perfection, for the soul to "come down" to earth? Is there any explanation except Plotinus's "it had to be," or his reference to the audacity and curiosity which may have tempted even the blessed in the world Yonder? Proclus has a better answer. "The soul came down, wishing to imitate the providence of the gods."

Perhaps the story of the Transfiguration of Christ may illustrate the point which I am trying to make. The three apostles who seem to have been an inner circle of the Twelve were privileged to see a vision of their Master clothed with light as with a garment, and attended by the great lawgiver and the greatest prophet of their nation. "Lord, it is good for us to be here," they exclaimed; here upon the holy mount. It was good for them to be there; but not to stay there. The vision soon faded, and they were left to return to the duties for which the vision was shown to them; there was a demon to cast out on the plain below. They were also being prepared for a very heavy trial to their faith; they were soon to witness the cruel death of their Master. "See that thou make all things according to the pattern showed thee in the mount." Man is seldom healthy or happy unless he is *making* something.

Withdrawal without return means salvation without love; and this is not permitted to the sons of men. It is punished by a fatal impoverishment of experience: "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" But did not Plotinus and the Indian sages love God? It would be absurd to deny it. They were far too great to be much injured by their concentration. The penalties of self-sacrificing specialization are happily not very severe. But in some of the mystics the absence of natural affection casts a chill upon the admiration which we should like to

feel for them. There is at bottom the wish to be invulnerable, and this we were never meant to be.

For ourselves, at this terribly sad time, the chief thing to remember is that the escape to which the mystics show us the way is a real escape. They testify what they have seen, and their witness agrees together. They have climbed the hill of the Lord, and in faltering accents, for human language was not made to express such things, they have described the view from the top. They have given up all that they had to buy the pearl of great price, and the pearl is in their possession. Let there be no mistake about this. Religious experience at its highest and richest is among the data of which any comprehensive philosophy must take account, and for which it must find room, on penalty of being partial, abstract, and incomplete. If any man, says Bradley, fancies that there is anything more real than what comes to him in religion, he knows not what he says. It is in religion—and we include in religion the disinterested search for the true and the devout homage to the beautiful—that we are in contact with the eternal and absolute values in which the mind of God is revealed to us. They stand in their own right; they can be explained by nothing outside themselves, and not even by each other. If we ask, "What is my duty?" there may be room for much debate. But if I ask, "If I know my duty, why should I do it?" there is no answer except, "Because you must." Pilate's question, "What is truth?" may not be always easy to answer. But to say, "If ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise," or (strangely enough) with Voltaire, "Ah, croyez moi, l'erreur a son mérite," is an insult to human nature. These ultimate values are the most real things in the world, and it is in our power "to live resolutely in the Good, the Whole, and the Beautiful." "Those who have seen it know what I say," Plotinus tells us. This appeal to the experience of those who have a right to give it is the last word of philosophy.

One caution is necessary. We shall not find that evil vanishes as we begin to see things as they are. The brighter the sunshine, the darker are the shadows. The saint, not the sinner, sees the world in silhouette. To ascend "beyond good and evil" is not for man in this life. Here we come into conflict with that too facile monism which is the bane of philosophy. The materialist puts mind inside matter, and calls the life of the spirit an epiphenomenon, a luminous haze floating idly over the real world of the countable and ponderable. The mentalist puts matter inside mind, and would have us believe that we create the world which we perceive. The idealist reduces evil to negation, and tells us that it needs only to be supplemented and transmuted in order to take its place in the perfect order. It will not do; the negative signs are there, and cannot be turned into positive signs by any legerdemain of transcendental arithmetic. Evil, as we

unhappily know too well, is not a defect of good, but the work of "the world-rulers of this darkness." This is why we cannot rest in the beatific vision, nor in Plato's Republic, while our brethren are struggling *in faece Romuli*. In St. Paul's words we must "fill up that which was lacking in the afflictions of Christ for his body's sake."

Macneile Dixon, in his charming and stimulating Gifford Lectures, shows remorselessly how we have been punished for our shallow optimism. "The kind-hearted humanitarians of the nineteenth century decided to improve upon Christianity. The thought of hell offended their susceptibilities. They closed it, and to their surprise the gates of heaven closed also with a melancholy clang. The malignant countenance of Satan distressed them. They dispensed with him, and at the same time God took his departure." "In yes and no all things consist."

And yet we are citizens of the city the type of which is laid up in heaven. The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen are eternal. St. Paul was on his way to bonds and death when he wrote those heroic, almost defiant words at the end of the eighth chapter of Romans. "In all these things we are more than conquerors." Augustine lived in an age when civilization was visibly breaking up. The Eternal City had been sacked by the Goths. The Vandals were at the gates of his little cathedral city of Hippo. He looks back at the *grande latrocinium* of the Roman Empire, and forward to the more ruthless savagery of the barbarians who destroyed it. He gives his verdict in unforgettable words: *acceperunt mercedem suam, vani vanam.*

The world of space and time is sacramental. It is linked to eternal reality through love, the hierophant of the divine mysteries, for in love the divine is incarnated to win deliverance through suffering, victory through defeat, life through death.

APPEAL TO PHILOSOPHERS[1]

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I

The Classical Tradition in Philosophy: its Practical Concern

I want in this paper to enter a protest against the preoccupations of many contemporary philosophers, and to put in a plea for a return to the classical tradition in philosophy. According to this tradition, philosophy is, or at least should be, concerned with the whole conduct of life. It has two main functions, to clarify the wisdom of common-sense people, and to increase it. To put it technically, philosophy, as traditionally conceived, is an activity of self-conscious beings which seeks, among other things, critically to examine the manifestations of human consciousness and the principles which guide human activity; to examine not disinterestedly, but in order to illuminate, to assist, and to reform. Philosophy has, therefore, the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue. One of the methods traditionally employed for achieving these two purposes consists in the attempt to discover those values which are ultimate in the sense that, while other things are desired for the sake of them, they alone are desired for their own sakes, to uncover by a process of analysis the values which underlie the judgments commonly passed by contemporary society—as for example, in our own society, the values implied by the judgment that increase of efficiency in slaughter is desirable, especially if combined with a readiness to undertake it whenever the State to which one happens to belong deems the moment expedient for the mass slaughter of the citizens of some other State—and to show how the latter deviate from the former.

In order to exhibit this deviation, philosophers have traditionally devoted some part of their attention to an examination of the conduct of fellow citizens, and interested themselves in the problems raised by the lives which were being lived by their contemporaries. The traditional philosopher has, in other words, spent a considerable proportion of his time in the cave and devoted a considerable pro-

[1] This article, which was originally read to a meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Cambridge in February 1940, is reprinted by permission of the Secretary.

portion of his attention to its affairs. And this he has done with the practical object of inducing his fellow cave-dwellers to realize that they are in fact dwelling in a cave, as a preliminary to leading them out of it.

This tradition is chiefly exemplified by the great Greek philosophers. Following it, they have enunciated a number of fairly definite principles in regard to the right conduct of the individual's life and the right conduct of the community's affairs, principles by means of which they sought to provide a guide to living. Examples are, in ethics, Plato's distinction between pure and impure pleasures in the *Philebus*—we are exhorted to cultivate the former and eschew the latter—the demonstration in the *Republic* that those who wish to obtain the greatest satisfaction allowable to and possible for the appetites will be well advised to submit the appetites to a rule of life prescribed by reason, and the doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle's *Ethics*. Political examples are the principle that only those who are averse from ruling should be permitted to rule, the doctrine that philosophers should be kings, and the view which ascribes to education the purpose of so training the citizen that he will revere the constitution of the State, adopt its values, obey its laws, and in no circumstances seek to change them.

Numerous other examples could be given. I am not here concerned to inquire whether these doctrines are true or false, salutary or harmful; it is sufficient for my purpose to point out that they do directly apply both to the conduct of the individual's life and to the administration of the community, and that the philosophers who propounded them considered that one of the main purposes of philosophy was to concern itself precisely in the way which these doctrines exemplify with the problems of good living and good government.

If it be objected that metaphysics was also the concern of the Greek philosophers, I agree that this is the case, but take leave to point out that Plato's metaphysical views are so closely bound up with his ethical and political doctrines that it is only if the former are true and if the entities whose existence they assert are knowable by human beings, that the Platonic State can be realized, and the authoritarianism of its regulations justified. What is more, Plato himself agrees that this is so. Even in Aristotle's *Ethics*, *theoria* is represented as the crown of *praxis*: the activity of disinterested research and contemplation is, in other words, commended as the highest form of the good life.

II

Similarities between Twentieth-Century Europe and Fourth-Century Greece

It is a commonplace that our age resembles in a number of important respects that of Plato and Aristotle.

(1) *Politics.*

Both ages are ages of transition. Profound changes, it is obvious, there must be, but it is not yet clear to us, any more than it was clear to Plato, what form they will take. In both fourth-century Athens and twentieth-century Europe democracy has been tried and, in the opinion of many, found wanting. Its alleged failure produced Plato's savage attack in the Eighth and Ninth Books of the *Republic*, no less than it prompts Mussolini's denial, as he tramples on the "putrefying corpse of liberty," that "the majority by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society." It was largely responsible for the division by both Plato and Aristotle of citizens into distinct human classes and types, just as it is responsible for the Fascist repudiation of the liberal doctrine that each individual is an end in himself, possessing rights other than those conferred on him by virtue of his citizenship of a State, pursuing ends which have no reference to the community, and entitled to conceive and realize purposes in which the community has no part.

A resemblance no less significant is to be found in the fact that the existing form of political organization was and is manifestly out of date. The City-States of fourth-century Greece could no more meet the challenge of the times than the Nation-States of twentieth-century Europe. In each case a change in the scale of living, which is itself a reflection of a change in the economic and technological background of society tends to render existing political forms obsolete, and to exhibit as anachronisms the organizations that maintain them. In fourth-century Greece the fundamental political question was: "Can the form of political organization which has been bequeathed to us from a comparatively remote past be adapted to meet the needs of a very different present; or must it be forcibly superseded because of its inability to make the necessary adaptations?" This is also the fundamental political question of our own day. Each age is, in short, in travail with a new political form. The City-States failed to meet the challenge and were in due course absorbed by Philip of Macedon. In the modern world the issue is still doubtful, but it has become reasonably certain that, unless the Nation-States agree to surrender part of their sovereignties to some form of federal or supernational government, they will grind one another to pieces.

(2) *Religion.*

Each age is characterized by a decline of traditional religious belief. The old gods no longer command respect and the old religious forms are no longer observed. This lack of respect and observation is particularly noticeable in the young. As a consequence, large numbers of young people are left in modern Europe, as they were left in ancient Greece, without a creed to live by, and, being manifestly incommoded by the lack, pursue all manner of strange gods in the endeavour to find an ideal for their aspirations and a channel for their emotions of reverence and awe. Nature abhors a vacuum in the spiritual world no less than in the physical, and, as the subsequent history of the ancient world shows, men deprived of gods make gods of men. They are doing so again to-day.

(3) *Ethics.*

The decline of religious belief is in part responsible for a repudiation of moral principles; for the lack of a creed is only too often responsible for the abandonment of a code. A large part of morality has sprung, in all ages, from a desire to please God, a desire which the prospect of the respective consequences of His pleasure and displeasure, consequences which most religions have painted in the liveliest colours, has done much to intensify. When heavenly rewards and hellish punishments are no longer operative to attract and to deter, the incentive to observe the traditional restraints is correspondingly diminished. A number of other factors contribute to the same result, of which the most important is the international situation. The nightmare fear of war has for years operated like a shutter cutting off the prospect of the future, and investing with a remote and somewhat academic air the injunction to adopt what one may describe as a long-term attitude to life with all that it implies in the way of discipline and training in the present in the interests of character-building for the future. Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die, is an understandable creed in a situation in which to postpone the fruition of the more obvious desires seems tantamount to forgoing them altogether.

These factors have contributed to produce a situation in which Plato's picture of the democratic man in the Eighth Book of the *Republic* impresses the observer with its terrifying topicality.

> "He will not receive nor suffer within the ramparts the true reasoning of any one who asserts that some pleasures spring from the desires that are good and noble, but others from those that are evil, and that the former should be fostered and honoured, and the latter disciplined and enslaved. To all such remarks he shakes his head, and says that all are alike and

> deserving of equal honour . . . And this is his life. Day after day he gratifies the pleasures as they come—now fluting down the primrose path of wine, now given over to teetotalism and banting; one day in hard training, the next slacking and idling, and the third playing the philosopher. Often he will take to politics, leap to his feet and do or say whatever comes into his head; or he conceives an admiration for a general, and his interests are in war; or for a man of business, and straightway that is his line. He knows no order or necessity in life; but he calls life as he conceives it pleasant and free and divinely blessed, and is ever faithful to it."

Plato proceeds to point out that sooner or later the democratic way of life is found unsatisfying. Sooner or later, a single tyrant desire will dominate the others, or men will submit themselves to the tyranny of an external authority in order to escape the tyranny of their own passions. This has already happened on the continent of Europe.

In England young people have for some years past been accumulating a fund of unexpended seriousness which only awaits a suitable channel through which to pour. It is in the existence of masses of disillusioned young men with energies untapped, minds unextended, and loyalties unawakened that lie Europe's danger and the philosopher's opportunity. It was a precisely similar opportunity that Plato and Aristotle were anxious to seize.

(4) *Intolerance.*

Partly because of the absence of a unifying creed in which most, or all, men believe, and of an accepted code which most, or all, men observe, public life was distinguished in Plato's Greece, as it is in modern Europe, by a growth of bitterness and intolerance. In both, the liberal spirit so carefully fostered during the preceding generations is palpably on the decline. This result comes about in the following way.

Where there is a large measure of general agreement in regard to ultimate ends, political doctrines can be represented as means to their realization. Where, however, there are no common ends to which the generality of men subscribe, political doctrines assume the status of ends in themselves. In the nineteenth century there was a general agreement among thinking people as to the nature and end of the individual. His nature was that of an immortal soul; his end was to achieve eternal salvation. Thus, when men differed about politics—even when they differed about ethics—their differences related to the best method of realizing the individual's nature and achieving the individual's end. Moreover, there was,

broadly speaking, a general agreement, at least in the western democracies, as to the kind of society which it was desirable to establish. Owing to the decline of traditional religion these agreements no longer obtain, precisely because there is to-day no general acceptance of the view of the individual as an immortal soul and no general reliance upon the hope of eternal salvation. Consequently, political doctrines such as Fascism and Communism assume for the twentieth century the status which religious doctrines possessed in the nineteenth; they are not, that is to say, doctrines in regard to means to an agreed end, but doctrines in regard to ends about which there is no agreement. It is from this source that the intolerance which the protagonists of the different contemporary ideologies feel for one another derives.

The parallel with late fifth- and fourth-century Athens is again too obvious to require elaboration. The increasing frequency of *stasis* and the intensifying bitterness between the partisans of oligarchy and democracy afford a close parallel to the modern rivalry between Communism and Fascism, and to the violence displayed by their adherents. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of religion from the foreground of the modern consciousness, these modern ideologies claim to cover the whole field of life and to possess the whole soul of man. Rival political and ethical philosophies in fourth-century Athens made the same claim. Against this background of religious disbelief, ethical anarchy and political bitterness, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle sought each in his different way to contrive by means of philosophy to discover a specific for the evils of the time. What, in the parallel circumstances of our own day, do we provide in the way of a parallel philosophical effort?

III

The Philosophers' Ivory Tower

The distinctive preoccupations of contemporary philosophers are too familiar to require description in a paper read to a Society which, in recent years, has devoted two-thirds of its time to their consideration. Outstanding among these preoccupations is the philosophical analysis of the meaning of sentences.

It is sometimes contended that philosophical analysis has a practical application—when we know more precisely what is the meaning of the expressions which appear in the language of the common-sense man (and also of the non-analytical philosopher), then, it is said, we shall have a better chance of knowing whether the statements that he makes are true; more often no such contention is made. Indeed, analytical philosophers often claim for their pursuits

the negative merit of not misleading people by propounding meaningless doctrines as to the nature of the universe and the conduct of life. The view that philosophy should provide for the twentieth-century ideals to live for and principles to live by is renounced, the claim to have done so by philosophies in the past is dismissed as bogus, and the attempt to do so by philosophers in the present is regarded as mistaken.

Whether practical application is or is not sought, none is in fact forthcoming. I doubt whether any single person has found life easier to live, problems easier to solve, or the universe easier to understand as a result of studying the works of those twentieth-century philosophers who have occupied themselves with the problems of philosophical analysis. For although, as I noted above, some analysts have contended that the method of analysis may lead to practical results, it is not easy to see what form these results could take. It is, of course, conceivable that a satisfactory analysis of sentences such as "I ought to do my duty," "the individual owes an allegiance to the State which transcends all other obligations," "the defence of what one believes to be true and right is never a justification for inflicting pain upon other people," "the mind of a human being is free to pursue the good and to eschew the evil," will one day be forthcoming; it is further conceivable that the analysis may be such as to throw light upon the difficulties of conduct and the dark places of the universe. What is clear is that no agreed analysis of the meaning of such sentences as these is in fact forthcoming, and I am doubtful—I write subject to correction—whether it is even attempted. The meaning of such sentences is, I dare say, too complex for investigation by the technique of analysis at its present stage of development. Or perhaps it will be said that they have no meaning . . .

It is not, then, upon such sentences as these that the analyst directs his attention. His intellectual activity is expended rather in discovering precisely what it is that I mean when I make such announcements as: "This rocking horse is covered with pink spots."

Since the last war topics of this kind have increasingly occupied the minds of contemporary philosophers to the exclusion of other interests, so that the traditional subjects of philosophy are either neglected or dismissed. There are, of course, notable exceptions. The Master of Balliol has, for example, in his course of lectures consistently sought to maintain the tradition that ethics and politics are not parlour games, but the training of men and women for life and work, while Professor Whitehead has developed a metaphysic in the grand manner which, whatever its obscurities and incidental difficulties—and the former are as profound as the latter are formidable—has at least succeeded in throwing for many of us new

light upon the nature of the universe which we inhabit. Professor Whitehead's works, in fact, conform to Professor Broad's definition of "speculative philosophy" in that they seek to propound a general metaphysical system.

But nobody would contend that Dr. Lindsay and Professor Whitehead are in any sense typical exponents of the distinctive philosophy of the times. The former is too practical, the latter too speculative; so much so, that Mr. Braithwaite writing in *Cambridge University Studies* on the present condition of Cambridge philosophy, speaks of Whitehead's development of his "philosophy of nature into a general metaphysic" as edifying "his disciples as much as it has perplexed his philosophical admirers."

The typical preoccupations of Cambridge philosophers are indicated by the reflection of the Chinese philosopher, described by Mr. Braithwaite in the same paper, who on leaving Cambridge "remarked mock-regretfully that he had hoped to learn from Moore the nature of the world and had instead learnt a great deal about the correct use of the English language."

It is sometimes said that only Cambridge philosophers who are distinctively preoccupied by the topics of philosophical analysis. That this is not so the following quotation from Professor Collingwood's recently published *An Autobiography* sufficiently testifies. Oxford philosophers, he writes, were "proud to have excogitated a philosophy so pure from the sordid taint of utility that they could lay their hands on their hearts and say it was no use at all; a philosophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life of pure research could appreciate it, and so abstuse that only a whole-time student, and a very clever man at that, could understand it. They were quite resigned to the contempt of fools and amateurs. If any differed from them on these points, it could only be because his intellect was weak or his motives bad." To put the same point in my own words, thought is regarded not as an instrument by means of which men can liberate themselves from bondage to nature, from servitude to abstractions, or from the tyranny of men; it is not even a torch to light up the dark places of the universe and so to reveal man's place and function within it. It shrinks into a technique for ensuring that, whenever philosophers try to use it for its traditional purposes, they shall be trapped in the meshes of a net of verbal contradictions and so reduced to philosophical helplessness.

What are the reasons for this withdrawal of the philosopher to the ivory tower of a practical and speculative sterility, whose steps can only be ascended by means of a specialized technique?

A number may, I think, be adduced. There is, in the first place, the general specialization of our age. Influenced by the procedure of the scientist who is engaged in acquiring ever fuller information

in an ever-narrowing field, philosophers seem to take it for granted that they ought to follow suit. The universe which science reveals is grown so complex, the number of facts which science has collected so prodigious, that the task of pooling and correlating with a view to surveying the whole upon which philosophy has been traditionally engaged, strikes terror into the most sanguine intellect. Unable any longer to take a synoptic view of so heterogeneous a subject-matter, and despairing of offering any effective contribution to the comprehension of a world which looks increasingly like a miscellany, diminishingly like a whole, the philosopher draws in his horns and contents himself with the scrutiny of sentences through an intellectual microscope.

Three factors have contributed to this contraction of the sphere of interest.

(1) The first is the growth of the sciences themselves. It has often been pointed out that all the lines of inquiry upon which the human mind has embarked began as philosophy. As soon as definite knowledge rewarded the efforts of the inquirers, the subject-matter of their study was removed from the sphere of philosophy and became a branch of knowledge in its own right. Thus, in the work of the sixth century B.C., Ionians, science and philosophy are inextricably interwoven; mathematics began as philosophy with the Pythagoreans, and for centuries alchemists were engaged in looking for the philosophers' stone; it was only when the quest was given up, that alchemy became chemistry. Thus, philosophy is in the unfortunate position of a schoolmaster who loses his pupils directly they show promise.

Now the sciences have in recent years enormously extended the sphere of science and that of philosophy has correspondingly contracted. Physics has taken over some of the philosophers' problems (only, incidentally, to return them again with interest), psychology others.

(2) A second contributory factor is what in the middle classes is called professionalism and in the working classes trade unionism. There is an inevitable tendency on the part of those engaged on work in a particular sphere to elaborate a professional technique. This has the advantage not only of facilitating communication and understanding between professionals, but of deterring outsiders from participating in the professional mysteries. It is natural for philosophers to encourage the propagation of the view that philosophy is a highly specialized pursuit in which only professionals can engage without intellectual ignominy. By virtue of the spread of this conviction they secure themselves against being blacklegged by outsiders and engender among non-philosophers the belief that philosophy is a branch of study which in this, at least, is like a

game, that its rules must first be taught, its technique mastered, before the onlooker may venture to take part in it.

(3) A further reason for the withdrawal of contemporary philosophers behind the wall of an academic technique is, I venture to suggest, timidity. The effects of timidity are shown in various ways. First, on the speculative side, the philosopher who ventures to tackle the great questions of philosophy, the possibility of free will, the nature of cause, the existence of purpose in evolution or of design in the universe, is trailing his coat for all his fellows to tread on. It is so much easier to show where a philosophy is wrong than to recognize where it is right, and most critics are far readier to take advantage of the facility which philosophy offers for the detection of error than to incur the risk of making errors for others to detect. Especially vulnerable is the philosopher who, venturing to adopt a positive position in regard to controversial metaphysical issues, and to profess what used to be called "a philosophy," is at pains to make himself clear. It has been said that the easiest way to refute a philosophy is to state it with complete clarity, thus throwing into high relief not only the positive affirmations which it entails, but the objections to which—since all metaphysical views hitherto propounded are in various degrees false—it is inevitably exposed. This, no doubt, is to overstate a truth; but, surveying the recent history of philosophy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the philosopher who shrouds his meaning in a veil of obscurity, diminishes his chances not only of being understood, but also of being censured, for "*rien comprendre*" is only too often "*tout pardonner*" It is possible that I am exaggerating the advantages of obscurity, which were greater twenty or thirty years ago than they are to-day. To-day, all-embracing metaphysical systems are so out of fashion that even obscurity affords no defence against the familiar charge of meaninglessness.

So far as relates to the practical application of philosophy, the motive of timidity operates still more strongly. I have already drawn attention to the similarity of our times to those in which Plato was writing, more particularly in respect of the bitterness and intolerance with which ideological differences are pursued. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that all the considerations which led the philosophers described in the Seventh Book of Plato's *Republic* to take shelter behind a wall should be found to operate with full force in our own times. Thus it is said that philosophy should remain detached from contemporary events, and that the philosopher should not take sides in current disputes. Now it is extremely difficult to propound any philosophical view whose conclusions bear, however remotely, upon contemporary problems without appearing to take sides.

The above are some of the reasons which have led philosophers to construct an ivory tower within which to take shelter from the storms of the times. While I can sympathize with the reasons, I am unable to approve the attitude which they support. Preoccupation with the correct analysis of the meaning of sentences seems to me to be a form of intellectual fiddling while Rome burns. It amounts to a desertion of their posts on the part of those to whom, in virtue of their talents, interests and education, the community has a right to look for guidance in difficult times. Even if twentieth-century philosophers have nothing very original of their own to offer, there is wisdom to be garnered from the great philosophies of the past and it is, I conceive, our duty to make it available for the comfort and guidance of our distracted times. Having said so much by way of criticism of what philosophers do in fact do, I shall now try to be constructive and in the last part of this paper to indicate in general terms what I think they should do.

IV

The Contribution that Philosophy could make

A convenient starting point is afforded by the charge referred to above that the philosopher who descends into the market place must take sides on current issues. I agree that the taking of sides is undesirable and should be avoided, but I cannot agree that sides must inevitably be taken. What I am contending is that philosophers should occupy themselves with topical concerns, not that they should take up a topical attitude. I am suggesting, further, that some of the problems which lie at the root of our contemporary discontents are in the strict sense philosophical problems, and that it is the business of the philosopher to address himself to the task of elucidating them.

It may be objected that I am advocating a reconsideration of matters which have been discussed and rediscussed *ad nauseam*, and that no purpose is to be served by ploughing up such exhausted soil. I do not, of course, wish to contend that the soil is new. In a certain sense, as has frequently been pointed out, there are no new philosophical problems; but only in a certain sense. There is another sense in which every philosophical problem is in each age a new problem. I do not mean merely that each age presents the old problems in a new setting; I mean more than this, that old problems presented in a new setting become in effect new problems. Marxism has at least taught us to recognize that the developing social and economic environment not only sets the problems with which the human mind concerns itself, but also orientates the minds which

confront the problems. To different minds the traditional problems look different, and for a problem to look different is to be different. To put it more technically, the mind is one side of a developing dialectic the other side of which is constituted by the procession of events which the mind confronts. The two sides taken together constitute what we call history. Let me state the same point in a rather different way; philosophical truth for the Greeks was usually obtained as a result of a process of questioning. Now the circumstance and setting of the age determine the questions we ask; they determine, too, within limits the answers that we shall find satisfactory.

Philosophy cannot, then, be regarded as a detached pursuit following inquiries which are outside time to which it returns answers which are immune from error; its questions are no more timeless than the answers which it gives to them are eternal. It is a phase, one among many, of a developing process which inevitably affects, although it does not wholly determine the line of inquiry which at any given epoch philosophy follows, the pattern of the systems which it constructs, the considerations which seem to be important, and the conclusions which are found to be convincing. On the practical side, the setting of social circumstance can affect philosophy negatively by causing the philosopher to turn his back upon a social process which, so far from controlling, he despairs even of understanding. It can affect philosophy, that is to say, by sending the philosopher up one of the avenues of escape; or it can affect it positively by riveting the attention of philosphers upon aspects of truth and conduct which the development of events presses upon their attention, suggesting new criteria by reference to which truth may be established and new scales of valuation in terms of which worth of conduct may be assessed.

I conclude that no philosophical problem is ever quite the same in different ages, nor are the solutions of one age those that will content the next. Although, therefore, the matters to which I would have philosophers turn their attention form part of the stock-in-trade of philosophical thought throughout the ages, it does not, therefore, follow that there is no need to examine them afresh in the light of the new data afforded by our own age and with the new minds which our own age has played its part in forming.

I will give one or two examples of the sort of problems I have in mind. Following Socrates' precedent I will begin with the soul. Here, again, the parallel with the classical period of Greek philosophy immediately makes itself apparent. Socrates, we are told, turned away from the speculations of the Ionian scientist-philosophers, and concentrated upon the soul of man because he was dissatisfied with the account which the Ionians had given of the universe. It left out, he thought, too much—mind and purpose and

morals and teleological causation. Many people feel to-day a similar dissatisfaction with the scientific scheme of the universe which dominated man's outlook until the last couple of decades, and feel it for the same reason. The philosophy of Whitehead is a product of this dissatisfaction. It seeks so to envisage the nature of the universe that room is found for the things that the scientific scheme left out. But though they are diminishingly regarded as affording a satisfactory interpretation of the universe, the concepts of determinism and materialism still dominate our treatment of the soul of man. Consider, for example, in this connection two distinctive creeds of our age, Marxism and psychoanalysis.

(i) For the Marxist, the soul is wholly a product of circumstances, and more particularly of social and economic circumstances. Its acts of thinking, valuing, deciding are not the expressions of its free and spontaneous activity; they are the psychological by-products of the social environment to which it is exposed. A good environment means a good soul; hardship, poverty, conflict and oppression produce an agitated and oppressed soul, the soul, in fact, of the proletarian who figures in the doctrine of the class conflict.

(ii) To the psycho-analyst, the soul is also a by-product of circumstances, but the circumstances are psychological. Our thoughts, valuations, and decisions are represented as the end results of a chain of causes stretching back into the remote past. Most of these causes lie beyond the reach of memory; many of them are located in early childhood. If training and environment in early childhood are satisfactory, then the soul will be good; if not, not.

What both these views have in common is their presentation of the soul as a function of circumstance. The obvious inference is that to alter the circumstance, is to alter the soul; to alter and, of course, to improve. Hence the suggestion under the influence of which many of my generation grew up, that so-called evil conduct is traceable to bad social and personal environment in terms of which it can be wholly explained, with the corollary that a world of adequately psycho-analysed communists would be millenial.

It may be doubted whether the events of the last twenty years make this view of evil as plausible as it used to be. May not evil, one is tempted again to wonder, be endemic in the heart of man? If we are driven to admit that it is, the metaphysical implications of our admission are far-reaching and raise, I would submit, a philosophical problem of the highest interest and importance.

The problem of evil is also brought into prominence by a rather different set of considerations. It is sometimes said that science has no contribution to make to philosophical problems. To their solution, perhaps, it has not, but to their setting it most indubitably has. For example, during those periods when it was believed that the

beginning of the world was contemporaneous with the creation of man it was possible to accept the doctrine of the Fall, and to regard evil as wholly due to man's misuse of the divine gift of freewill. But having regard to the biological discoveries of the last hundred years, what account, we must now ask, is to be given of the condition of this planet during the inconceivably long period that science has now shown to have preceded the appearance of man. During this period the *Ichneumonidae* wasps were stinging their caterpillar prey in such a way as to paralyse without killing them, and laying their eggs in the paralysed tissues so that the newly hatched larvæ would have a supply of fresh living meat afforded by their unwilling incubators. During this period again, the offspring of the midge *Miastor* was first eating its way out of the body of its parent, and then gnawing its way out of the body of its grandmother as a preliminary to giving birth on its own account.

It is difficult to believe that these operations did not involve pain; impossible to ascribe the pain to the wickedness of mankind. Now pain is an evil. It seems reasonable to conclude that the advance of science has confronted those philosophers who are also theologians with the problem of evil in a new and more formidable form.

These must suffice as examples of the speculative problems which circumstances present to the attention of philosophers in a new light.

I conclude with some examples of practical problems. Pre-eminent is the question of the relation of the individual to the State. This, it may be urged, has been endlessly discussed and it is extremely unlikely that further consideration will yield fruitful results. I do not agree. For, once again, new factors are in the field of which a contemporary discussion would have to take account. One such factor is the claim made by the modern State to exert rights over the minds no less than over the bodies of its individual members, a claim which outdoes the pretensions of any of the States of the past. Another is that this claim is put forward in the interests of a policy which aims at the mass destruction of the citizens of other States, unless their governments bow to the will of *the* State. When a State demands horrible sacrifices of its own citizens in order that they may harm those of an alleged enemy, the question arises in a peculiarly pressing form, what, if any, is the philosophical justification for these claims? And what, if any, is the philosophical justification for the individual's rejection of them? Let me define these questions more precisely. What, one wants to know, are the grounds for regarding the State as exempt from the ordinary canons of morality? And how is the citizen most appropriately to be conceived? As a drop of blood in an ocean of racial purity? As a cog in a proletarian machine? Or as an end in himself, possessing the right to live his life as seems good to him in this world and entitled,

if he lives it aright, to look forward to the prospect of eternal happiness in the next?

I cannot rid my mind of the conviction that, had they been exposed to the pressures and urgencies of our times, the philosophers of the past would have felt it their duty to concern themselves with these matters and to pronounce upon them, even at the risk of offending the State whose claims they were critically examining. It is conceivable that their consideration might have issued in the conclusion that the State is not, as the Hegelians have urged in theory and the Nazis maintain in practice, the final form of human association.

This reflection suggests a further problem or set of problems for philosophical consideration, those, namely, raised by the claims made on behalf of Federal Union. If the Hegelian philosophy is correct in all that it asserts, the proposal to supersede the national State in respect of certain of its functions and to transfer them to a Federal Government directly representative of the peoples of the different States who come into union can be pronounced *a priori* to be impracticable for reasons analogous to those which render the amalgamation of a number of individual personalities in a federal person impracticable. Proposals to establish a Federal Union composed of existing States and beginning with the democratic States must also be regarded as impracticable, if the Marxist analysis of the existing situations in terms of the realist conception of history and the concepts of the class war is fundamental.

As a final example of philosophical issues directly raised by the present situation, I cite the use of leisure. Let us suppose for a moment that the existing international conflict is brought to a satisfactory conclusion and that there is a period of peace. Then it is not unreasonable to look forward to an era of great and expanding prosperity. Economists are often heard to assert that, but for political difficulties, men should be enabled, given the existing technique of production, to satisfy all their material needs for a relatively small expenditure of time and effort. We are asked, then, to look forward to an age in which comfort and a competence are assured to all workers in return for some three or four hours' machine-minding a day. How are the vast periods of leisure accruing in a world organized on these lines to be utilized?

There are, broadly, three possibilities; first, a development on Brave New World lines in which psychologically-conditioned citizens are kept in unthinking contentment through the provision of elaborate standardized amusements by a benevolent government conceived on Platonic lines. Secondly, there is a possibility of a relapse into conflict and a reversion to comparatively primitive conditions as a result of men's inability to find a peaceful outlet

for their surplus energies. Thirdly, there is the hope of a general advance to a level of civilization at which human life achieves a hitherto undreamed of amenity. The choice between these alternatives raises questions of an ultimate character touching the nature both of the evolutionary process and of man, its latest and, we are accustomed to think, its highest expression; touching, too, from a new angle the nature of the individual soul and the relation of the citizen of the State. Is the object of the evolutionary process the achievement of an enlarged consciousness, and if so, upon what will its awareness be directed? Upon the values of truth, beauty, and goodness? If the answer is "Yes," we are presumably entitled to measure the worth of a civilization by the degree to which its members have realized these values in the past and to regard the object of the evolutionary process as their ever-increasing realization in the future? Or may it be that there is some fundamental flaw in human nature, a taint, perhaps, which we have inherited from the primeval slime which renders human life capable of rising to a given level, but incapable of passing beyond it, or, indeed, of maintaining itself at the level which has been reached? In that event, we must look forward to a reversion of our civilization, following the precedent set by its predecessors, to earlier and more primitive levels of existence.

These questions are prominently raised by the existing predicament of a civilization which is manifestly unable to compass a measure of political and social wisdom even remotely adequate to the challenge of its increased technical power.

V

Conclusion

The examples which I have given will suffice to illustrate the kind of question which I have in mind, when I say that philosophers should concern themselves with the issues which are directly raised by the contemporary situation. It should, I maintain, be part of the duty of a philosopher to try to answer, or, at any rate, to reflect upon the questions which have a practical bearing on this situation. He should further seek to indicate for the guidance of his contemporaries ideals to live for and principles to live by; and he should do this more particularly in a time such as the present, when traditional ideals have been repudiated and traditional principles abandoned. It is partly because of this repudiation and this abandonment that our civilization has reached its present *impasse.*

If philosophers reject this task on the ground that it is not within the province of philosophy to offer practical guidance to a distracted

generation, they are by implication subscribing to some such avowal as the following: "It is our profession to study the wisdom of the past and to acquaint ourselves with what great men have said and thought memorably about life, but it is not our business to make this wisdom available for the benefit of our age, or to communicate these thoughts and sayings to a generation which, while manifestly needing guidance, is equally manifestly without a guide. Thinking is, of course, our speciality; thinking, which our predecessors have devoted to such subjects as the meaning and purpose of life, the nature of the universe and the status of man within it, the nature of the State and the relation of the citizen to the State. Nevertheless, it is not by thinking that the world can now be assisted, and we do not propose, therefore, to apply our thinking to the problems of the age."

And therefore? To answer the question, I cannot do better than again quote from Professor Collingwood, as he follows out the implications of the philosophers' withdrawal:

> "Since one must not seek it from thinkers or from thinking, from ideals or from principles, one must look to people who were not thinkers (but fools), to processes that were not thinking (but passion), to aims that were not ideals (but caprices), and to rules that were not principles (but rules of expediency). If the realists had wanted to train up a generation of Englishmen and Englishwomen expressly as the potential dupes of every adventurer in morals or politics, commerce or religion who should appeal to their emotions and promise them private gains which he neither could procure them nor even meant to procure them, no better way of doing it could have been discovered."

I conclude that though the contribution of philosophy to the solution of the problems of our times may be modest and the making of even a modest contribution difficult, to refuse to attempt it is to ensure that it will be made by others, who have neither the training nor the equipment to solve successfully the problems which philosophers refuse to attempt to solve at all. The effects of this abandonment by philosophers of the tasks which have traditionally fallen within their province are all too visibly before us.

THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF MIND AND BODY

FOSTER KENNEDY, M.D., F.R.S.

WHEN we climb in the high places of the earth, plodding slowly at mountaineer's pace with crampons on our boots, that we may keep foothold on the blue ice, we should stop from time to time and, steadying ourselves with our ice-axe for a moment, raise our down-bent eyes, weary with guiding our steps between crevasses, to the great peaks we would conquer, and see, too, the foot hills we have left behind. Only by gazing thus can the Alpine climber find values, and often he catches too, just then, a glimpse of beauty. So it is profitable to turn from our work in laboratories and among the sick, to survey the general state of our knowledge in larger sweep. We cannot hope to have added by our deliberations to-day anything of solving value in this ultimate problem. But we clarify to ourselves the state of our small knowledge and the extent of our nescience, and, though we may throw on these matters no more light than that which Milton tells us shines in Hell, "enough to make darkness visible," yet it were well done.

The world has not yet made up its mind whether Plato or Aristotle was right—whether man is really Spirit or Machine. We here, probably, call him a transformer of power and straddle the question. It is quite certain, however, that without a good brain you cannot have a good mind, and good breeding begets good brain. But it is not enough for us to think of brain only. We must consider also the relation of the nervous system to the detailed and specialized activities of the rest of the body. It affects and is affected by the whole organism; and consciousness is found not as the resident of parochial places, but as the emergent distillate of the total structure. Neurologists have erred in being rigidly deterministic in their consideration of neural integration, and psychologists of some modern schools are not less vicious in their unbending and over-simplified dogmas regarding functional abstractions, existing, they would seem to want us to believe, in their own right. We see, then, science yearning to systematize and make rigid, ideas and theories: theories which to attain a goal, like runners in a hundred-yards dash, must be put between tapes.

In the early study of any knowledge, dogma and rigidity are needed; the axioms of arithmetic and Euclidean geometry are

required for simple living and for searching in an environment simply considered; but these hypotheses must become almost progressively more flexible if they are to be useful at all in any cosmic fashion; only bouyant variables can stay afloat in a solution of relativity!

We must know in order to appraise man's projecting power, that we are three dimensional, and we should have a lively suspicion that, in a space-time continuum, we are almost certainly four!

It may well be that the scientists' view of the Universe as being, as it were, mindless, non-creative, traditional, and lacking aim or object—"a bloodless dance of categories"—comes from some scientists' mistaking the discovery of a regulating Natural Law for a revelation of the universe itself. To attempt to apprehend the stars in terms of a mathematical formula, or a Law of Gravitation, is probably like mistaking his electro-encephalogram or his brain metabolism for the personality of a poet.

Advances in knowledge come often, not by the addition of new facts but by a novel rearrangement of known material, giving new direction through a mental "jump," placing old knowledge on a new, a more manageable, and more illuminated level. The Masters have all done this lifting. Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, Freud, Einstein: they have made patterns and order where there seemed disorder without aim; and when they have discovered the Design, whether in Cosmos, in Nature fixed or vital, or in Man, the organized whole is always found to be greater and more variable than the sum of its parts.

Correlation calls for definition of terms. But there is trouble here; for any set of phenomena may properly be described in exact technical terms in many manners. We may view epilepsy as a brain water-logged, or as a brain rhythm, or as a personality reaction; or, for that matter, the passion of love as a very short wave-length indeed, or as phosphate of lime. No one aspect can tell everything, but all, could we find them, may. We must strive to inter-relate ideas, with as little technicality as possible; to find harmonious union in kaleidoscopic variety. The accuracy and authority of each science has to be taken for granted by every other science, yet no one science can explain all. Each profession begins as a conspiracy against the public, and the first defence of a new science against other sciences is to throw around itself breastworks of new names, not always for new ideas. No one technical observer can see how the war is going on, any more than can a company commander, blinkered, from his own section of trench. And should we succeed in fusing or integrating such varied facts as we have been regarding here, what we shall then see, or what we shall then know, may be something as unsurmised, as astonishing, and as vastly different from the factual

material we have been trying to know, as oxygen and hydrogen are different from both light or heavy water. So each subject, here presented, can be but one facet of a vastly complex crystal.

Modern psychology—despite strong grasp and vigorous reach, has regarded man as an entity, more or less isolated from the universal forces which made him and are around him. And an entity over-simplified and stereotyped—a cliff of obsidian beaten by the waves of social and biological environment. Over-symbolized and dogmatic, it has been technically concerned with man as a vital being without regard to the endless variety of that being and the endless variety of his reactions; and with little regard for the nature and variety of the patterned structure of his nervous system and the rest of his body; a structure enormously varied which necessarily permits and emits enormous variety of process and expression. Formerly structure was structure and force was force. And none doubted the antithesis of the two elements out of which the universe seemed to be composed. There thus grew a clear and obvious dichotomy of body and mind. However, matter, structure, substance, when the search into its nature grew fierce enough, eluded the materialists, and, changing shape and attributes like witch and princess in the fairly tale, is seen to be force in different forms, utterly without substance and impalpable. Even the notion of space-empty or space-ethereal has to-day been abandoned and all is viewed as activity, energy, force. Energy in cosmos has the power to turn into or to precipitate mass; function in living beings turns into or precipitates structure; the type and complexity of structure depends on the type and power of directive activity of the trapped fragment of driving power. The kind of structure then fabricated will determine the character and expression of the energy mediated through it. Nature, thus, is but energy—patterned into worlds, patterned variously also for every stick, stone, or bit of life upon them. We thus become one with our environment which pervades us wholly and into which we extend ourselves hugely. We hold our unique pattern as a momentary opportunity for experience on a radiant stream of creative continuity, designed for aim. We are coagula, innate with purpose in a flow of power—and about to be dispersed! It is this unique dynamic pattern of energy imprisoned and constructed for so little a time that by varied procedures we have been here exploring.

Plotinus said that sensations are obscure thoughts, and intelligible or spiritual thoughts are clear sensations. Man has the power by the percipience of his senses to fabricate mental images. These, retained, recalled, and enlarged by imaginative interaction, he can then project into circumambient nature and so interfere with routine happenings both there and within himself. He can modify natural tradition, and, by creating new self-enjoying principles, he can re-

create novelties for the future. There seems to be no end in him to the evolution, out of primitive homogeneity, of power upon power, of faculty upon faculty, through the ages. Great need in organism grows organic and special function. The repeated "striving-use" of function, eons long, grows structure and channelled power, and power long used, is an unconscious emanation. Mass and energy thus become interchangeable, but only perfectly so for the mathematical physicist, who, like the rest of us, when using but one set of instruments, can perceive and manage but one aspect of the Whole. For Mass and Energy are the same, with a difference.

But where vitality anywhere exists, aim is found. A primitive consciousness exists as "purpose" in every living cell, and organizes itself as structure; this primitive mind becomes specialized, layer upon layer, segment upon super-segment, into complicated reflexes, later more complicated instincts, and later, still more complex emotional tones and feelings, integrated and channelled for expression through thalamus and hypothalamus. Finally there has been added the neopallium, the new brain, more and more exquisitely integrated; a concatenation of such ordered representation and *swift* activity that through it, primitive power can appear even as the gift of critical discrimination. Slowly, too, this power is distilled into a sense of spacial and temporal relationship. Up to the present point of evolutionary time, the highest product of this captured, specialized, focused energy of cosmic origin is our self-awareness, self-direction, power of surmise, and power of speculative imagination which almost denies the universe itself for boundary—all radiated, implemented, and sometimes disturbed, by emotion.

Purpose is mediated by protoplasm. Consciousness is an enormous amplification of early purpose as primitive as tropism. And it is raised to its highest power and focused for its greatest good by the contrivance of symbolism, and imagery, and the invention of the tool of speech. The distillate of consciousness is thus focused into self-awareness. This achievement is nothing but the flowering of the aim, drive and purpose, innate and part and parcel of every cell in our bodies, and as truly a part of each cell as is its mere "skeleton" with which by our ingenuity and skill we have made our senses familiar. So, instead of the Animula, Blandula, Vagula of the Emperor Hadrian we find the "soul" a focused and aspiring purpose, implemented by feeling, each "soul" unlike every other, living but in a tick of time, and carved out of the Absolute.

However we differ in degree, we do not differ in kind, from Amphioxus, that lowly creature with a primitive vertebral column, and translucent. We, too, have a backbone and are often also sufficiently transparent. So in some matters we have not marched so far along our road of Destiny.

To reiterate, then, we regard mass as precipitated power and believe that in organisms that are vital (and living things differ from unliving things only perhaps, by the geometrical structure of their molecules) function and urgent need precipitates and patterns structure; this in turn transmits energy, and at the same time ordains much of its character and final expression. And it must not be forgotten that through the study of viruses the line between life and non-life in terms of behaviour becomes truly a very soft border. Indeed, the consciousness of plants and trees primitively considered may be in quality of the same stuff as our own; the apparent difference between ours and theirs being dependent on different speed and timing and focus. The experiments of Bose on plants show their movements and manners purposeful when translated into space-time terms that we can understand. As levels of bodily function, for the most part unconscious, are represented and re-represented in the evolving nervous system, so there are analogous segmentations of mental life. ("A pox here! on that ecclesiastical inheritance, a dualistic vocabulary!) These levels are many mansions, and, for the conservation of energy and the conservation of ourselves, we try to put as many of them as possible, just like any other dug-outs, below the level of consciousness. Much of our feeling and sensory perception should be classed as almost effortless idea-activity at one of the deepest mental strata. The development of yet another mental threshold allows us to economize by the development of habits and conditioned behaviour. This lower physiological level of educated habit furnishes a speedier reaction to our fierce and provocative environment than can be given by the imagery of ideas. These are discriminative, associative, creative, and enable us to know that we know, and to be self-contemplative.

We can bend, however, these high faculties in directions to which they were probably not intended to be bent. High faculties are laid down in us by evolution and by heredity, they develop by the friction of experience, and we use them in a manner often improper! We think, for instance, that we are exceedingly rational beings. Rather, our higher intelligence is often prostituted in service in that, when possible, we use our higher intelligence to explain away our lower happenings. However, it was only the other day that we began to give a clear motive—authority to our emotional trends and antique desires in the determination of conscious thought and action. But, in the first fine careless rapture of that discovery, modern novelists, psychologists, and painters have pertinaciously urged on us the premature destruction of the values of Truth and Beauty and have tried "to project their own tastes upon the empty canvas of a value-less Universe" (Joad). Some still try to dethrone the majesty of men's Reason; to replace it, not augment it, by a catch-as-catch-can

Subconscious. This is a revolt of the helots indeed—a mere kitchen rebellion—the puny gesturing of a generation that got tired out, and of its successor that was born fatigued. However, should the inherited ration of power prove puny in any one of us, and at long last we find our distilled capacity for abstract thought humiliatingly small, our directive awareness, thank goodness! is always able to put that modicum, like Eve's dress, where it does the most good. Self-awareness makes for conservation of self, or of the changing complex called self. And in the midst of change, memory swiftly associates what are perhaps the molecular designs of old impressions of sense and thought, so insuring personal identity, and producing individual unity throughout a life-history of flexible variation. Memory is the thread of Ariadne in the labyrinth of ever-changing personality, by grace of which we contrive to find our way back to the past and, by using the images of recalled experience, find our way also into the future.

Thus the evolution of stratified structure in the nervous system is essentially the precipitation of function always directional; at first primitive and homogeneous, later specialized into variety, and multiplied into complexity. The old always containing within itself the new, burgeoning through material, impulses which will carry a new drive, about to be born. In the evolutionary present, the directional activity of unicellular consciousness has been multiplied and amplified, focused and brightened, into the flame of abstract thought. Thus, through this long-distance development of our nervous system there has arisen that Hierarchy of powers which we call the brain and in Frederick Tilney's phrase "the Master organ of life." But there is also a similar phylogenetic development of behaviour and personality. Each individual, as he grows from the embryo to the adult, is a little cycle of the race. We have long known that from the egg to death, we pass through stages in our body at least similar to those through which humanity has passed before. Freud has now made it clear that in our emotions, in our urgings, in the preponderance of this instinct over that at different periods of our lives, we have a like evolution and—if we live into senility—devolution, of personality. He has shown the child as indeed no angel, but rather, at the age of five, a polytheistic savage, having for his authority, and, too, his private pleasure, a *genius loci* in every tree and star, and at ten, a kind of Nazi, naturally characterized by restricted imagination, hypertrophied tribal emotions, and truculence towards other tribes; he is regimented in ritual, totally intolerant, and, to offset his annoying sense of inadequacy, brutally contemptuous towards all those he thinks weaker than himself. Freud has insisted that the child's sexual instincts emerge by gradual progression from an emotional preoccupation with one

orifice of its body to an emotional preoccupation with another. However, Freud himself doubts the therapeutic value of this contribution of our knowledge of ourselves. But at least his teaching makes clear how our instincts have developed within the microcosm of each man's body and, if inherited endowment be lacking with which to attain maturity, how a man, or masses of men, may "stick" at the different instinctual levels. However, as regards some of Freud's other conclusions, I feel that while, bodily, we have still vestigial remnants of our past like gill-slits, and, emotionally, others like sexual reversions, it is absurd to attempt to estimate the total adult body in terms of gill-slits, or the total adult personality in terms of an uncovered sexual reversion.

However, when we lose what we last acquired, we uncover the pattern we had acquired before. The proverb says of the Russian, if you scratch him, you will find a Tartar. It is no more true of the Russian than the rest of us. If you scratch the surface you will find, below, the more ancient, the more primitive man.

And where do these patterns come from? They come from the reception of outside and inside impressions, over ages of time, into the brain and body where they are focused and worked up into ideas and re-creating notions. There have been those who believed the world to be a subjective experience of our own senses, who denied the very existence of anything of which man is unaware. Descartes and Locke and Kant thought of a homocentric universe, in the days before the progress of knowledge forced us to the realistic renunciation of our own ultimate authority. We no longer can believe that the existence of a thing depends on our perception of it; and contemporary thought is amazed that so flattering a philosophy was ever acceptable. Centuries of thinking had to be done before the obvious implications of the discoveries of Copernicus were applied to our own relationship with that world lying apparently about us and outside ourselves. These idealists agreed with Alice in Wonderland that I would go out like a candle as soon as you all stop thinking about me or regarding me or perceiving me. But my withers are unwrung by any such terroristic threat; common sense tells me that when you all drop into coma, I shall continue to exist, as unconcerned and as untrammelled in function, as I should be at the bedside of a patient suddenly stopped in his talk with me by an epileptic convulsion. I warn you I am as immune from summary dissipation of my atoms and their constituent particles of energy as if I had suddenly ceased being viewed and considered by a man just run over by a truck!

Nature, except to our especial senses, is impalpable and without what we call substance (only in Wonderland can we find a grin without a cat!) And that word "impalpable" offers a clue to the

dualistic difficulties which have beset our thoughts and lamed our progress for two thousand years. Indeed, as I have already petulantly complained, we have only a dualistic vocabulary with which to combat dualism. "Impalpable" means unseizable by our senses. But these, our senses, after all, have, through millions of years of development, been produced in the fulness of evolutionary effort so that we might be able to make contact with the universe and nature around us in at least one aspect, though only in their terms. But remember, had we a different set of senses the world, as we know it, would be changed utterly to some other fabric of some other dream. Our senses give us the working world of common sense. We can adjust and direct our activities within their framework as much as may be, allowing for their inaccuracies the while.

Once in the Sahara, I saw, it seemed miles away, a great lake with a few palm trees and some tallish isolated buildings. I kept my attention on this appearance, which endured for half an hour as I advanced toward it. About two miles from where I had first seen the mirage, I found the same number of low cacti as I had counted palm trees, and the same number of low Bedouin tents as I had counted houses. As Hume has told us, pure sense perception cannot provide data for its own interpretation.

Indeed, there is a vast universe we cannot touch, that we can only imagine, and indeed we cannot imagine it. We can only surmise in abstract thought, by speculative projection through the poetry of mathematics and emotional aspiration, that it exists at all. It is impossible for us really to envisage the universe from even a dog's-eye point of view.

Religion has always served us in this purpose. The earliest Art-Form, giving a frame to the unknowable so that we may know and use it a little. At first, man made religion as a shield against his ignorance of the appalling happenings by which he found himself surrounded. And now that the notion of geological Time and light years of Space have given way to one of a Cosmos knowing neither, constantly turning itself inside out, at the same time expanding to infinity (and it can't be for nothing that the ancient symbol of eternal-infinity was a serpent swallowing its own tail!) we find our emotional natures such little things that we need as much as ever the Arch-Pattern of Religion as a shield against our knowledge of the greatness of our surroundings and the smallness of ourselves.

Lately I was being helped to dress by a German man-servant. Like old soldiers, of course we talked about the war. When about to hold my dinner jacket for me, he told me that when the Revolution came he had been billeted in a house where, two days earlier, the fourth son had died. As he went behind me with the coat he said, "it makes you think there is no God." I put my right arm half into the

sleeve as he held the coat. To do so, I turned my head, and our eyes met. With fierce intensity, he said "Doctor! do you think there is a God?" He had me pinioned and in a defenceless position; the fierceness too of his interrogation demanded reply. Without hesitation I said, "Yes, Fred, I am quite sure there is a God, but I am less sure that there is such a thing as a man." This answer allowed me to get on my coat, and he said then in a wondering tone, "That is a strange saying; what do you mean?" So I had to think it out, and answered, "Each of my blood cells lives about thirty-two days, they are born as embryos and infants in the marrow of my long bones. Through adolescence, they grow to maturity; they are highly complex in structure, and they have a baffling variety of duties. Seen with a telescope from Mars, they would appear as purposeful in their activities as do men. They fight; they are officered and battalioned for various actions; where their country is invaded they give battle, and many lay down their lives; many more are wounded in the wars—and limp, wounded, inefficient, perhaps on relief, throughout the remainder of their lives. But, ill or maimed, they are gathered to Abraham's bosom in my spleen, and I don't know the name of one of them; nor, indeed, would I even guess at their existence, if Loewenhoek had not invented the microscope and had somebody not told me how to use it. Who knows but that we humans may be the blood corpuscles of the world or of God Himself?"

The unconscionable number of cells of the brain and body are perhaps as individual as any one of us, doing their work as efficiently as any of us, gathering their energies and sending them out in orderly fashion, reproducing themselves in their own image, as capable of explosion as any of us, as capable of disorderly conduct as you or me.

It has been the fashion for the last twenty-five years to discuss mental illness as though the mind were like Mahomet's coffin, swung, unsupported, in the empyrean between heaven and earth, without pathology or structure. I am convinced this is an error. The abnormal psychology that we have been familiar with in the last twenty-five years is in the nature of a description of mere phenomena and productions or of rather pontifical postulates on their environmental dynamics. It more than tends to ignore physiological genesis and implications. We talk of the modern brand as an analysis. It is so far from really plumbing the depths of mental origins that it is but figure-skating on the surface of the problem. The real problem is why does a certain person have to substitute something else for his difficulty in order to relieve his difficulty. And why does another person not have to go through that complicated procedure in order to be happy? The true problem is the nature of the play through good or well patterned structure

of positive or negative forces in the individual causing the stable or unstable equilibrium of his feelings and his intellect. The difference between one individual and another is here in modern psychology only described and not explained. But life itself depends on conflict, on forces mutually opposed; each force has its ebb and flow so that vital organisms fluctuate in character for ever. They are never exactly the same in any two periods of time. They trap energy and transmit it. According to their variety of fabrication, the expression of power of which they are capable changes, great or small, good or bad, self-preserving in the sound organism, self-damaging in the organism less sound. Indeed, the very title of this address, is, to me, absurd. For there can be no such thing as correlation of mind and body; the two are the same thing. Aim is the characteristic of every vital cell; consciousness is merely the focus of the aggregate aim. Mind, to think of it in imagery, is to the Body as the flower is to the tap-root, different but the same, the same but different; it may well be that the flowering bulb corresponds to the flowering of self-awareness from the primitive homogeneous consciousness of the earlier organism. So we must not mistake the projections and the productions of the mind for the deeper causes of those projections and productions. And the cause of the projections in the last analysis lies in the type and quality of brain, body, and experience. These centre our impulses and control the weather in our souls. But the whole body, blood, bone, and muscle, our internal glands, our sympathetic nervous system play their complex parts, and the result is function of mind. The body is a nexus of consciousness, of which the brain is the essential switchboard, and mind is to the body as the function of Sight is to the eye. But should we think of Sight with no regard to the eye nor the brain, where it will be gathered, sorted, accepted, or rejected, and with no regard for the psychology of Vision, we should know nothing of sight. Lacking such consideration we would be regarding not Sight but aesthetics, visual aesthetics, and we should be dwelling in this, too, as among the Mysteries.

From this it follows that the function of mind can only work in the dimensions of the frame of our inheritance. We forget to apply to the human being truths which are perfect platitudes applied to polo ponies. Christ did not. Christ knew better and said, "Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" He loved the weak and the forgotten man, but, in this scornful question, He is an Aristocrat of the intellect speaking the known facts of biological knowledge.

People differ in their inherited endowments, Thomas Jefferson and Dr. Watson notwithstanding! Nor am I at all sure that "inherited endowment" should be an absolute fixed concept. I challenge the dogma that there is no such thing as the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Indeed, part of our trouble in this whole discussion

is that we see the problem narrow and we see it short. We think in far too small units of time. The visible, observable functioning of our body, its growth and senescence, and our sense of "the dread Fury with the abhorred shears, that slits the thin-spun life" sets for us an absolute time-scale from which we seldom emotionally recover. We cannot see the results of inheritance of acquired characteristics because of the paltry shortness of our own lives, and, because our eyes are holden, our minds are holden also.

There is much evidence in the animal world that such transmission of acquired characteristics exists, that a defective germinal cell will produce a defective descendant and that the defective descendant will procreate a defect in his descendant. If this can happen in the lower animals it may happen to us; only our nervous systems are so complex, they are so much more evolved, that we cannot see changes in them in the span of our little lifetimes. And ages of effort may and do produce an improvement in the general pattern of brain and body. It is certain that if we do not stimulate the central nervous system from environment, it does not properly develop. The idiot rendered so by deprivation of special senses has special corresponding sense areas in the brain undeveloped, not because these special centres in the brain were not born properly but because they were never properly impinged upon from the outside world. For instance, in Laurel Bridges, born deaf and blind, it was found after death that the areas of vision and the areas of hearing in the brain had not developed. But the initial error lay not there; it lay in the ears and eyes, in the outlying, supplying apparatus; a lack here of Nurture rather than Nature.

So the pressure of sex, the pressure of hunger, the pressure of the herd, impinge on and mould, modify, and direct the organism and its personality expression. Focal disorders may come from emotional opposition, as gastric ulcer from unhappiness and strain; and in both civil and military life, we've all seen fright produce hyperadrenalism and acute enlargement of the thyroid. Many allergic persons react to their specific protein only when their autonomic systems are, as it were, "triggered" by emotion. However, this shadow-country where the saints dwell is perhaps the Never-Never Land of Medicine. If we should learn it enough for geography and charts, we might learn to control personality and so lose our humanity. However, the stupidity of statesmen and apes in aeroplanes may be relied on to destroy civilization before disaster can reach us by our knowing what should not be known.

No army hopes to succeed without an Intelligence Corps and a General Staff to gather and sift facts and near-facts from fiction, and to bring a resultant of forces from the whole. For this in our work we need a Science of Man—a Science which may be found to

have rules of its own, hypotheses of its own, and relationships of its own. For it will have to deal not only with man as an entity, variable in his own terms, but variable too in terms of his environment—social, material, and cosmic. We must use technique to gather information; we need intuition, and a sense of history and Philosophy to integrate it.

Almost in our own times have we become aware of our own evolution, and we have been here perhaps a hundred million years—a tenth of the time that life has been upon this planet. Mankind is just departing from his nursery; he stands, bright-eyed with new knowledge of his forebears, and, for the first time, with the power and zest to mould his destiny. It must have been a murderous need that made, so many ages ago, a superior water-creature take to the Land, but it was a fiery thought that made man take to the Air. And how far he may yet project his power and personality we cannot even guess. The most complex things are the infinitely little and the infinitely vast, the ultimate nature of the atom and the ultimate nature of God. Between these two mysteries is the range of our knowledge, and, maybe, the wheel coming full circle, the secret of the one will be found as the secret of the other.

We are still so larval in our growing that to try to storm the seat of Zeus is to court failure and the fate of the Titans. Nevertheless, we must needs grapple ardently with the problem of Reality, whilst leading our lowly lives and earthly fates. The Stretch and Thrust, upward and outward, of aspiring thought forces brain growth and makes for almost conscious evolutionary development.

Of course we have as yet a likeness, when we would assault Heaven clamorously for Knowledge, to a winged and iridescent beetle in my cellar trying with all his little might to make up his mind whether or not I am going to Copenhagen next summer when I cannot know myself. The beetle must fail in his impossible aim, but the ardour of his passionate thought, and the mystical ecstacy, vouchsafed to a few of the more finely organized beetles, will, aided, of course, by their most happy faculty of rapid generation, pile ability upon ability within them. So, one day, the nature of the deity in the drawing-room upstairs may become dimly apprehended by some poetic beetle, given to mysticism, and of a very superior order.

For the Vision is only to him who will see it.

NEW BOOKS

Theism and Cosmology. By JOHN LAIRD (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1940. Pp. 325. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This is, as the title-page informs us, "the first series of a course of Gifford Lectures on the general subject of Metaphysics and Theism" which Professor Laird is giving before the University of Glasgow. The "self-imposed restrictions," explained in the preface, which Professor Laird has put upon the discussions in this book make it difficult to review, especially for one who is convinced that the attempt to infer the existence of a God, in the sense of an object for religious worship, from "cosmology" considered altogether apart from any sort of specifically religious experience has been abundantly shown to be vain. Professor Laird not only excludes from consideration in this series of lectures "such topics as divine tenderness and pity and righteousness," promising to reconsider in his second series on "Mind and Deity" the "provisional realism" which he here adopts, but examines the "cosmological argument" and the "argument from design" without reference to the third traditional argument, apart from which, according to the contention of Kant in his celebrated criticism of rational theology—a contention which seems to be substantially correct—the other two could not even plausibly reach the conclusion which they profess to establish; for the discussion of the "ontological argument" is deliberately postponed to the second series which is to follow this.

It has been suggested that in all instances which would be generally admitted to be instances of religion (whether "theistic" or no) there will be found two features, which may be designated respectively as "ultimacy" and "intimacy"; and Professor Laird frequently insists, and, I am sure, with reason, on the necessity of the former feature to any developed form of genuine theism. But the consideration of "intimacy" would, I think, fall outside the limits which he has prescribed to himself in the book before us, as belonging to the discussion of such evidence for theism as may be gathered from "mind" and not from "cosmology." Yet if, as I venture to think, without the union of "intimacy" with "ultimacy" we have not got religion, and if by theism we mean, as Professor Laird certainly appears to mean, not any theory of ultimate reality but the doctrine that an ultimate account of reality postulates a being who can be the object of religious worship, then the consideration of the note of "intimacy" cannot be, even provisionally, ignored and adjourned to a promised sequel.

In these days when "logical positivism" has, so far as in it lies, surrendered on behalf of philosophy all claim to any interest in regions of thought which were once regarded as its peculiar domain, it is refreshing to find Professor Laird confidently affirming (p. 39) that "unless philosophy is itself mere vanity, there is no doubt at all that it is a philosopher's proper business to treat among other things of theology," and emphatically dissenting from a "modish body of opinion" (p. 31), according to which "the greater part of traditional philosophy, and the whole of philosophical theology, should be regarded as a kind of poetry" and not as science "in the general sense that they profess to be based upon reasoned argument" (p. 32). In his reaction, however, against the denial to natural theology of any claim to be science in

this general sense of the word, he appears to me to abandon what is perhaps Kant's most important contribution to the philosophy of religion, namely the proof of the inconclusiveness of "rational theology" as a theoretical justification for religion, apart from a specifically religious experience; a proof which is not vitiated by what I take to be a mistake on Kant's own part, his identification of religious experience with the consciousness of moral obligation.

Were the sense of being in the presence of Something or Someone at once "ultimate" and "intimate" not a normal characteristic of the human mind, the arguments of natural theology could not, in the absence of this necessary presupposition of all religion, prove the existence of God as the object of religious worship. Yet, given this sense, they may demonstrate the inadequacy of any view of the world which excludes on principle the recognition of a reality which, being infinite and eternal, can afford scope for those native aspirations of the human spirit which we describe as religious to seek and perhaps to find their satisfaction. Those who approach the subject prescribed to his lecturers by Lord Gifford in the manner here suggested will, while welcoming a close and impartial criticism of arguments whose supposed apologetic value may easily blind defenders of religion to their logical deficiencies, learn without surprise that Professor Laird, after the examination of cosmological theism to which the book before us is devoted, finds "that no conclusive demonstration of the truth of theism could be obtained on any of the lines we examined" (p. 294). They will also note that no reference is made by Professor Laird in this connection to Professor A. E. Taylor's remarkable "Vindication of Theism" by a restated "cosmological argument" in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, which does not attempt to abstract altogether from "the sense" (to use Professor Taylor's own expression, *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 76) "of being immediately in the presence of the 'other-worldly' " which is the necessary presupposition of any profitable use of "cosmology" as a support of theism.

Professor Laird, in his anxiety to be rigorously exact in his scrutiny of the arguments alleged by theists who rely upon cosmology, is perhaps less than fair to those who accept as not wholly valueless considerations which they would readily admit to fall short of a "demonstration" compelling the assent even of persons prepared to deny that they have any such "sense" as that mentioned by Professor Taylor in the passage quoted above. Thus he says (p. 295): "We have to insist that the failure of a demonstration *is* a failure. It need not indicate that the searchers are getting warm." But does anyone think that it need? What one may, I submit, not unreasonably think is that there must be something in arguments which have impressed so many and some such great thinkers, although, in isolation from any specifically religious experience which calls for interpretation, they may not afford a demonstration.

The inconvenience of Professor Laird's method of leaving over for subsequent consideration aspects of religion which may belong to its essence is seen again in his brief dismissal (on p. 34) of the subject of the bearing of history on theology. "Communal metaphysics," he observes, "is as plain an ineptitude as communal physics would be. The same is true of communal theology, unless it can be shown by general argument that some church or nation is, in a peculiar sense, God's peculiar people." I entirely agree that, as Professor Laird remarks, human "affairs have little bearing upon natural theology in its usual historical sense," and in no way complain of their being in this context left out of account. But surely their relevance to religion and so ultimately to any argument claiming to prove the reality of its object is undeniable, since man's religious experience—his consciousness of the presence of a reality at once "ultimate" and "intimate"—is conditioned throughout by his nature as a

social being; and the school of Durkheim, however they may have exaggerated the importance of this fact in proportion to their recognition of his capacity to apprehend absolute truth, were not wholly astray in their suggestion that even "cosmological" conceptions which are indispensable to physical science arise originally in social contexts, though they may for the purposes of physical science, have to be eventually disentangled from those contexts.

The above observations may perhaps be taken to imply on my part a belief in what Professor Laird calls (p. 53) "a peculiar theopathic faculty" (whatever may be the precise meaning of this phrase). "Neither the sentiment of reverence," says Professor Laird, "nor what is called communion with God is evidence of the existence" of such a faculty. Reverence may, he points out, be felt towards other persons and things than God; and if (p. 54) a "personal acquaintance with the divine being not wholly dissimilar from one's "acquaintance with other men" is claimed, this need not, he suggests, require "more than the heightening of a natural power," nor could one "know that the God so revealed" was "the creator of heaven and earth." "It is doubtful," he continues, "whether we have any other means of knowing" than "the ordinary means," and "it need not be true that the knowledgeable powers we apply within nature could not apply to nature or to nature's God."

Anything like an adequate examination of the positions here stated or implied would obviously demand far more space than is now at my disposal. I will therefore content myself with three remarks, which will suffice to indicate why I do not find convincing what seems to be an attempt to show the needlessness of assuming a factor in our religious experience which cannot be reduced without remainder to non-religious elements.

In the first place, the fact that "the sentiment of reverence," the existence of which Professor Laird does not question, can be directed to objects other than God, does not prove that it is not directed to these in virtue of the presence in them of something which is precisely what we mean by "the divine" and the problem of whose objective reality is indistinguishable from that of the existence of God as the object of religious worship.

In the second place, I would refer to the admirable treatment of the similarity and dissimilarity of "social" and "religious" experience in Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* (vol. ii, pp. 380, 381), which is, I think, by no means bound up with certain peculiarities in Alexander's theism in which (as I gather from *Theism and Cosmology*, p. 74) Professor Laird finds the same difficulties as I do myself.

Thirdly, and lastly, so far from wishing to see in what I have just called the factor in our religious experience which cannot be reduced without remainder to non-religious elements something not "ordinary," still less something only to be found in exceptional persons vividly conscious of enjoying a personal communion with God, I regard it as a normal or ordinary phenomenon of human nature. (Perhaps I may be allowed to refer to a note on p. 26 of my Liverpool lectures on *Religion and Theism* with its context.)

While, as will be clear from what has already been said, I do not think that the failure of any argument to establish the existence of God *as the object of religious worship*, apart from some experience which is in principle already religious, is fatal to its claim to contribute in any way to the support of theism, it is plain that if an argument can be convicted of logical fallacy, not merely when stated in one of several alternative ways or in respect of some subsidiary reasoning which may have found favour with those who have put it forward, but in itself, it can be of no value as an argument on behalf of theism or of anything else; and everyone who is interested in the "natural theology" which has played so great a part in the history of reflection on the religious

experience of mankind must welcome the careful examination to which Professor Laird has submitted the traditional "cosmological argument" and "argument from design." It would not be treating this examination with the respect which it deserves to venture to pronounce upon it after a single reading. Its issue is, I think, intended to be a reasoned denial that either the cosmological or the teleological argument gives any real support to belief in an "over-worldly" deity, although they may be fairly allowed to suggest the possibility of a pantheism (which yet need not assert that God's immanence in the world in which we find ourselves exhausts the possibilities of his being), should other considerations be found to afford a securer basis for such a faith. But I may perhaps be allowed to point out some passages in which Professor Laird seems to me himself to fail to prove the particular point he has there in view. Thus (on p. 89) he falls foul of "totalitarian philosophers" who "claim that from the premiss "This exists" (whatever "this" may be), it is always possible to reach the Whole by a logical process," whereas "there are no known logical or causal principles according to which the toad flax on a derelict garden wall supplies sufficient data for inferring everything else that there is." But would not the existence of a single being that was not self-dependent be a sufficient premiss for the cosmological argument, if the argument turned upon nothing in the being in question which would not be common to it with every other conceivable being that was not self-dependent?

Again, he asks (on p. 96), "Would it be possible to persuade anyone that the world had a cause, although many of the effects within the world had no cause at all?" But those who believe in "free" actions do not hold them to be uncaused, but rather to reveal a cause of a kind which is precisely that to which, as the only kind which satisfies the mind as possibly ultimate, they go on to say the cause of the world must be.

Professor Laird is not alone in finding in nature less evidence of *design* than of what he calls "unidead" teleology. He makes the valuable remark that "no known organism, our own or any other, is kept alive and healthy by scheming or volition. Its deepest vital teleology is unidead" (pp. 266–7). We cannot, in fact, as we were told long ago, by taking thought add one cubit to our stature. But is it true (as suggested on p. 263) that to look on organisms as "natural machines" because they are teleological and argue that they *are* artificial is to ignore the basis of the theory thus expressed, namely that the "particulate teleology" of organisms is *not* artificial? The argument is surely that one *understands* "idead teleology," and that "unidead," to be made intelligible, must (as Kant said) be expressed in terms of the "idead." It is in keeping with what I think is Professor Laird's failure to appreciate the position of those who find "design" more intelligible than "unidead teleology," even though it may be easier (especially in face of the problem of dysteleology) to accept the latter as a fact without seeking to make it more intelligible by reference to a divine artist, that he expresses surprise at the "very anthropomorphic" statement in *Doctrine in the Church of England* that creation (in the sense of an act of the divine will) is compatible with Christian principles, while "emanation" from the divine nature is not. I cannot, however, but think that there is considerable confusion of thought in Professor Laird's suggestion that there is inconsistency between the view thus expressed and the stress laid in Christian ethics upon humility and purity of heart on the ground that these are "qualities of character that cannot be summoned at will."

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book before us is Professor Laird's discussion of certain problems, familiar to those who have given special attention to the philosophy of religion, which arise in the course of an attempt to reconcile the divine attributes of eternity and infinity which are postulated

by the "ultimacy" characteristic of religion with the temporal and spatial conditions of that experienced world which religion envisages as the manifestation or effect of the activity of a "living God" with whom we can enter into those personal relations which constitute the complementary feature of all religion which I have called "intimacy." Professor Laird is dissatisfied with what he calls "the theological view that the world proceeds from a God who does not himself proceed." He is perhaps not quite accurate in describing this view; for the word "process" is regularly used by Christian theologians in connection with their "trinitarian" doctrine of the divine nature as involving relations of mutual love. But, no doubt, they usually envisage the "eternal" process of which they speak as transcending the process of the universe in time, whereas Professor Laird would deny such transcendence to the process which he ascribes to God. It is, however, misleading to suggest that theology is committed to a belittling of "process" as in every sense unworthy of God, and it would be interesting to learn how Professor Laird would regard the conception of a God "perfect in process," "moving from perfection to perfection," which is suggested in the late Sir Henry Jones's *A Faith that Enquires*. I should be in entire agreement with Professor Laird that we cannot simply get rid of "change"; that even "the illusion of change implies the reality of *some* change" and that a "relative change" involves a real or "absolute" change somewhere (p. 146). I think, too, that even experiences such as that famous one of Augustine at Ostia described in his *Confessions* (ix, 10) occur in time, being *preceded* and *followed* by others; so that we seem to have no clue in our own experience to one wholly exempt from temporal succession. But the classical definition of God's eternity in Boethius (*interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*), although no doubt it describes something which is (as one would expect) beyond any experience of ours, does not exclude (but rather, by including the word *vita*, implies) a genuine *process*, though a process involving neither loss nor gain. What the "theologian" hesitates to attribute to God is not process or perhaps even succession as such; it is rather that which the word *possessio* seems designed to exclude; namely, the lapse of the past into not-being, and the "dead hand" which it seems to lay upon the present; the uncertainty of the future and the merely potential grade of being to which without it the present appears to be reduced.

While Professor Laird is prepared to contend that God is in time because, in his view, "the attribute of time" must be allowed to "pervade all conceivable reality," he is less sure about God being spatial. "I do not doubt," he says (though what follows shows that this is not strictly true), "that all reality is spatial. Therefore I incline towards the view that Nature is God's body, if there be a God." He admits, however, that there might be an "overworldly Supreme Being, who could not be timeless but who need not be spatial and therefore need not have any body at all" (p. 301). Thus, after all, he *does* doubt whether all reality is spatial, though he thinks it most probably is.

It appears to be true that while, as we saw, even an experience which seems to transcend time must take its place in a time series, there may be experiences (e.g. of mathematical truths) to which space appears to be irrelevant, and which can only be indirectly located through the occupation of space by the body of the experient. But there is a problem, parallel to that arising from the religious requirement that God, although "eternal," must be, if he is to be a "living God" and the Creator of the world and of ourselves, brought into relation with beings who are certainly in time, concerning the relation of such a God, supposed to be himself not spatial, to a world which is certainly in space and which is yet held to be his creation and the (or a) sphere of his activity. Professor Laird (p. 175) represents "theologians" as halting between

two opinions. "On the one hand, theologians have been reluctant to deny God's spatial omnipresence. . . . On the other hand, there has been theological repugnance to the idea that God would . . . be material" or "spatial at all." He makes no reference to any serious attempt (whether successful or no) to deal with the obvious difficulties involved in the ubiquity or omnipresence attributed to God such as that made by St. Thomas (*S.T.*, i, qu. 8); so that it might be supposed that it was left to those who, like Professor Laird, take up a critical position towards the exponents of natural theology, to point out these difficulties. Those which attend the view, which he favours, that there is, in Pope's words, "one stupendous Whole, Whose body Nature is and God the Soul," are probably reserved by him for discussion in the promised series of lectures on "Mind and Deity."

This review is already far too long; and I must content myself with calling attention to some interesting remarks on subjects of philosophical importance. Infinite divisibility and an actual infinite Professor Laird holds (I think rightly) to involve no contradiction (pp. 153, 185, 309); and he justly observes that "there may be much in the universe that is truly *sui generis*." Holding that the future is indeterminable before it occurs, and pointing out that we have no faculty whereby we can become non-inferentially acquainted with it, corresponding to our memory of what is past, he denies the possibility of foreknowledge not only to man but to God (pp. 169, 172). His leaning towards pantheism has already been mentioned. Perhaps I may be allowed to say that a remark of my own which he quotes on p. 320 was not intended and was (I hope) so expressed as to show that it was not intended to apply to all forms of pantheism.

Professor Laird seems to take pleasure in using words unknown to the editors of the *Oxford English Dictionary* or known to them only in a different sense, such as "diacosmic," "prospicience," "particulate." He is also apt to relieve the severity of philosophic argument by quips and puns: with these I have for the most part no quarrel, but I should like to convince him that there is nothing justly provocative of facetiousness in a writer on philosophy being also a dignitary of the Church, and that it is no more amusing to refer to Paley as "the good archdeacon" or to talk of Dr. Barnes's "episcopal eye" than it would be to allude to Locke as the "worthy medico," or to speak of Dr. Laird himself as lending a professorial ear to some suggestion.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

Spinoza's "Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione": A Commentary. By the late HAROLD H. JOACHIM. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. xvi + 231. Price 15s. net.)

The late Professor Joachim had been able very nearly to complete his commentary on the *Tractatus*, and, although he had intended to submit the completed work to further revision, the Provost of Oriel has unquestionably been right in advising the publication of the work as it stands. Curiously enough the incompleteness of the commentary was due to the incompleteness of the *Tractatus* itself, for the commentator was held up by the difficulty of determining how Spinoza had designed to complete his own work.

"The object of this book," we are told in the opening paragraph, "is to study some of the leading philosophical ideas in Spinoza's unfinished 'Essay on the Purification of the Intellect.' It will be concerned in the main with Spinoza's teaching in regard to knowledge and its method; in regard to

truth, supposal, doubt, and error; and in regard to the nature, powers, and limitations of the knowing mind." It is necessary to lay stress on this statement because it suggests (what is the case) that the book is not exactly a commentary in the sense in which we perhaps usually understand the word. The author is not mainly interested in the mere interpretation of the text, but much more in discussing the philosophical value and coherence of the doctrines of the *Tractatus* taken in their connection with the rest of Spinoza's philosophy. Consequently he is always ready to travel beyond the *Tractatus* and to discuss those metaphysical doctrines of the *Ethics* which he takes to underlie or to be implied in the argument of the smaller work. These discussions are indeed likely to be regarded by the student of Spinoza's philosophy as the most interesting and important parts of the book, and they make it a very valuable supplement and addition to the author's previous *Study* of the *Ethics*, since they contain, of course, his latest reflections on some of the most difficult problems there dealt with. Perhaps from the point of view of interpretation it might have been preferable to deal with the *Tractatus* apart in the first instance, and then discuss its relation to the philosophical system as finally formulated in the *Ethics*; and this course might also have been fairer to Spinoza, since, as Joachim himself warns us more than once, "the treatment of the human mind in the *TdIe* is conducted, for the most part, on an empirical and popular level" (p. 89).

The short introductory chapter is concerned with philological questions about the text and date of the *Tractatus*, its relation to the other works, etc. Chapter II first expounds the sections in which the goods that are commonly sought after are contrasted with the true good, and then the sections that deal with the four kinds or grades of knowledge. Spinoza's conclusion in these latter sections was that the best kind of knowledge is that which gives an intuitive comprehension of the essence of a thing. This conclusion gives occasion for an excursus, in which, after considering Spinoza's view about essence, Joachim discusses the difficulties involved in the notion of *Scientia Intuitiva*.

Chapter III is entitled 'Knowledge and its Method.' The first topic is the troublesome one of idea and ideatum. Here it seems to me that Joachim modernizes and becomes inaccurate. There is, he says, no *correlation* of idea and ideatum as 'of two things' but a "*two-sided identity*—a single identical term, or 'something' displaying its *concrete* singleness in a duality of aspects" (p. 55). This language seems plainly inconsistent with that of the *Tractatus*, where Peter and the true idea of Peter are said *each* to be *quid reale* and quite different from each other. Again, we are told (p. 56 n.) that "the true idea *is* the thing *qua* intelligible." But for Spinoza, surely, the thing *qua* intelligible is still the thing, and therefore *not* the idea of the thing. Joachim seems in fact to be reading back into the *Tractatus* his own interpretation of the metaphysical doctrine of the *Ethics*. With Spinoza's account here of the true idea Joachim connects the metaphysical doctrine of § 73 that "we are parts of a thinking being, so that its thoughts . . . constitute our minds" (p. 60). He is thus led into a long metaphysical excursus on the relation of modes to their attributes. The excursus, it need hardly be said, is of great interest to the student of Spinoza's philosophy, but it certainly does interrupt the exposition of the argument of the *Tractatus*.

Returning, then, to the *Tractatus*, Joachim expounds Spinoza's view (in a later passage) of truth as adequacy, and then proceeds to a criticism of his conception of method as *cognitio reflexiva* or *idea ideae*. The chief difficulty —Joachim recurs to it again and again—urged against this conception is Spinoza's insistence upon "the secondary and derivative character of reflective knowledge. There can be no *cognitio reflexiva* . . . unless there is actually

given knowledge itself—direct or primary knowledge—on which to reflect" (pp. 105–6). I confess this seems to me self-evident. But to Joachim "it seems to follow that Method can neither guide nor control the knowledge of which it is the Method." He suggests that Spinoza's doctrine of method must undergo a radical reconstruction, and sketches the lines on which he thinks the reconstruction would have to proceed. He was moved to this severity of criticism, not so much apparently by anything in the *Tractatus*, as by what is said about the *idea ideae* in the *Ethics*, and chiefly indeed by one admittedly 'obscure' sentence—an instance, surely, of the danger of interpreting the earlier by the later work.

Chapter IV deals with 'Supposal, Error, Doubt,' i.e. with the *idea ficta, falsa, dubia* respectively. It is a long chapter of mingled exposition and criticism; I must be content to indicate the main criticisms. As regards the *idea ficta* there is this dilemma: if the idea is a mere suggestion or picture, not believed in, why trouble to distinguish it from the true idea? but if it is believed in, it becomes a false idea. As regards error, Joachim thinks that there is a marked difference between the *Tractatus* and the *Ethics*, in so far as the latter does not make such a cleavage between imagination and knowledge, as the former does, but his final criticism of the view that error consists in mere privation applies to their common doctrine. A false idea, it is urged, is either not a genuine idea at all, since, being confused and defective, it is not the idea of any genuine ideatum, or, on the other hand, it cannot be simply false. As regards doubt, Joachim finds two conflicting views, one that "the mind can only doubt so far as its power of thinking is in abeyance" (p. 192), the other that doubt depends upon confused thinking; and he concludes that no coherent account of doubt can be got out of the *Tractatus*.

The main topic of the unfinished last chapter is Spinoza's view about definitions and their place in method; and the main criticism is that the view could convince only those who had already accepted his philosophy and who needed no convincing.

On p. 168 there are two unfortunate, if obvious, misprints of 'goaded' and 'guided' for 'graded.'

H. Barker.

Introduction to the History of Philosophy. By Joseph B. Burgess, M.A. (London: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 1939. Pp. xi + 631. Price 18s.)

This is a very comprehensive survey of the history of European philosophy from the early Greek period to the modern, though present-day philosophy is not treated except as regards "some implications of modern science." The method followed, in which the philosophers are set against the background of their periods, seems well conceived in view of the introductory purpose of the work. The provision at the end of each chapter of a list of questions and of "Parallel Readings" will also be helpful to students. It seems, however, unfortunate that the great majority of the books recommended are histories of philosophy and rarely—only I think in the cases of Plato and Descartes (*Discours*)—does a philosopher appear *in propria persona*. A knowledge of foreign languages need not perhaps be expected of beginners, and Spinoza and Kant may be in general too difficult. But why should not such books as Aristotle's *Ethics* or Spinoza on *The Improvement of the Understanding* be included in translation, not to speak of Berkeley's *Dialogues*, Hume's *Enquiries*, Butler's *Sermons*, etc.? Some of the questions at least could not be adequately

answered without consulting the philosophers themselves. In view of the vast field covered, it is probably inevitable that the treatment of individual thinkers should be in some cases rather cursory. The periods which appear to receive a most adequate introduction are the early Greek, the transition from mediaeval to modern philosophy, and amongst individual philosophers, Descartes and Hume, and I should add Spinoza and Kant but for one or two questionable points. As regards Plato and Aristotle, it is not to be expected that the exacting problems in relation to the interpretation of these thinkers should receive much notice.

But the existence of the most crucial issues, especially the Socratic-Platonic enigma and the significance of Aristotle's account of Plato, ought surely to be pointed out for the stimulation of the student's interest and further inquiry. There is danger lest by the authoritative exposition of the history of philosophy the reader's questioning spirit should be lulled and the paramount object of awakening his own thought neglected. One meets with such phrases as "Without entering into the problem," when the problem is just what the student ought to grapple with. It must also be observed that an account of Aristotle in which there is little or no reference to the chief problems raised in the Posterior Analytics, and only slight notice of the doctrine of Substance, whilst the Psychology is not mentioned, must be felt to be insufficient, however introductory. In the *Ethics* the principle of "Practical Reason" is not clearly recognized, and the ideal portrait of the great citizen, and the contrasting picture of the theoretic life with its all but absolute self-sufficiency, are alike passed over. If fewer pages had been devoted to the "Currents of the French Enlightenment" and to "Natural Rights and Social Change" (much the longest chapter in the volume), the student might have been given a more complete view of the teaching of the greatest philosophers.

In conclusion, attention must be drawn to a few of the most questionable expressions. With reference to Aristotle's "Unmoved Mover," we meet with "The Motive power of the Prime Mover." In Kant's argument for freedom the upshot is "that though we cannot prove by reason the actuality of freedom, we are compelled to believe in freedom through feeling." Also the greatest paradox of Kant's philosophy of freedom is blinked in the comment: "If the command is to act according to a principle, it must be assumed that it is possible likewise to act not in accordance with it." In connection with Rousseau, confusion may be caused by use of the term "group-will" for Rousseau's "*volonté générale*," since "group" suggests association, and Rousseau insists that the will of the association is not a true or general will. Again, Kant's vital distinction between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* is obscured by the employment of the word "reason" for both the activity which is concerned in the formation of judgments and the "reason" of the Dialectic, which Mr. Burgess terms "reason as a special agency." There appears to be also a serious lack of distinction between Spinoza's view of the "Mode" in its individual activity or *conatus* and as element in the whole of substance or nature, when the chief good for man is described as "ability to increase his power to preserve himself. This is derived through knowing activity which ultimately pursues genuine truth by knowing God." Finally, whilst we are not entitled to cavil at Americanisms in an American book, we may ask that the Utilitarian end should be stated in the language of the Utilitarians, and not as "the Most Pleasure for Most People." Here, moreover, the phrase may be misleading since "the most pleasure" is not identical with "the Greatest Happiness," though the Utilitarians were admittedly ambiguous about this. And the picture of "the myth-stained fingers of Thales and the early Ionians" would seem likely to mystify, without adding to the gaiety of the student.

These protests must not be taken to depreciate the author's success in presenting a clear account, calculated to interest and attract beginners of the immense sweep of philosophic thought from Thales to the present. Whilst seldom avoiding the lions in his path, he attains in his treatment of many of the problems a greater simplicity than is usually found in histories of philosophy.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

The Individual and his Society: the Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization. By ABRAM KARDINER, M.D., with a Foreword and two Ethnological Reports by Ralph Linton. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xxvii + 503. Price 22s.)

This considerable work of some five hundred pages is the fruit of a rather loose co-operation between a psychiatrist and an anthropologist, neither of them professing to be an expert in the other's subject. To the reviewer, himself an anthropologist with little theoretical and no practical acquaintance with psychoanalysis, Professor Linton, whether in his descriptive chapters or when he offers a preliminary statement of the object of their joint study, seems to be lucidity itself as compared with the main treatment. This, though full of interesting suggestion, appears to him to suffer from a certain discursiveness. Or it may be that Dr. Kardiner's efforts to determine his method, and to justify it in the eyes of other Freudians and Neo-Freudians, have to some extent interfered with its detailed application to the anthropological data; for, whether the blame lie on the method or on the insufficiency of the material provided, the results are not impressive, at least to one who merely reads, and was not present at the seminars in which these matters were originally debated.

Now, to understand human nature in its cultural aspect, not only society as a set of organized customs, but also the individual, who forms the social unit through whom and for whom the continuous life of the group is carried on, must be studied as complementary elements. The true individual, however, lies beyond the range of sociology, which is limited to externals; and, since science cannot deal with the unique, even psychology must be content to substitute a fiction in the shape of a generalized individual, no longer a genuine unit, but more or less of an item. Here psychology proposes to meet sociology half-way by concentrating on the notion of a group personality so "basic" that within a given society everyone is somehow brought to conform thereto. On this hypothetical type of social self—by no means easy to discover and characterize in the complex modern state, but all too easy to profess to recognize in the so-called simple society, with which the civilized observer is so rarely in close touch—psychoanalysis gets to work so as in approved fashion to explain it in terms of some infantile prototype. No doubt education begins early, or in other words the socializing process starts as soon as dependence on parental care and native self-will struggle for mastery of the soul emerging into consciousness. Whereas, then, Freud lays stress on biological features, Dr. Kardiner's interest in going over much the same ground is sociological as it were by anticipation. All such pioneer work is deserving of praise, and that anthropological research should at once or in the long run benefit therefrom is both desirable and not unlikely.

R. R. MARETT.

A Sacramental Universe: Being a Study in the Metaphysics of Experience. By A. A. Bowman. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1939. Pp. xxviii + 428. Price 5 dollars; 22s. 6d. net.)

Those who were fortunate enough to know the late Professor A. A. Bowman needed no literary remains to convince them of the grievous loss which Philosophy sustained by his untimely death. To those of us who had not that privilege this posthumous volume is conclusive evidence of the fact, and an impressive amplification and supplement to the two volumes of *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion* already published in 1936. The present work is tantalizingly incomplete. It falls into three parts. The first—some four-fifths of the whole, the only part more or less completed for publication by the author—was based on the first three of the course of Van Uxem lectures which he delivered at Princeton in 1934. The second part, about half the remainder, is made up out of his notes for the whole course of lectures, and the third consists of supplementary papers and discussions of topics that would have been treated less disconnectedly in the expanded work had it been brought to completion. Professor J. W. Scott has carried out his task of editor with impeccable care, bringing to it not only the zeal of personal friendship but a full understanding of the author's thought and a sympathy with his standpoint. His occasional footnotes show his keen appreciation of what might be difficulties in the text to an unwary reader.

I do not think it can be doubted that in its completed form this would have been a really great book: as it is it remains a very memorable "torso." In a day in which every sort of speculative metaphysics is in some influential quarters regarded as nonsense, and idealist metaphysics as the stalest form of nonsense, we have here a militant and challenging argument for the irreducible reality of spiritual being and for the cosmic significance of creative "spirit." It carries the war aggressively into the enemy's camp. The Logical Positivists, the nihilists of philosophy, come in for but cursory mention, but the polemic against the naturalisms of thinkers like Santayana and Whitehead, Holt and Alexander, is developed at some length with, I think, unanswerable force and cogency. But the argument is more constructive than it is critical of others. The title is indeed a misnomer of the work as it stands. Bowman had hardly begun to develop the significance of the "sacramental" idea as he interpets it; but in this the earlier work helps to fill in his argument most valuably. What we have is (as the editor has termed the first part) the "metaphysical prolegomena" to the system the author did not live to complete. It is an exposition enriched by valuable illustrations drawn from the history of philosophy ancient and modern, as well as from contemporary physical science and (this with special felicity) from the author's study of language and philology.

I cannot do better than put the kernel of his contention in his own words. It is, he says,

> "reducible, in the main, to the following four points. (1) There are grounds for conceiving the physical world as a self-contained and indefeasibly non-subjective system of functionally related particulars, many of the latter themselves physical systems. (2) There are grounds for believing in the existence of subjective systems, otherwise known as spiritual beings or persons, and for thinking of these as irreducibly non-physical in character. (3) Any attempt to qualify the duality of the spiritual and the physical . . . is fatal to an understanding of either, and is indeed apt to issue . . . in a dualism more insidious

> than that which it is designed to obviate. And (4) while nothing can detract from the ontological distinctiveness of the dual opposites, the spiritual and the physical enter into relations of a highly determinate character, from which arise certain new possibilities of being, (*a*) the forms of life, and (*b*) the various types of values . . ." (pp. 9–10).

A few points in this summary demand comment. The idea of a functionally ordered system is the author's fundamental ontological principle, to which he returns again and again. "Functional dependence upon a system—or, to express the same thought from the opposite point of view, the ontological priority of systems to their constituents—is what I take to be the principle of being in whatever form" (p. 13). This may have a familiar idealist ring, and indeed the principle of functional systems has affinities with the "concrete universal," though used less as a logical than as a cosmological principle. He insists upon the irresolvable duality of the spiritual and the physical, but he is equally clear that there must be no irresolvable duality between Being and Becoming, timeless essence and temporal event. Philosophies like those of Santayana and Whitehead, recognizing such a duality with their "essences" and "eternal objects," leave us with a world of unique, unrecognizable events which come to be but strictly never *are*, and, contrasted with these, objects which strictly are and never come to be. And he finds a clue to the fallacy in a false view of identity which seeks to polarize pure otherness assigned to events and pure sameness assigned to objects. Inevitably again we are reminded of the constant polemic of Bradley and Bosanquet a generation ago against an interpretation of identity which excludes difference.

The name of Bosanquet recalls the Gifford lectures on Individuality and Value delivered in 1910–11. Those two impressive volumes revealed startlingly how far Absolute Idealism could go in concessions to naturalism, determinism, and materialism. "The teleology of the Finite Consciousness" became a "sub-form" (and a not very important form) of Individuality, and by the time the reader began the second volume upon "The Value and Destiny of the Individual," he may well have come to feel that the individual Self had not much value in the scheme of things and no destiny worth mentioning. Bowman's Idealism (the word must surely be used, though he avoids it for understandable reasons) is of a very different orientation. One might call it a Personal Idealism if that term had not already been bespoke. It will give no quarter to any theory which represents mind as in any sense epiphenomenal to matter, as a supervening quality in a constellation of spatio-temporal events, or consciousness as virtually identical with its objects. "Subject-existence" is substantial and, so to speak, three-dimensional. We have been too ready to assume an exact correlation between the subject and the object. But the correlation is not equal. We have the experience of *being a subject*, and that is something more than the experience of *having an object*. The significance of "subjective systems," which in their higher manifestations are "selves" or "souls" is not to be blurred away by any theory of "neutral" entities mitigating the essential difference between mind and matter.

This defence of the ultimacy of spiritual being is carried out with remarkable penetration and thoroughness. I have neither space nor wish nor ability to offer criticisms. One would like to call special attention to special topics discussed, e.g. that of Value, in which the fundamental contrast between this philosophy and naturalism is rendered the more striking because of the points of resemblance between its account of value and that in e.g. *Space, Time, and Deity*.

In what was to be his last profession of philosophical belief, William James

noted that the notice of the soul which "so freely used by common men . . . has no prestige in the eyes of critical thinkers" might regain a place in philosophy some day, but only "when some one has found in the term a pragmatic significance that has hitherto eluded observation. When that champion speaks, as he well may speak some day, it will be time to consider souls more seriously" (*A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 210–11). It seems to me that Bowman in this book, a generation later, has amply fulfilled that prediction. His book is a vindication of the metaphysical indispensability of the principle of the soul.

JOHN W. HARVEY.

The Deeper Causes of the War and its Issues. By various authors. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 206. Price 5s.)

There is general agreement that whatever may be the approximate causes of the conflict which is raging in Europe, it is in the world of thought that we must look for its origins and ultimately its cure. To explore these is the proper object of the Institute of Philosophy, and the volume on *The Deeper Causes of the War*, to which eight of its most distinguished members have contributed, is a timely aid to reflection and understanding. The more timely because, while shirking none of the philosophical issues, the writers eschew technical language and appeal in a simple and persuasive way to the common intelligence.

The background common to all these writers is the profound disturbance of the ways of thought and life in the modern world. Nothing in previous history is at all comparable to the revolution in material and moral conditions wrought in a few recent generations by the advance of science with its characteristic products, steam and electricity. The enormous and rapid increase of population in Europe following on new methods of production, the problems of *lebensraum*, so skilfully analysed by Professor Barker in his chapter; the challenge thrown by science to traditional beliefs, the search for new values as the old became uncertain, the inadequacy of the old political forms to the new conditions—all this has had somehow to be assimilated and digested in a period not much more than twice the span of a man's life. Never in the world's history has so much new wine been poured into old bottles as in the last hundred and sixty years. There is no reason to despair if the brain of man has for the time being proved unequal to the strain put upon it. The period has been one of construction as well as of destruction, and if the two things are at present in a precarious balance the outcome may yet be a great rally of the constructive forces. We have lost the complacent belief of the nineteenth century that progress would be a steady and orderly process, and have learnt that any given generation may be called upon to fight to the death for it.

Out of the welter of conflicting thoughts and feelings two contrasted ideas of human society have finally projected themselves, one that of supposed superior races claiming dominance in virtue of a natural law alleged to be above the common ideas of right and wrong acknowledged by individuals in their dealings with one another; the other that of an international comity, seeking the life of peace in conformity with law and justice, as these words are ordinarily understood. This contrast is the theme of most of these essays. Dr. Gilbert Murray finds it in the two conceptions of the herd as destructive and protective, and is supported by Sir Richard Gregory in his chapter on "Science and Humane Values." Lord Samuel finds it in the homelier doctrine of the wheat and the tares, and brings us back to the timely reminder that as men sow, individually or collectively, so shall they reap. Sir Richard Livingstone sees in the new gospel a breakaway from the Graeco-Christian tradition

which for so many centuries ruled Europe, and a recrudescence of the barbarism which Christianity and Greece did so much to tame.

It is the merit of these essays that they face the formidable nature of this new gospel and do justice to the zeal and loyalty—however misplaced—of some of those who have embraced it. It is a portentous fact that the negation of what the world has hitherto regarded as right and wrong should have acquired the status of a religion and have been backed by a body of dogma provided by philosophers. The part played by Hegel in this has been exhaustively discussed in recent numbers of *Philosophy*, and I will only repeat briefly that when Hegel declared the Prince of Machiavelli to be "the great and true conception of a real political genius with the highest and noblest intentions" he pronounced the decree of divorce between the public and the private morality which Hitler and the Nazis are now carrying to its logical and terrifying conclusion. Their final audacity was to provide their doctrine with a Church, a "German Christian" Church, in which Christianity is de-Christianized to bring it into conformity with the principles of Machiavelli, reinforced with the new doctrine of blood and race.

This brings us to one of the fundamental issues of the present time. When the law of the jungle, as we think it to be, has acquired this spiritual and philosophical status, and is being preached as a religion to millions of ardent young men, can we on our side be mere spectators while so many clever people, young and old, are grubbing away at our own foundations of belief. In their different ways nearly all the essayists come back to this question—Professor Adams, Sir Richard Livingstone, Sir Richard Gregory, no less than the Dean of St. Paul's. To clear "the paths to Deity" and break down "the barriers between God and man" is a purpose which Lord Samuel with his pragmatist philosophy shares with the Orthodox theologian. Burke, after visiting Paris in 1773, broke out against the "petulant, assuming, short-sighted coxcombs of philosophy who imagine that they have discovered the secrets of the standing and falling of States," and a very different man, Rousseau, had used much the same language a few years earlier about the "vain and futile declaimers who go forth on all sides armed with their fatal paradoxes to sap the foundations of our faith and nullify virtue." The essayists in this volume are more restrained in their language, but they bring vividly before us the dangers of the merely destructive criticism that creates a vacuum and does nothing to fill it. The house swept and garnished is but a bleak dwelling-place until it is refurnished. We have no need, like Hitler, to invent a ready-made religion to suit our view of life. But to be aware of the dangers of the vacuum and make an effort to fill it is a very positive duty in these times.

There is undoubtedly a philosophy behind the idea of "Federal Union" expounded by Sir William Beveridge in his contribution to this book, but here it is the practical politician rather than the philosopher who must judge. To what has been written about science I would add that one of the subtlest but most far-reaching revolutions it has effected in thought is its extension of the time-scale. A hundred years ago the immense majority thought of human life and history as a long-drawn-out drama in a world that was very old; now, science bids us look forward to millions of years in which the earth will probably still be habitable. This new perspective suggests some sobering thoughts, of which by no means the least is that theorists and ideologues should take a modest view of their capacity to forecast the political or economic future from the brief period of six thousand years which is all that is covered in recorded history. We may draw some encouragement in these evil times from the thought that humanity is still in an infantile stage, but there never was a time when religion and philosophy had a clearer duty to assert their values against all tendencies that would sink or dwarf them in the temporal scale.

J. A. SPENDER.

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XVIII. *Hume and Present-day Problems*; the symposia read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society, the Scots Philosophical Club, and the Mind Association at Edinburgh, July 7–10, 1939. (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1939. Pp. xxxiv + 228. Price 15s. net.)

Since the year 1939 was the bicentenary of Hume's *Treatise*, it was fitting that the Annual Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association (joined on this occasion by the Scots Philosophical Club) should be held last July at Edinburgh; and the title of this volume, *Hume and Present-day Problems*, corresponds reasonably well with the nature of the contents. As to its merits, one need only say that it does not fall below the high standard set by its predecessors. Many very different points of view and methods of philosophising are represented. The Historian of Philosophy, the Epistemologist, the Philosophical Psychologist, the Moralist, the Theologian, and even the old-fashioned Speculative Metaphysician—each of those will find something to interest him. (Only the Formal Logician is left out in the cold.) But this very variety sets the reviewer an almost impossible task. An adequate review would require a whole number of *Philosophy*. I can only offer a brief summary of the main points raised, with a few comments here and there.

In the Inaugural Address, "Hume, 1739–1939," Professor N. Kemp Smith is concerned to defend Hume against the charge that "regard for truth formed no part of his character" (the words are J. S. Mill's). He has been accused of caring for nothing but literary fame; indeed, he himself confessed that this was his ruling passion. When the *Treatise*, his greatest work, failed to bring him the success he had hoped for, he did his best to consign it to oblivion; he re-modelled and popularized his theory of knowledge in the *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, omitting some of his most characteristic and most shocking doctrines; finally, he deserted philosophy altogether, and devoted himself entirely to historical and political studies. Professor Kemp Smith's reply is that the omissions and compressions which offend us in the *Inquiries* were the result of honest self-criticism, as the Appendix to the *Treatise* already suggests. Even in the *Treatise* itself, Hume's central interests were moral and political rather than epistemological. Critics, from Reid onwards, have assumed that Hume is merely the consistent follower of Locke and Berkeley. According to Professor Kemp Smith, this is a mistake. Two other influences were equally important: first, the "mechanistic" influence derived from Newton—Association was to do the same work in the mental world as gravitation did in the physical—and, secondly, the "biological" influence of Hutcheson, with its emphasis on feeling and instinct. The explanation of the difference between the *Treatise* and the *Inquiries* is that in the interval the Hutchesonian influence grow stronger and stronger, while the difficulties of the Associationist or Newtonian view become more and more obvious. (We may compare Professor G. della Volpe's description of Hume's philosophy as a "dogmatism of feeling"—*dommatismo del sentimento*.) Finally, when we ask why Hume deserted Philosophy for History and Political Theory, we are asking the wrong question. We ought rather to ask why he spent ten years of his life on Philosophy, since Philosophy for him was merely the prolegomena to History and Politics.

The Inaugural Address is followed by four Symposia. The first by Professor J. N. Wright and Dr. C. A. Mace, is on "Self-identity." Professor Wright defends the existence and knowability of mental acts (but why does he say that our awareness of them is a form of thinking?); maintains that all con-

sciousness is consciousness "of" something, and that there are no intransitive, objectless experiences; and concludes that the self is a persistent particular, on the ground that no "serial" theory of the self can give an adequate account of memory. Dr. Mace, in an exceedingly interesting and ingenious paper, agrees with Professor Wright that Hume's introspection was at fault. Introspection, he says, reveals not merely impression and images, but also something which perceives them. But this something is not unanalysable. It is analysable in terms of organic sensation. A "mental act," for example an act of attention, is a name for the fact that "a change in the visual or auditory field is brought about by some 'bodily adjustment' experienced as a change in the somatic complex" (p. 41). In this connection, Dr. Mace develops the view suggested by Professor Broad that "coming to be sensed" is equivalent to "coming into a relation of direct simultaneity with the complex of somatic sensa." This paper seems to me to be the best statement of the "somato-centric" theory of the self which I have met with. But I would add that Dr. Mace says nothing at all about *thinking*, nor about the emotions and conations into which thinking enters as an element. I confess to a suspicion that the somato-centric theory, though it applies well enough to such elementary mental acts as sensing and imaging, would be gravely embarrassed when it came to deal with higher mental processes, such as inference or deliberation or choice.

The title of the second Symposium is "Are there a priori concepts?" Mr. D. M. Mackinnon, in a brief opening paper, formulates the problem thus: "Either some form of non-sensuous intuition must be admitted, or else the common-sense conceptual picture of the world must be relegated to the status of a notational device" (p. 54). Mr. W. G. Maclagan, who follows, accepts the first alternative. Even the resemblance between two simultaneously seen colours is according to him non-sensuously intuited. The concept of resemblance is indeed abstracted from *particular* resemblances; those particular resemblances, however, are not sensed, but intuited on the occasion of sensing. Having taken this plunge, he naturally maintains a similar view about ideal-limit concepts such as straightness, about normative concepts such as rightness, and about categorial concepts such as causality. But in the last two cases he suggests that the instances are presented to us in a "dim" or "out-of-focus" manner. Unfortunately he does not tell us enough about this queer mode of consciousness, which is dim and yet gives fundamentally important information, non-sensuous yet occasioned by sensing. Mr. J. L. Austin concludes the discussion with an exceedingly acute but almost entirely unconstructive paper. He professes not to know what is meant by the question set for discussion. He points out that the traditional language of "concepts," and likewise of "universals," has led philosophers into all sorts of muddles. They were misled by the naïve principle "one word, one thing" (*unum nomen unum nominatum*), and concluded that since there are general words, there must be general *things* for them to correspond to. But, he asks, may not words be by nature general? May it not be the whole function of a word to denote many particulars? (If so, I suppose philosophers have been barking up the wrong tree. They ought rather to have asked, "Why are some words apparently singular?"—e.g. proper names or demonstratives.) Further, even though we allow the language of concepts, it is misleading to ask whether we *possess* such and such a concept, or how we acquired it; as if it were a piece of property, like a gold watch. The question we ought to ask is "Does So and So know how to use such and such a *word* (e.g. the word "straight" or "cause") and how did he come to know how to do so?" Now very likely this reformulation of the question is an improve-

ment (though I do not think that our predecessors were *quite* so muddled as Mr. Austin suggests). But unfortunately Mr. Austin is content to reformulate it; he does not offer any answer.

I must deal more briefly with the last two Symposia. In the third, "The Moral Good as a relation between persons," Mr. I. A. Phillips maintains that "the good by reference to which conduct is morally judged" is a relation of community or sodality. However, this good is not to be conceived as an *end*; it is something "achieved in the very act, and not a remote object of action" (p. 115 *fn.*). Moreover, it can only be achieved in the course of doing something else, e.g. buying or selling or talking. Professor A. Macbeath, who follows, criticizes this thesis from the Self-Realisationist point of view; while Professor Hallett, the third contributor, supports it, but with an entirely new set of arguments, of a purely metaphysical kind. He holds that an empirical moralist can make no sense of *action*, the fundamental notion of ethics. Action belongs to the world of things-in-themselves, which are super-temporal. All action is in the present, "which is not a moment of time but an influx of eternity" (p. 146); while "from the standpoint of eternity," action "is an efflux that generates time" (p. 147). Moreover, *all* things-in-themselves—and not merely those which appear as human organisms—are agents: and we must co-operate with all of them, in different degrees and manners.

The last Symposium is on "The present-day relevance of *Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*." Professor A. E. Taylor, who begins, confesses that he has no high opinion of the *Dialogues*. He finds them "lacking in high seriousness and logical cogency"; and on both counts he has some very severe things to say. In the constructive part of his paper, he tries to extend the scope of the Argument from Design (the main theme of the *Dialogues*), laying particular stress on the epistemological form of it, which starts from the apparent adaptation of Physical Nature to the human intelligence: though even so, he thinks that the Argument will not give the Theist all he wants. Professor J. Laird, who follows, points out that the Theology examined in the *Dialogues* is Deistic rather than Theistic. He suggests that a cautious modern Deist would do well to stop at the intelligible order of the world itself—without saying that this order must have been *put* there by some exterior Being. Such a theory "might lead to *τό θεῖον* rather than to *ὁ θεός*; but the gain might be greater than the loss" (p. 216). Finally, Professor T. E. Jessop doubts whether the *Dialogues* have *any* present-day relevance. They have "the eighteenth century written all over them." Apart from this, he finds that they are marked by two capital defects: (1) Hume's assumption that existential propositions can only be established by *a posteriori* arguments; (2) Hume's "spectator-attitude"—the fact that "he omits from his picture of the world his own ability to draw that picture."

H. H. Price.

Our Human Truths. By the late F. C. S. Schiller. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. Pp. x + 371. Price 15s. 6d.)

This is a collection of the late Dr. Schiller's last writings. It consists of twenty-seven papers, all previously published except, perhaps, two library lectures in California which are not stated to have been published. The earliest of the papers has the date 1953. Five of them deal with politics and world

affairs, a major interest of the author of *Cassandra* in the "To-day and To-morrow" series. The rest are philosophical, for there is much more of philosophy than of literary criticism in the quartette that the editor, Dr. Schiller's widow, has chosen to call by the latter name. In his last years Schiller resided principally in California, and nine of the papers were published in *The Personalist*, Dr. Flewelling's journal in Los Angeles. Most of the papers were written for an American public, but two were for *The Hibbert Journal*, three for *Mind*, and two were contributions to International Congresses at Prague and at Paris.

The volume, of course, is interesting; for all that Schiller wrote was interesting, lucid, stylistically unpretentious, and very readable. He was often witty—"the paregorical imperative," "to cherish animosity towards pure mathematics is about as impossible as to show disrespect towards the equator." Sometimes, however, the joke is only a jingle, e.g. "spells were a part of spelling, and glamour was the efficacious part of grammar." Yet frequently he was wise.

In his last years Schiller kept pace with recent developments He had, for instance, several talks with "Polyanna," *alias* Logistical Positivism; but his best work, and nearly all his strenuous thinking, had been done many years before. In substance he was content to repeat the conclusions of earlier (sometimes famous) books with a minimum of adaptation to circumstances. This he always did gracefully. To those who agree with him, and to the much larger company of those who are ready to learn from him (as all should be prepared to do), the present volume will be valuable principally for its indications of what seemed to him to be central because he recurred to it so often. There are more than the inevitable number of repetitions in the present book, and that may be almost tedious even when the repetitions are singly felicitous. But the blemish can be discounted.

Those, and they are many, who think of Schiller with real affection will have warmer reasons for welcoming this book. It will not add to his reputation, for it adds nothing to his life's work. But he never let himself down, and there was no misdirected piety in the publication of the book.

JOHN LAIRD.

Books received also:—

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A. Robson. *Human Nature.* Adyar, Madras: and London: Theosophical Publishing House. 1940. Pp. xiii + 352. 5s. 9d., Rs. 3.12.

P. McLaughlin. *The Necessity of Worship.* London: Dacre Press. (*Signposts* series.) 1940. Pp. 118. 1s.

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CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

I know that resentment is not a philosophical emotion, but I am compelled to express the feeling of indignation with which I read Professor Ritchie's article on the "Ethics of Pacificism" (or, as he calls it, "Pacifism"). He sums up by saying that the case for being prepared to fight depends on political expediency, while the pacificist's case rests on the moral ideal. I write as the father of a young man who was killed at Dunkirk, and who was not unacquainted with philosophy. I know what motives actuated him, because his mind was disclosed to me. The question of political expediency had no place in them. There was a growing indignation against the wrongs which were being committed with a high hand, culminating in a decision that anyone who could do anything to stop them and refrained was a contemptible coward. That boy died for justice as he saw it. I believe that this motive is not only the most widespread but also the most respectable. "Indignation against successful vice," Butler told us, is a necessary element in the good life, and here he was only repeating what Aristotle had said about *νέμεσις*. This transcends political expediency. I am willing to believe that some pacificists are honestly following the moral ideal as they see it, but I am not prepared to agree that men who stay in safety while the cause of freedom is at stake are on a higher moral plane than those who have given their lives that others may be free. I thought that perhaps Professor Ritchie equated justice and political expediency, but a reference to his article shows that he does not. I am therefore at a loss to understand his conclusion, unless he does not regard justice as a part of the moral ideal. Do I do well to be angry? I think I do—it is the expression of indignation against successful vice.

W. R. Matthews.

The Deanery, St. Paul's, E.C.4.
June 27, 1940.

INSTITUTE NOTES

The Annual Meeting of the Institute was held on July 16th, when the Report of the Council and Statement of Accounts were presented and adopted.

It will be clear to Members that the exceptional conditions created by the war make it impossible to arrange for public meetings at present. Should it become possible to organize any special courses of lectures in the daytime, during the Session, an announcement will be made in due course.

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